In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape. — ucarr

Fine. Then we're talking past each other because I'm not exploring nonexistence of concepts.

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws.

None of those exist under E2. Concepts of them do, but a concept of say mass does not have mass.
None of those have objective meaning since they are all but properties of objects in our universe,. So I don't see how you're going to build an argument for EPP under E1 using these empirical notions.

My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.

Your premise seems to presume that only 'material' things have objective existence, which confines them to our universe or one very much like it, pretty much an E4 definition. What if your premise is wrong? I mean, 14 is even (a predicate) and yet 14 is not material, so it doesn't exist by your premise. That seems to be a counterexample to your premise. And remember, I'm talking about 14 and not the concept of 14, the latter of which does not have the listed predicate.
14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time.

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates.

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.

event A is measured by event B if the state of event B is in any way a function of the state at event A. This is a definition of 'measure' as used by E5. My paragraphs were meant as examples illustrating how it worked.

Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2.

The stipulation is logical. The topic is about mind independent existence, and E2 is by definition mind dependent existence. I'm not saying it's wrong, it's just not mind independent.

Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology.

When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics.

Not sure if physics defines Pegasus. That specific creature is, after all, in violation of our physics. Physics does allow a winged thing that in a reasonable way otherwise resembles a horse, so I'll accept the comment.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

I don't understand almost any of that, but in the end you draw a distinction between something observable or not. Not sure how Pegasus can not be observable since it, being a life form, is an observer, whether it exists or not.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else. — ucarr

False, since Baker St is present in London, no mere abstraction. The example shows its nonexistence in a chosen domain, and yet still having predication. This is a counterexample to EPP for existence in a domain.

E1"Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" says there is no objective reality of things not embedded within existence defined by E1.

This seems to say that there cannot be more than one objective reality, or one OR embedded within another. With that I can agree, but tell me if I parsed it wrong, because it's obfuscated wording.

Moreover, as you say, if you try to exclude Sherlock Holmes from E1, you get a contradiction forbidding that exclusion. For Sherlock Holmes, or anything else, to exist, it must be part of E1.

Nothing is 'part of E1'. E1 is a definition. So anything that exists is part of objective reality (OR), by definition. If Sherlock Holmes is not part of OR (and I had presumed this), then I see no contradiction still. X exists. Y does not. I see no contradiction in some things being part of OR and other things not.
The only rule seems to be that if X and Y interact, they must have similar ontology. I can interact with ghosts only if ghosts are real or if I'm not real.
Anyway, you said 'get a contradiction from excluding Holmes from OR. Please spell out that contradiction since I do not see one. It is asserted, but in no way demonstrated.

Causal relationships are not temporal.

By definition they very much are.

When your parents conceived you, they became cause to your effect, and not a moment before.

I was talking about the E5 definition, and this isn't true under E5. They are not the cause to my effect until my effect measures them, and that doesn't happen for over half a century after said conception event. E5 is not a standard ontology definition. Rovelli is the only one that got close to its wording.

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me. — ucarr

I didn't say it was. I said that under E5 definition, its existence relative to you is due to your measurement of it. That measurement has zero to do with epistemology. Rocks measure things in this sense just as much as a biological system. E5 is a completely mind independent definition.

The inconceivability of universe without spacetime supports emergence.

Wow, I have no trouble conceiving of a universe without spacetime.

The link you provide does not provide links to philosophical references regarding the term "determinism." — javra

The SEP article on the subject is the best I can do, and it opens with using #1 as its definition, and touching on some of the others.

I got into philosophy precisely due to the lack of any articles from people that know their physics. So I learned the physics myself and payed little attention to any philosopher that wasn't aware of physics up to about a century ago.

What is 'biological determinism'? Sounds like biological things operate deterministically, but robots don't.

Maybe I should have specified "as pertains to the concept of free will as context".

All of them pertain.

(with full libertarian free will on #6) — noAxioms

How on earth do you rationally justify this claim? If omniscient X knows all that they will choose in the future (entailed by their omniscience) they can't have libertarian free will on account of all their future choices already being pre-established. No?

If you read my linked post, I ask exactly that. You have to ask those that assert the omniscient god also granting us (and only us) free will. There are articles about this one since the contradiction is so obvious. They wave hands almost as hard as the people trying to rationalize the Millennium Falcon being so fast that it "made the Kessel Run in less than twelve parsecs" which is a unit of distance, not time.

and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability. — noAxioms
Irrelevant to the issue of causal inevitability, which it does entail.

Sort of. If the initial state is far enough back, you choose both vanilla and chocolate. You do otherwise. Both are causally inevitable.

As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. — noAxioms
How is this in any way relevant?

It (along with double slit) are flagships of hard determinism vs randomness. The former says that the decay will happen at time X. Quantum theory gives only probabilities of when it will decay (a half life). Most interpretations consider such decay to be totally uncaused, just like where the photon gets detected after passing through the double slits.

but #1 does not entail this inevitability — noAxioms
How do you figure that?

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. It stands opposed to supernaturalism (dualism) where this is not the case. Most modern incompatibilist proponents of free will presume dualism. Anyway, naturalism does not necessarily imply inevitability. As I said, quantum theory (very much part of naturalism) is empirically probabilistic.

If a decision is based on a reason, then that decision is not free. — MoK

By this definition, any free choice is irrational.

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing? — javra

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience

Of these, 2,4,5,6 can probably be pitched as entailing causal inevitability (with full libertarian free will on #6), but #1 does not entail this inevitability, and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability.

Decision making probably falls under class 5 for the short term.
As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. This is phenomenally inevitable only under 2,4,6

When Achilles runs the one yard, the tortoise is a tenth-of-a-yard ahead. And so on, without end. — Nemo2124

Without end? Sure, it's an infinite series, but it ends when Achilles has run 111 1/9 yards. That's a finite time and a finite distance, simply expressed as a limit of an infinite series. So where is the paradox identified.

There's all sorts of interesting ways to make it more fun, really giving Zeno's argument a run for its money.
You have a FIFO queue, a pipeline of sorts. At 1 second, you put in numbered balls 1 & 2, and take out the next ball, which is '1'. The next half second, you put in 3 & 4 and take out the 2. Each iteration puts in two balls and takes out 1. They're numbered and put in and taken out in order. After the series completes in 2 seconds, how many balls are in the queue? Answer: None since there is no ball that doesn't have a defined time at which it was inserted and another time at which it was removed.

Precisely, by mathematical summation the series gives unity, but in practice - physically - it's impossible. — Nemo2124

The physical has not been shown to be any different than the mathematical model in this scenario, especially since it's a mathematical mind-experiment, not a physical one.

We ought to remove those points, those beginnings and ends, from the representation of the movement of the thing itself — Metaphysician Undercover

The two are admittedly modeled as points, which works if you consider say their centers of gravity or their most-forward point. But by your assertion, do you mean that the tortoise is never at these intermediate points, only, the regions between?

I don't think that Achilles can ever reach the tortoise, unless it reaches some sort of Planckian limit in distance and suddenly quantum leaps to become 'the winner' — Nemo2124

You think that space being continuous is disproven by this story then. Quantum theory AFAIK has never suggested quantizing spacetime.

By relativity theory, an object is always moving, and cannot actually be at a fixed position. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry to find a nit in everything, even stuff irrelevant to the OP, but relativity theory doesn't say this. In the frame of Earth, Earth is stationary. There's noting invalid about this frame.

Zeno's paradoxes when interpreted mathematically, pose fundamental questions concerning the relationship between mathematics and logic, and in particular the question as to the logical foundation of calculus. — sime

:100:

How can nature have anything infinite within it? — Gregory

I don't see why it would be a problem. For instance, there doesn't seem to be a bound to space or time, making both infinite. Nothing stops working due to that model.

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. — ucarr

You are incapable of setting EPP aside then, are you?: You are then incapable of defending it since you cannot drive the lack of it to contradiction without being able to conceive of the lack of it.

Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense.

Depends on your definition of 'exists', something you refuse to specify despite it seemingly changing from one statement to the next.. I've gone through all six, and it indeed makes no sense for some of them, and plenty of sense for others.

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem.

I don't see how mass conservation allows a generalization to E1. If you mean Pegasus cannot just pop into our universe without being built by existing mass, then I agree, but nobody is claiming that. E1 has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws. E4 might apply to that, but Pegasus can easily have wings while not having E4 existence by simply being in another universe.

Zero does not equal non-existence
...
In a similar manner, zero as a factor erases value including presence altogether.

Make up your mind...

in base 10

All bases are base 10, but they're not all base ten. Sorry, I digress, but I totally didn't see any point to the number base comment.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar.

I don't see the relevance of this. Pegasus has two wings. Not contradictory. There are zero instances of an existing Pegasus, thus there are zero times 2 existing Pegasus-wings. None of this is contradictory until you drag EPP into it.

Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible.

So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again.

That is beyond the scope of my critique: I am merely pointing out to flannel jesus that it is not a valid rejoinder to libertarianism to stipulate one will will the same (and thusly the change in causality is from some other source if the causality is different at all the second or third time we rewind the clock). — Bob Ross

It is valid. The phrase 'rewind time' should never have been used. Free will is often described as 'could have done otherwise' and not 'would do otherwise if given the chance again'. To assert that one's will is not the same after the rewind is to assert that one has two different states of mind at that one time, not that the same physical scenario is presented to you in succession, just as going back to a saved state in a video game.

They tend to believe in a soul or immaterial mind and that reality has top-down causality to some extent; which would not be random: e.g., things ordering themselves in correspondence with an idea is not random at all. The idea is that the higher-ontological things have some sway over what exists at the lower-ontological things. — Bob Ross

Why have I never seen such a libertarian describe how/where in any way these 'higher-ontological things' exert any sway at all over something 'lower'? Where is the primitive in the lower part (the part accessible to empirical analysis) that is in any way sensitive to something other than physical cause?

so are you or are you not also rewinding the will when your rewind the physical? — flannel jesus

No, the description seems to rewind only the physical part of the state, not all of it, thus sidestepping the argument in the OP paper. It's two different initial conditions, so of course they're likely to evolve differently.

I was saying that willing, under some forms of libertarianism,generates new causality that originates from the will and the willing may differ even if the physical causality differs — Bob Ross

How does the bold part even work. Why would new causality being generated be any advantage at all? Suppose one uses this kind of free will to cross a busy street. Generating new causality seems to be pure randomness, as opposed to actually looking and using the state of the cars as the primary cause of your decision as to when to cross.

1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said. — noAxioms
No. You did say, "the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist."
...
You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. — ucarr

But I didn't say that it also existed. That's the part that would have made it paradoxical.

You've been talking this way throughout this conversation. My sentential logic translation of your words quoted above makes clear the element of paradox in your explanation of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I suspect you embrace Meinong's rejection of EPP.

I had explicitly not posited EPP in my example. This does not mean I embrace anything, it means I am testing it. I am trying to have it driven to contradiction, but I've not seen that done yet.

You say, "Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction." I'm unsure about the purity of the truth content of your claim.

There are alternate theories where time is absolute, sure. Aether theories come to mind, but then all talk of spacetime is discarded.

If I'm in Cincinnati, I know I'm simultaneously in Ohio.

So you are. It's simultaneity at a distance that is abstract. I stand clarified.

Is EPP your language denoting Sartre’s “Existence Precedes Essence”?

No. I suppose I would abbreviate that as EPE.

Anyone can show non-existent winged Pegasus is a contradiction by establishing the definition of attribute:

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something: flexibility and mobility are the key attributes of our army. – The Apple Dictionary

I think it likely the cited definition of “attribute” assumes EPP based on its use of the preposition “of.” — ucarr

No leverage of EPP is there. 'of' refers to Pegasus in our example. None of your cited definitions make mention of the object of predication necessarily existing.
Besides, it's a definition, and language usage is not proof of anything.

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter.

I don't think Pegasus requires creation from nothing. Also, the reference to the necessity of matter makes this an E4 reference (part of a domain), not E1, and I already gave a solid example of something nonexistent having predicates. So I don't see the relevance of any of your 'conservation laws' at all.

At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms:

I don't even know what 'eternal matter' is. There was no matter shortly after the big bang, so if you think there's relevance to there not being a time when there wasn't matter, you'd be wrong. There will be none left after heat death either.

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy?

Apparently not since Meinong would say that a square with a predicate of being round absists, but does not exist in any way.

Compatibilism is a related interesting side topic. I'm not even completely sure that, when I'm talking about compatibilism, what I mean when I say "free will" is the right thing to call "free will", but that's all a complete aside to the argument here, which is all about incompatibilist free will (or at least that's how I define libertarian free will). — flannel jesus

Thing is, the argument linked in the OP also works against compatibilism, but only if free will is defined the same way. A compatibilist cannot claim 'could have done otherwise', so his (your) definition of free will is one that necessarily is immune to the sort of argument put forth in that paper.

I'm all about that as well. I don't get all enamored over the free will concept, so I have no drive to define it in a way that pleases me. The typical definition sounds horrible and would not be something I'd want.
But if I did need to assert I had it, I'd define it in a sort of compatibilist way even if I don't think the kinds of determinism that are relevant are the case.

My definition then? How about "the think doing the choosing is getting what it wants". That works, and means I lack the free will to fly like superman. Physics really does constrain my choices, more evidence against idealism where physics does not so constrain you.

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field — ucarr

I made no mention of any existence within a language field. Your comment used words that implied usage of 'existing' within the domain of time, as opposed to your usual domain of perception, and I was noting that. I need to do this since you've been very inconsistent and unclear with your usage of the word. There are no axioms being leveraged.

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds.

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception.

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)
Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events.

I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind. — ucarr

Yes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric.

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours.

Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless.

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? — ucarr

I am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there.

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

'Ontic' means existence, so it seems contradictory to refer to ontic status independent of existence. But while 'ontic' refers to what is, it isn't confined to just one definition of what is, E1-E6+.

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication? — ucarr

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived.
How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5.
So E1 is the problem. Sherlock Holmes presumably doesn't objectively exist and yet he wears a trench coat. I cannot say he just exists in some other domain, since that would violate E1. So trick is to drive that premise to contradiction without leveraging EPP.

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality. — ucarr

For the most part, I am willing to accept this. The measurement event and the wave function of its entire causal past (a subset of its past light cone given a presumption of locality) can be thought of as expressions of the same thing, neither being prior to the other. But all past events (the causes) are temporally prior. I was caused in part by my parents long ago, thus my parents then exist in relation to me now and not v-v.

The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Under E5 it's existence relative to you is by definition caused by you. Without you, there'd be no ball relative to you.
Its existence relative to you just has nothing to do with the event of your learning about it. It has been part of your causal past long before that.

Spacetime means space and time are connected. — ucarr

Yes. Spacetime is part of the universe, not something in which the universe is contained.

Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically.

Both wrong. Time isn't something that elapses under the spacetime model. It is a dimension. Due to deformation of otherwise flat spacetime, timelike worldlines between two events are shorter along paths near mass. Coordinate time dilation (an abstract coordinate effect, not a physical one like gravitational effects) is not a function of acceleration.

The universe has an age.

This statement presumes the universe is is something contained by time. If so, you discard the spacetime model, but adopt an nonstandard model where it is meaningful to say the universe-object-with-age exists (E4, existing in some larger container universe)

Yes, the argument still holds given the dualistic model. It just extends what currently is known as 'naturalism. Either way, Bob1 & Bob2 are only going to 'do otherwise' due to differences not in the Bobs. Under 'hard' determinism (I counted 5 other kinds), it is not possible for the Bobs to choose differently. Funny that they can under the other five.

Free will, as typically defined, sounds dreadful, like responsibility for choices only exists if there's randomness or demonic possession at work instead choices being rational. That's a crock.

The compatibilists have a better definition of free will, that the thing being held responsible actually had critical agency (and knowledge of the morality of the situation) in the making of the choice.

So an epiphenomenal mind cannot be held responsible since it lacks agency. It would be like me being held responsible for a murder because I watched a murder movie.
Similarly, a seagull is not much responsible for snatching my chips since it holds to a different moral code, one which allows me to wring its neck if I catch it in the act.

A soldier is not responsible for murder if the choice is mandated by his commander. The ultimate commander's responsibility lies with the morality of his participation in the conflict.

Bob contracts rabies and starts biting babies. Is he responsible for that or is the disease that has taken over his will? It's not like the disease is a conscious agent, and yet it takes over your mechanism for agency.

But "I'm not responsible, physics made me do it" is not an excuse. You had the agency, knew the consequences of an immoral choice, and chose anyway. Free will (by most definitions), physics, and determinism all have nothing to do with that.

In short, if you maintain that if you were to set the entire world state back to what it was before a decision (including every aspect of your mental being, your will, your agency), and then something different might happen... well, maybe something different might happen, but you can't attribute that difference to your will. — flannel jesus

I totally agree with that point. The exact same reasoning can be used against dualism, the kind they say is incompatible with determinism. The claimed agency is not from natural causes, such that one 'could do otherwise'. Sure, but doing otherwise would be attributed to quantum randomness, not to any difference to your will, unless said naturalistic physics is violated somewhere in the causal chain. No biological element has ever been shown to do this.
They have to claim not randomness (mere indeterminism) but actual intentional physical effects that do not have any physical cause. Only this will yield choices that can be attributed to a free will thus defined.

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. — ucarr

Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said.
2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept.

The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." — ucarr

Wrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur.
Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature.

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

I never said it exists. Read the quote.

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1. — ucarr

OK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.
Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.
There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence.

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets.


As for my counter to EPP, I point out that 8 is an even number, which is a predicate of 8. The concept of 8 is not even, but the concept of 8 bears the concept of something even. Either way it is not a predicate of the concept. How is EPP consistent with that?

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence

No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong.

Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. — ucarr

You know I don't consider color to be a predicate of a soccer ball, but I will allow it to have physical properties that would result in perception by some as what you call these proto-colors, yet unspecified.

The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red.

More like black and white. All colors look pretty much like grayscale under monochrome light. If the ball had two different materials (as most do), the one would be lighter than the other. Anyway, were it observed by a simple human-made digital camera, yes, you'd get a picture with only reds in it. I'm just being picky here, not disagreeing with anything. More picky: Is there such a thing as invisible red light?

Your soccer ball seems to reflect at least these two wavelengths of light, else your story would not work.

In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things

Not clear under E1. Yes, clear under E2 and E4, the two anthropocentric definitions.

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me.

Is this meant to be your definition of 'exists'? Because from that I have no idea what does and doesn't exist. It seems to presume that we already know, yet no definition is given.
Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. If not, then you need to define how you're using 'exists' here before I can agree to taking such a position. Remember, no EPP if we're predicating nonexistent things.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration.

I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists.

Actually, your logic in your earlier post was perhaps predicating nonexistent things when talking about winged horses. But yes, you did say that you hold to EPP.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist.

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't).

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.
Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse.
Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic.

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality.

Yes, there is a tiny bit of overlap between perception and quantum entanglement, but they're a world apart in my opinion.

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition.

If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

But nobody was questioning the existence of the drawing or of a statue (OK, I am questioning it). We're questioning the existence of Pegasus, and by E2, yes. Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. I have better proof of mind independence.
So OK, the drawing is perhaps more than an ideal. The ideal corresponds to something mind independent. Next question: Does it exist? Depends on definition. OK, specifically, does it exist under definitions E1,3,4,5,6? Most of those are similar but with different domains. Under which domains does the drawing exist? Under which domains is EPP valid? E4 still seems anthropocentric, a form of mind dependency. Thus E4 makes for a poor definition for mind independent existence.

You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives.

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. I also did not mention a third part. The example was how you would see it.
What is evidence for the sign's mind independence is that we both see it, as we did with your example of a drawing above.

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway.

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post.

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?

Kind of off topic, no? I have neither claimed this nor denied this.

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it?

The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball?

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical

Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

Yes, it did (E5), because it was measured even before you had a notion to seek after it. Your current state was a function of the ball, as it is a function of a great deal of anything inside your past light cone.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room?

Most people use 'material' to mean matter. If space was matter, you could not walk into a room since it was already full. So rather than argue about this, let's clearly define 'material' before we decide if space qualifies as it or not.
Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space.

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static?

It has a temporal dimension. What you call 'change' is a difference in cross sections at different times, just like an MRI image has different pictures of cross sections of a body at different values of some spatial axis.

I wonder if you hold with background independence?

I suppose I hold to it. I only know the relevance to general relativity.

So Roombas are the mental equals of humans? The only thing separating us is emotion? — Patterner

Ask MoK. He's the one that said that "hysical processes in general are not possible without an entity that I call the Mind", which implies that a Roomba is not possible without a mind. It's apparently how he explains the action resulting from an immaterial decision.

By options, I mean things that are real and accessible to us and we can choose one or more of them depending on the situation. — MoK

I think that pretty much matches the wording I gave. It works great for the Roomba too.

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence; D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." — ucarr

Don't follow, but that may be me. You reference only C and D, so let's say B is my mailbox and C is <stuff in my kitchen>. I don't know what " Let C = {D | D ∉ C} " means. It seems to say existence is some object where the object is not in my kitchen which seems to be a self contradictory definition of what existence meant. Existence is anything that doesn't exist. I didn't say that.
Maybe I read it wrong. E would be 'has a flag'. We can go to Pegasus after we work out the mailbox example, and also if we have a far better definition of 'existence'.

In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}.

Don't know what any of that means. Sorry if I'm not up on the notation. I don't know what the zero means. Existence of Pegasus is the zero of Pegasus?

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?

It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
— Corvus
No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue. — noAxioms
X is a free variable. It can take any value in it. X could have been a statue of Pegasus for its original value. — Corvus

Fine, then X is a statue of Pegasus, but that doesn't make your statement valid since a statue of X would be a statue of a statue, not a statue of Pegasus. And yes, they do make statues of statues. They sell them in gift shops.

We have had this discussion many times before, and it had been concluded that number is concept.

Only by a non-realist, and this discussion is about realism. Per my OP, if I say '14', I am discussing 14 and not the concept of 14. If you can't do that (if only to demonstrate the inconsistency of it), then as I say, you've nothing to contribute to a discussion about a stance that distinguishes the two.

Your ignorance on the fact

14 being no more than a concept is not a fact, it's an idealistic opinion.

The difference is I am aware that I have options. — Patterner

Both are. The Roomba would not be able to choose an option of which it was unaware. So maybe the left path has been visited less recently, but if it didn't know left was an option, it would just go to the one path it does know about and clean the same spot over and over. Not very good programming.

The Roomba goes one way or the other at the command of it's programming

The programming is part of the Roomba, same as your programming is part of you (maybe, opinions differ on the latter. You make it sound like a program at the factory is somehow remote controlling the device. It could work that way, but it doesn;t.

never aware of how the decision was made

Also true of both.

It has no concept of options. — Patterner

As I said, the device couldn't operate if it wasn't aware of options. It has sensory inputs. It uses them to determine options, including the option to seek the charging station, just like you do.

It does not think about the choice it made two minutes ago

Actually it does, but I do agree that some devices don't retain memory of past choices. How is that a fundamental difference? You also don't remember all choices made in the past, even 2 minutes old. The Roomba doesn't so much remember the specific choices (which come at the rate of several per second, possibly thousands), but rather remembers the consequences of them.

And it certainly doesn't regret any choice it ever made. — Patterner

Got me there. The human emotion of regret probably does not enhance its functionality, so they didn't include that. The recent chess playing machines do definitely have regret (its own kind, not the human kind), something necessary for learning, but Roombas are not learning things.

I wanted to say that determinists deny the existence of options rather than determinism. — MoK

If they do that, they're using a very different definition of 'options' than are you.

Your definition (OM): the available paths up for choice. There are usually hundreds of options, but in a simplified model, you come to a T intersection in a maze. [Left, right, back the way you came, just sit there, pause and make a mark] summarize most of the main categories. Going straight is not an option because there's a wall there.
I am putting words in your mouth, so if I'm wrong, then call it ON (Option definition, Noaxioms) and then give your own definition with clear examples of what is and is not an option.

OK, said hard determinist with the alternate definition OD: The possible subsequent states that lead from a given initial state. If determinism is true, there is indeed only one of those, both for the Roomba and for you. There is no distinction.

Thing is, there is no empirical way to figure out if determinism is the case or not. The experience is the same. If you want to go left, you go left. If you want to go right, you go right. That's true, determinism or not, and it's true regardless of which definition of 'options' is used.

Side note: Using OD:, there is one option only with types 2, 5, and 6, but 1,4 and 6 are not especially considered 'hard determinism'.

Sure, I think that the mind is separate from neural processes. — MoK

OK. Then it's going to at some point need to make a physical effect from it's choice. If you choose to punch your wife in the face, your choice needs to at some point cause your arm to move, something that cannot happen if the subsequent state is solely a function of the prior physical state. So your view is compatible only with type 6 determinism, and then only in a self-contradictory way, but self contradiction is what 6 is all about.

To me, physical processes in general are not possible without an entity that I call the Mind.

Fine. Work out the problem I identified just above. If you can't do that, then you haven't thought things through. Do you deny known natural law? If not, your beliefs fail right out of the gate. If you do deny it, where specifically is it violated?

How is the Roomba mind fundamentally different than yours? It's a physical process, and you assert above that such process is not possible without a mind. A rock cannot fall without a mind.

I suppose that works under idealism, but determinism (or lack of it) has pretty much no meaning under idealism.

How about wording it this way:
A Roomba wouldn't work if it didn't realize it has options. — Patterner

I'm fine with that.

You didn't answer the question asked "What fundamentally do you do that a Roomba doesn't?" when you imply that a Roomba doesn't realize options.

We were considering a fork in the path of a maze. Are they not a pair of options? — noAxioms

Sure they are.

Sure, one cannot choose to first go down both. Of the options, only one can be chosen, and once done, choosing otherwise cannot be done without some sort of retrocausality. They show this in time travel fictions where you go back to correct some choice that had unforeseen bad consequences. — noAxioms

The point is that both paths are real and accessible, as we can recognize them. However, the process of recognizing paths is deterministic. This is something that hard determinists deny. — MoK

How can a determinist deny that some physical process is determisitic? You have a reference for this denial by 'hard determinists'?
I mean, even in a non-deterministic universe, the process of recognizing paths (biological or machine) is deterministic. I cannot think of a non-determinstic way to to implement it.

I don't think that the decision results from the brain's neural process. The decision is due to the mind.

Ah, so you think that this 'mind' is separate from neural processes. You should probably state assumptions of magic up front, especially when discussing how neural processes do something that you deny are done by the neural processes. Or maybe the brain actually has a function after all besides just keeping the heart beating and such.

since any deterministic system halts when you present it with options.

Tell that to Roomba or the maze runner, neither of which halts at all.

A deterministic system always goes from one state to another unique state. If a deterministic system reaches a situation where there are two states available for it it cannot choose between two states therefore it halts.

No, it makes a choice between them. Determinism helps with that, not hinders it. Choosing to halt is a decision as well, but rarely made. You make a lot of strawman assumptions about deterministic systems, don't you?

In the example of the maze, the options are presented to the person's visual fields. In the case of rubbery the options are mental objects.

The maze options are also 'mental' objects, where 'mental; is defined as the state of the information processing portion of the system. A difference in how the choice comes to be known is not a fundamental difference to the choice existing.

I know you're talking about mental processing of visual data, but that's far more complex than anybody here is qualified to answer, so I am instead picking statements that seem to be falsified by a simple, understandable model.

No, you consider the existence of options granted — MoK

We were considering a fork in the path of a maze. Are they not a pair of options?
Sure, one cannot choose to first go down both. Of the options, only one can be chosen, and once done, choosing otherwise cannot be done without some sort of retrocausality. They show this in time travel fictions where you go back to correct some choice that had unforeseen bad consequences.

I guess I don't know what you consider to be options.

I am talking about available options to a thief before committing the crime.

So you do grant the existence of multiple options before choosing one of them. What part of the maze example then is different than the crime example?

But, unlike the Roomba, I realize I have options. — Patterner

A Roomba wouldn't work if it didn't realize options. If there are two paths to choose from, it needs to know that. If it always picked the left path, there would be vast swaths of floor never visited. It needs awareness of alternative places to go.

What fundamentally do you do that a Roomba doesn't? If you mean it is not remote controlled, I'll agree. It makes its own choices. The RC car on the other hand is remote controlled and has no free will of its own. That's a fundamental distinction between the Roomba and the RC car, but I ask about the Roomba and you, because I suspect you're the RC car, a puppet of another.

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? — ucarr

Depends on definitions.

how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify?

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence.
If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red.

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'.

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us.

As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.

The color read exists

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers.

b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.

I will protest this one. A hydrocarbon is simply not sweetness. It is a molecule, and sweetness is only a perception when the molecule is contacted in just the right places by something evolved to be sensitive to it.
Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them.

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different.

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so.

Whether or not Sherlock Holmes exists or not depends on definitions, and by your definition above, I would say that yes, he exists since you can measure him the same way you claimed to measure the mathematical concept of infinity. To that, instead of giving examples of things that exist, give some examples of something nonexistent. Pretty tough to do since the mere act of thinking about the example is a measurement, and thus it must exist.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.
None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them.

In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.

Under E2, yes. Oddly enough, under E5 it doesn't. Rovelli discussed that interesting bit. Under a relational view like that, measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement.

If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. Space expansion over time means that (given a simplified linear expansion), a meter expands to two meters after twice the time. The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime.

Of course there are other definitions of 'universe', some of which are contained by time. Some use the word to refer to the visible universe, which expands over time since after a longer time, light from more distant things has had enough time to reach us. The visible universe has a time-dependent size, and thus the visible universe expands, currently at a rate of about 6-7c proper distance along lines of constant cosmological time. But that would be true even without expansion of space.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No? — Corvus

No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue.

The concept of 14 is 14.

Per a very explicit statement in the OP, if I wanted to refer to the concept of 14, I would have explicitly said something like 'the concept of 14' or 'the perception of X'. Your inability to distinguish the two prevents any productive participation in a discussion about realism.

Pegasus is mythical, so any real creature claiming to be Pegasus is a con. — Banno

How can a mythical creature be real? Mythical already implies not real. — Corvus

Troy was a mythical city. Is the Troy they discovered a con then? It certainly didn't have all the embellished events happen there, but some of them are based on real events. Just saying that being mythical does not necessarily equate to not real. Hard to argue with Pegasus though.

There was likely for instance a real King Arthur, but the legend about the sword&stone is almost certainly mythology.

So Pegasus is a word without its object? Are there objects without their words / names? — Corvus

Only if you don't define object as that to which words have been assigned. If this restraint is lifted, there are (E4 say) more unnamed objects than named ones. There are waaaay more given a non-athropocentric definition like E5.

An object can be both mental and physical. If you imagined a winged horse, that winged horse is your mental object. If you saw one made of physical matter in Disney, it is a physical object of a winged horse. It is not the real Pegasus, but it is still a winged horse, and one can name it as Pegasus. No? — Corvus

It's a statue of X, not X. There's a difference, kind of the same difference between the concept of 14 and 14.

Attributes exist as characteristics that don't characterize anything? They embody the role of an adjective, but they don't attach to any existing thing playing the role of a noun or pronoun? — ucarr

Adjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used.

The color read exists

Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself, much like 'sweet' exists (E2). It didn't exist relative to my father, but blue did, which is why he always played the blue pieces in a game of 'Sorry' or something. When he was able to do something mean to one of the other pieces, he couldn't play favorites since he didn't know whose pieces the other colors were. There was just blue and not-blue.

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton.

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from.

OK, that's fine. To be honest, why did you wait this long to state this? Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?
17 is prime, so 17 exists? Same questions.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr

So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception? — noAxioms

I don't deny mind-independence outright in accordance with a hard-edged yes/no binary. I allow my still developing thinking upon the subject to include a gray space that accommodates thoroughgoing nuancing.

Sounds like both of us actually don't know then, in which case it seems too soon to draw conclusions about how existence is dependent on perception.


The question is especially difficult from the standpoint of perspective, given that no sentient can perceive anything without its mind.[/quote]A machine can perceive stuff without what most would call a 'mind', but I suppose it would not qualify as a sentient thing.

Speculation about mind-independent reality cannot even be supported by inference because that too is mind dependent.

Agree. I have appealed to logic rather than inference, but even that doesn't supply a helpful solution. Hence I don't lay claim to realism. Mind dependent existence has pragmatic value and humans simply forget that it is a relation.

We cannot do any organized perceiving without injecting ourselves into the perceived reality per our perceptual boundaries.

I did not quote the whole but, but it sounds like you are actually exploring this area, more than most of the posters to this topic.

Since perceive means to become aware of something

I thought it meant 'not absence', and not 'perceived'. The opposite of that is unperceived.

If it's impossible to measure something not present

Not impossible. It's just a little more indirect is all. Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. Time dilation is not perceived, but it can be measured/calculated.
Sorry, just looking for counterexamples.

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named.

The most inclusive context would include Pegasus, and there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. Not saying it's wrong, just that it lacks utility.

The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical. — noAxioms

Your statement raises logical issues: a) if something doesn't exist, it doesn't exist anywhere — ucarr

Mine was a relational definition. If X doesn't exist in domain D1, it might exist in domain D2, so your a) doesn't follow. It seems to be more of a rule for E1: absolute existence, a property that is had or is not had, period.

b) if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A').

Sorry, I don't follow this notation. All I see is one domain 'A', and it is unclear if these 'two things' are part of it or not.

I don't believe you live your life according to the integrity of your claims here.

1) They're not claims, they're consequences of some of the various definitions. Secondly, I live my life to a very different set of definitions and beliefs than what I rationally have concluded. I hold pragmatic beliefs for the former, even if these are demonstrably false. We all do this. I'm just more aware of it than most.

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them.

Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies).

In my view, your two examples demonstrate the impossibility of humans talking about mind-independent situations. Sans observers, the orbits of planets around suns cannot be characterized as such, nor can they be characterized by us in any way.

True, but characterization isn't necessary for the planet to orbit at that distance. The part that I find anthropocentric is where we say words like 'the universe' or 'our universe' which carries the implication that ours is the only one, that our universe has a preferred existence over the others due to us being in it. That's the sort of thinking that prompts me to label a definition as anthropocentric, not the inability to conceive of the mind-independent thing without utilizing a mind, and not just 'a mind', but 'my mind' in particular.

Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact.

The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.
Greed (not a material thing) drives much of the actions of people (material things).
A shadow (not a material thing) has a length, and often relates to a material object.

Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding?

Common misconception. Space expands over time, but the universe, not being 'over' time, does not expand, and doesn't meaningfully have a size or an age. This is presuming of course the consensus model of spacetime and not something weird like aether theory under which the universe kind of is an object and very much does have an age.

A world-line is a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.

There you go. That is not a description of travel.

In math, an interval is a set of numbers that includes all real numbers between two endpoints.

OK. Different definition of 'interval'. I was using the spacetime interval definition from physics.

I think Banno and @noAxioms both proposed compatibilist responses to your worry, — Pierre-Normand

A compatibilist says that free will and determinism are compatible with each other, but I would need both words more precisely defined were I to agree with that.

noAxioms suggests that we are counting objects. — MoK

I was showing the counting of options, not objects.

I agree that one can write code to help a robot count the number of unmoving dots in its visual field. — MoK

You are complicating a simple matter. I made no mention of the fairly complex task of interpreting a visual field. The average maze runner doesn't even have a visual field at all, but some do.
All I am doing is showing the utterly trivial task of counting options, which is a task easily performed by a determinsitic entity, answering your seeming inability to realize this when you state "So I am wondering how can deterministic processes lead to the realization of options".

The solution is to count the options (in the maze example, paths away from current location) and if there is more than one, options have been realized. If there is but one, it isn't optional. The means by which these options are counted is a needless complication that is besides the point.

But I don't think a person can write code to help a robot count the number of objects or moving dots.

I wrote code that did exactly that. It would look at a bin of parts and decide on the next one to pick up, and would determine the angle at which to best do that. This was 45 years ago when this sort of thing was still considered innovative.

Copenhagen interpretation for example suffers from the Schrodinger's cat paradox.

Nonsense. Just because you don't know how it explains a scenario doesn't mean it doesn't explain it. Copenhagen was developed as an epistemological interpretation which means the observer outside the box doesn't know (wave function describing state) the cat state and the observer inside has a more collapsed wave function state. Super easy.
Sure, off topic, so I'll leave off the delayed-choice thingy.
But your assertion that Bohmian mechanics is the only valid interpretation (a deterministic one) is on topic, and thus the falsification of the other interpretations is very much on topic.

Again, I counted six kinds of determinism, and some of those are almost certainly the case and some of them are almost certainly not the case. Bohmian mechanics was number 2.

We are morally responsible if we could do otherwise. That means that we at least have two options to choose from. — MoK

Moral responsibility is far more complicated than that, as illustrated by counterexamples, but the core is correct. There being more than one course of action available, and it is very hard to come up with an example where that is not the case. I am in a maze, but find myself embedded in the concrete walls instead of the paths between. I have no options, and thus am not responsible for anything I do there.

The options are however mental objects, like to steal or not to steal

Stealing and not stealing are physical actions, not mental objects. Bearing moral responsibility for one's mental objects is a rare thing, but they did it to Jimmy Carter, about a moral person as they come.

The fallacy seems to be in the assertion that determinism somehow takes away choice, which of course is nonsense since we'd not have evolved large (and very expensive) brains if not to make better choices. I cannot think of a single way that a choice can be made better by a non-deterministic process than by a similar but deterministic process. I invite such an example, but a deterministic algorithm implemented on a non-deterministic information processor is still a deterministic process.

So I am wondering how can deterministic processes lead to the realization of options. — MoK

This is trivially illustrated with the most simple code.

Take a step.
Count the ways forward (don't include the way you came)
If 0, it's a dead end. Only option is to turn around.
If 1, continue that one way
else there are multiple options.

It's that easy. The realization of multiple options is as simple as counting, and there is even multiple options with case 1 since a good maze following program might conclude it to not be productive to follow the current path to its unseen end.

Almost all computer programs are fully deterministic and are great models to simplify what might otherwise be a complex subject.

What you need to worry about is not the realization of options, but how determinism always results in the same choice given the exact same initial state. So our program might be crude and uses the right-hand rule, in which case it doesn't even count options, it just takes the first rightmost valid path and doesn't even notice if there are other options. A better program would be more optimal than that, but then complexity is required, and it still does the same thing given the same initial state.

So realization of options is one thing, but no matter how many options there are, only one choice can be ultimately be made, even if determinism is not the case. You can follow a choice in the maze, and if it dead ends, you go back and take the other way, which is 'doing otherwise'. Even the right-hand robot can do otherwise in that sense.


As for the infant process of neural development, that's an insanely complex issue that likely requires a doctorate in the right field to discuss the current view of how all that works. It seems irrelevant to the topic of determinism and options.

First, I have to say that De Broglie–Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct since it is paradox-free. — MoK

All the interpretations are paradox free. None of them has been falsified (else they'd not be valid interpretations), and some of them posit fundamental randomness, but several don't.

I don't like Bohmian mechanics because it requires FTL causality and even retro-causality, forbidden by the principle of locality, but that principle is denied by that interpretation. That makes it valid, but it doesn't make me willing to accept it.

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. — ucarr

You got it backwards. Given EPP, a thing with defining attributes necessarily exists since existence is prior to those attributes. So the answer would be 'no' given EPP since nothing is added.
Meinong denies EPP, and therefore existence is not necessary for a thing to have attributes. So Meinong would say 'yes' (as do you), existence is optional and thus in addition to those attributes.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr

So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception?

Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable.

If perception defines existence, then measurability seems to define presence, not the other way around.

I think I can answer your question, "What meaningful difference is made by having this property (existence) vs the same thing not having it?"
...
If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library.

This seems to suggest existence as being part of a domain (the universe perhaps) and not at all based on perception. This seems to utterly contradict your definition above. OK, so perhaps you are using E4 as a definition. X exists if X is a member of some domain, which is our material universe perhaps. That's a common enough definition, and it is a relational one, not a property. A thing doesn't just 'exist', it exists IN something, it is a member OF something.

The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical.

Here again, the unicorn exists by E4 (it's out there somewhere in this universe) and perhaps under E2 (because our imagination is arguably perception of it). The horse and the unicorn share the same ontology.

Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist?

I never claimed that. I said distance would not exist given a definition that only material things exist, and the fact that while distance might be a relation between material things, it is not itself material. Anyway, I would never use that definition, so I don't claim anything about the existence of distance.

Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic?

In a world like this one but without humans in it at all, a planet orbits one light-hour from its star. Of course I had to use human concepts (including one of our standard units) to say that, but the distance is between objects that have no anthropocentric existence.
2nd example: In a very different universe of conway's game of life, a Lightweight spaceship is of length (distance) 5 at all times. There is no people in that universe since it has but 2 spatial dimensions, but an observer is possible.

All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."

Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially?

No. The question seems to be a category error, treating the universe as an object that 'does things'.

How do immaterial things relate to material things?

Well, light was one of my examples, arguably not a material thing since it is massless. My material eyes react to light, so that's a relation.
Another example is the fine-structure constant (α) which relates to me since material of any sort cannot form with most other values of it. Universe with different values of it might just be fading radiation.

how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes?

I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material.

Since you believe light is not material, how do you understand light bending around a gravitational field, and how do you understand laser light generating heat?

Light travels on a geodesic, so it doesn't curve. As for heat, light has energy. If energy is considered to be material, then I guess light is considered to be material.

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?

No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location.

I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. — noAxioms

We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B.

If we're talking spacetime, points in spacetime are called events. If we're not talking spacetime, then there is no meaningful interval between the points.

In determinism, could you have willed otherwise? — Patterner

I can think of I think 4-6 different kinds of determinism, and under 2 of those, yes, you could have willed otherwise, but probably not due to any difference of internal state, which is, as I've said, evolved to not be a function of random processes.

What is will?

Cheap answer: It's what you want to do. I will to be outside this jail cell. Physics compels me to do otherwise, so my will isn't entirely free in that sense.

In the philosophical sense, I'm totally unclear why free will is better since it seems to be a freedom to do something other than what you want, which is a weird thing to value. Or perhaps choice not based on prior state, which is an insanely bad thing to value.

To me will is an ability of the mind. What do you mean by mental processes here? — MoK

Same meaning as yours, different words. Both of our words leave 'mind/mental' fairly undefined, leaving open a natural or supernatural interpretation of it.

In determinism, is it not the resolution of an uncountable number of factors which, although we cannot hope to track them all, resolve in the only possible way? — Patterner

Under 4 of the 6 definitions, yes, 'the only possible way', and we even have free will under one of those 4.

Just as, though we cannot calculate all the factors in an avalanche, due to their arrangement at the start, every rock lands in exactly the one and only place and position it does?

Under 4 of the 6, yes.

I have argued in the past and I still think can be considered true that if something cannot be predicted, even in theory, it is meaningless to say it is determined. — T Clark

Well, a system in principle can be predicted from outside the system, it's just from inside that it has been proven unpredictable, a rather trivial proof at that, by Alan Turing.

It feels intuitively to me that in some, many, most? cases unraveling cause is not possible even in theory.

A deterministic world is not necessarily reverse deterministic. Classically, our physics seems to be, but it is weird watching entropy go the wrong way. A world like Conway's game of Life is hard deterministic, and yet history cannot be deduced since multiple prior states can result in the same subsequent state.

could not be unraveled with the fastest supercomputer operating for the life of the universe

A computer, however unreasonably fast, cannot simulate itself, at least not at speed. I wrote a program to do exactly that and got it up to about 15% efficiency.

There is a point, isn't there, where "completely outside the scope of human possibility" turns into "not possible even in theory." Seems to me there is.

Actually simulating our physics (even the most trivial closed classical system with say 3 particles) cannot be done without infinite precision variables, which puts it in the 'not possible even in theory' category.

We are on the same page if you agree that options are real. — MoK

We are on the same page. Say the options are vanilla and chocolate. Both options are available and while your lack of sufficient funds might compel a choice of only one of them, determinism does not compel some choice against your will. It is your choice since it is a function of your mental processes.

What does "would otherwise have done" mean in a deterministic setting? — Patterner

In the context of my comment, it means that determinism does not remove the choice from being a function of your will. Had you willed otherwise, a different choice would have occurred.

If you read carefully, it says "That sounds like". It doesn't mean that "That is". — Corvus

It doesn't 'sound like' dishonesty either. There statement is perfectly reasonable.

You are also still in confusion between the sentence in the post to you with your own visual perception of the object on my desk.

I have no visual perception of the object on your desk, and never claimed to have it. Please stick to what I said and not what you unreasonably imply from what I said.

You have no perception of the object on my desk, hence you have no idea what the object is, was the point.

I did not disagree with your point. Your point was simply irrelevant to the existence of the object, which is what this topic is about.

But your saying that you know the object relation to my desk sounded something not quite right.

If I parse that correctly, I think you're saying that what I posted didn't sound quite right to you. That's acceptable. You are trapped in a mode where you seemingly cannot assess the validity of a statement that uses a different definition of 'exists' than E2. But if that's the case, why are you contributing to a topic that explicitly states up front that it is not about mind-dependent views?

If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist? — ucarr

Depends on the definition of 'exists'. That's always going to be my answer if I don't know the definition. Your first statement says if it is material, it exists. OK, but that doesn't mean that if it exists, it must be material. So it does not imply an assertion of existence only of material things, leaving me with no clear definition from you of what you think 'exists' means.

Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations?

No. I don't deny the meaningfulness of the word, even if there's no context here to narrow it down to a specific definition of the word.

Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?

Depends on the definition of 'exists', but you seem to be leaning heavily upon an anthropocentric definition, in which case, no, I don't deny their existence given such a relational definition.

All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.
2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe.

Regarding my reading of E1 - quoted above - "member of all" tells me existence as "member of all" participates as a presence in "all that is part of objective reality."

Yea, that's a pretty good reading of E1.

Unless you entertain some arcane notion, such as, "Objective reality is inaccessible to consciousness." then I see the definition as simple and clear.

Objective reality being accessible to a specific consciousness depends probably on if said consciousness is part of that reality or not. There seems to be no test for being part of objective reality or the exact same thing not being part of that reality. That's not your problem, it's the problem of the E1 definition.

If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime

One does not travel in spacetime. One travels in space, and one traces a worldline in spacetime. 'Travel' implies that the thing is no longer at point A once point B is reached, and this is not true of a worldline in spacetime.

Regarding frame dependence WRT distance and interval, can you show logically that distance and interval are not both framed between different states?

I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. As for the two words not meaning the same thing, 'distance' is frame dependent, and 'interval' is not.
So to translate between frames, a Lorentz transform is used which says that x' = λ(x - vt) which shows x' (the distance in the 2nd frame) not to be equal to the x (distance in 1st frame).
The interval on the other hand is invariant over a Lorentz transform. You can verify the algebra if you look it up. All this is since you asked, but is off topic.

What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms
I'm examining your question presented in bold immediately above. I don't agree that Meinong, by arguing against EPP and thereby setting up, "...allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent
things..." establishes existence as a property.

With what part are you in disagreement. I assure you that existence becoming a property follows from denial of EPP. Disagreeing with EPP on the other hand is an opinion, one which is logically valid. The question is, how justified is that opinion?

Existence is not a property because it is not emergent. This is one of the important implications of "Eternal universe uncaused."

OK, but I don't accept (let alone understand) your premises, so I don't accept that existence needs to be emergent. It does seem to be emergent under say E5 at least.

The idea of determinism, for me, isn’t a simple domino effect; it’s more like a web of interconnected factors—each one influencing the other. Our choices, in this context, aren’t isolated events but are deeply embedded in this complex system. And while we may not fully understand it, I think determinism accounts for all of this complexity and interconnectedness. — Matripsa

Determinism or no, yes, it is a complex web of interconnected factors, hardly a linear domino chain. You got this right.

Chesterton emphasizes the importance of mystery in life, and at first glance, it might seem like determinism would strip away that mystery.

Don't confuse determinism with predictiability. Lack of predictability is the source of mystery, and it has been nicely proven that the world is not predictable, even in principle.

It’s not randomness that creates mystery—it’s the overwhelming intricacy of a system that we can never fully predict or control.

One can control it to an extent. That's what good decision making is all about, and why deterministic processes are an aid to that, not a hindrance.

Does anyone else here feel that determinism, in its full intricacy, actually leaves room for more mystery rather than less?

Same, not more. Whether the sort of determinism you envision is the case or not seems not to have any effect on this.

If I present you with one ball, there is only one option available whereas in another case, when you are presented with two balls there are two options. — MoK

There are always multiple options. Your examples don't bear that out well since there's one obvious correct answer, but correct answer might not be the reply you want.

- - - -

Many spin determism as a bad thing, but never have I seen an example of determinism thwarting what you would otherwise have done. Quite the opposite: Randomness might thwart what you might otherwise have chosen. For this reason, evolution has suppressed amplification of random events and selected for deterministic functions in all biological processes, exactly as have engineers making artificial information processing devices.

That sounds like gross dishonesty to keep pretending to know, when not knowing anything about it. — Corvus

So you just told me something and now I'm being accused of being grossly dishonest when I indicate that I know what you just told me. Strange claim there. For the record, even if you define existence by perception, I have perceived your object precisely via your telling me about it. That perception told me the one predicate of the object that I care about.

But this topic is about definitions of existence other than E2, and only under E2 does existence require perception. In a world like this one in every way except absent perceiving things, that object (assuming it is not itself a perceiving entity) would still exist upon your desk in the same ways (E1,3,4,5,6) that it did with the presence of the perceiving entities. Only it's existence under E2 would not be satisfied.



All this seems very strange coming from somebody claiming to be a realist. I really don't think you know what the term means.

Mind-independent existence? Tell us some examples of mind-independent existence.

The object on your desk is such an example.

E1 The object exists if the desk exists.
E3 The object has the property of being on your desk, so it exists.
E4 The object is in the universe, so it exists.
E5 The object being at rest is a function of the desk exerting a force on it, so that makes the desk exist in relation to the object.
E6 (∃x) (x is on your desk) Your object satisfies that, so your object exists by E6.

Not one of those examples mentions or relies on perception by a mind. Only the reading and understanding of those words requires perception, but the existence of the object by any of the above definitions doesn't require those words to be perceived or understood.

In order to understand what existence prior to predicates, you must first understand what existence means. Would you not agree?

Totally agree, which is why I reference one of the six main definitions whenever I use the word, and then I wonder why you don't follow your own advice when you make assertions like this one:

The point is that without perception, you don't have existence.

Despite stressing the importance of what 'existence' means, you didn't define the word there, so non-sequitur. The object on your desk presumably doesn't have perception, and yet I suspect that you consider it to exist, in direct contradiction to the literal wording of that assertion.

The point is that you don't know anything about it apart from it is an object. — Corvus

I do know more. It exists in relation to your desk. That's the only predicate that matters for this topic.

Existence is the result of perception.

That is not a very mind-independent view. This topic is meant to discuss the meaning of mind-independent existence. Do you have anything to contribute to that besides assertions of definitions not compatible with the topic subject?

I am looking at an object on my desk right now. I can say I know what it is because it exists in front of me. But you can't. You don't see it, and you don't know what it is. — Corvus

Sure I do. It's an object. It's on your desk. You just perceive more details than do I.

Hence, the object I am seeing, doesn't exist in you.

It doesn't exist in you either, unless you ate your desk.

Where do you see problem in my argument here?

Since this topic isn't about epistemology, no, I don't see any problem. Said object exists under E2,3,4,5,6, and perhaps meaninglessly under E1. That's the whole list.

When I see the object, I can also tell the time of seeing it.

But you indicated that the telling of time was necessary, not just an option, for said object to exist. Maybe you meant something else by that wording, but rather than clarifying, you seem to be doubling down on the assertion.

We agree that there is the domain of the mind and the domain of a mind-independent world. — RussellA

And other domains besides those two. Not sure if you agree with the validity of other domains, but E6 examples have referenced some of them.

The problem remains that your disclaimer requires the mind to be able to understand something that we agree by defintion is independent of the mind ie, to understand existence in a mind-independent world.

No. ... to understand the existence OF a mind independent world, not that anything IN that world is doing the understanding. So no problem at all.

Any realist (of the physical universe) believes in a mind-independent world, that is, something not dependent on (supervenes on?) mind. Our own world is such a world, but hardly the only one.

This presumes that 'understanding' is only something that a 'mind' can do, else said world could be understood by some non-mind thing contained by that world.


Edit: I thought about it and ours is a mind-dependent world. It has minds in it (presuming a non-supernatural definition of 'mind'), and had it not those minds, it would be a different world. Ergo, ours is a mind dependent world in the same way that it is a Betelgeuse dependent world.

Your disclaimer makes the OP logically impossible to answer.

If we had no perceptions, we would have nothing to reason about. — RussellA

Nowhere am I claiming that we have no perceptions. This topic is simply not about them.

Our only knowledge about ontology and realism is founded on our perceptions, and our only understanding of the metaphysical depends on the epistemological/empirical.

Again, I never claimed otherwise.

It is logically impossible because any such understanding of a mind-independent world depends on the mind understanding something that is mind-independent.

It's actually quite easy if you follow my disclaimer since understanding of such a world does not require the understander to lack a mind. It just requires the world under consideration to lack the mind.

That you cannot distinguish the difference is pretty hard evidence that you're an idealist, despite whatever label you pin on yourself.

My notion of time is that it is a concept. Can concepts be said to exist? We have concepts, and use them. But they don't exist like trees and cups do. — Corvus

I didn't even list the ideal of time as one of my options since I don't consider concepts to be time. It doesn't take an hour of concept to bake my brownies. Your other topic seemed to want it to be an object, something you could see with a location and color or whatever. "But still I cannot see time. I only see the movement.". But movement is a concept as well then, no? How can you see a concept? If not, why is time a concept but movement is not?
You don't seem to have sorted yourself out.

The list of 6 definitions of Existence you listed are made up of ambiguous words, that need to be clarified.

Yes, they do. Thus there are more than 6 definitions, depending on those clarifications. But most notions of existence fall into those 6 categories, and few would choose say E5, but that one was unique and is sort of derived from Rovelli.

Where are the 3 definitions of time you listed? I cannot locate them in the thread, and I have not been reading all the posts in the thread but just have been replying to your posts to me. Could you list them again?

The reply was directly to you here. The relevant bit:
1) proper time, that which clocks measure
2) Coordinate time, that which dilates
3) Progression of the present, one's intuitive sense of the flow of events.

Of course, to an idealist, a clock is a concept, and concepts don't measure proper time. Concepts don't dilate, but per my disclaimer, I'm talking about time and not just about the concept of time.

It is not the tooth fairy at all.

I didn't say it was the tooth fairy. I said that in my opinion, it shared the same ontology with the tooth fairy, which also exists only under E2 and E3.

If time is a concept, then how we use the concept in our statements and propositions reflect time. If our temporal statements are to be meaningful, then time must be real in the statements.

Exactly so, but you're the one defining time to be a concept, not me.

E1 "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms

sounds like tautology or circular.

I agree, especially with the circular part.

If E1 doesn't make sense, should it not be dropped, and move on to E2?

Too many people assert it to do that.

E2 "I know about it" — noAxioms
If you know something, is it Existence? I know a name called Pegasus. Is Pegasus existence, because you know, and I know it?

Under E2 definition, yes. There seems to be no distinction between a horse and a unicorn under E2 or E3.

Or if someone comes along and say he is a Pegasus, is he the real Pegasus? Or is he someone pretending to be a Pegasus, therefore a fake Pegasus?

This gets into identity. Pegasus isn't just 'a flying horse', it's a specific one, but other entities can be similar or share its name. Both might exist in the same way, but only one is the actual Pegasus typically referenced and the other is not.
Notice that I said 'a unicorn' above, which is not a particular the way 'Pegasus' is.

Can he be qualified as the existence of Pegasus?

Something pretending to be a certain identity does not (arguable) alter the ontology of the actual thing with that identity.

This is a classical example of a definition that comes from quantum mechanics. — noAxioms

Not a standard definition afraid. — Corvus

What do you think the 'standard' definitions of existence are under quantum mechanics then? I admit it comes from one of the interpretations and not from the theory proper since the theory proper doesn't make metaphysical assertions. E5 did not fit into any of the other categories, and it's important.

Existence is also nonexistence, and nonexistence is also existence. Something cannot exist without possibility of nonexistence.

Not so. While I didn't list it, E8 could be "is possible", which is similar to Meinong's 'subsist' category. E8 could then be worded as "anything that subsists", thus merging his two highest categories. Point is, anything that subsists by definition has no possibility of nonsusbistence.

Nonexistence cannot exist without possibility of existence.

Similar counterexamples falsify this assertion.

I will try to reword your assertions to something that might make sense:
Existence is meaningless without distinction from something that doesn't exist.
That renders totally empty an assertion like "everything exists" or "nothing exists". The latter is perhaps nihilism, which is perhaps more of an awareness of the meaningless of the notion of existence than it is an assertion that there is a reality, and that reality is empty.

No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (∃x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time. — noAxioms

Existence of X means that X was perceived.

No. There is similarly no mention of perception either in my example of E6. You're using E2 again.

Perceiving X means perceiving of the time X was perceived. Hence all existence exists in time, and time is perception.

None of this is logically valid. I might think of something while being totally unaware of the time. Even if I was aware of the time, only under E4 or E5 would existing things be in time, and not even then since proper time itself exists under E4 and yet does not exist in time.
Your assertion doesn't even work under E2 (the only one based on perception) since you consider time to be a concept, and your mind does not exist within a concept.

When 35 is perceived or stated as a non prime, its instantiation of the idea emerges with time perceived. — Corvus

Fine, but per my disclaimer, my example was about 35 and not about the idea of 35. My example was of a mind independent kind of existence. Only E2 is mind dependent.

E1 to E6 can be interpreted from the position of Idealism, from the position of Direct Realism and from the position of Indirect Realism. Each interpretation will be different. Any interpretation of E1 to E6 that is based on a combination of Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism will become unnecessarily convoluted. — RussellA

Sounds like combining them would create contradictions, not just convolution.

If you don't identify with either Idealism, Direct Realism or Indirect Realism, which theory of perception are you using?

I looked up the SEP page on 'action theories of perception' and got all kinds of options, many of which are not mutually exclusive. I didn't read enough to figure out which one(s) seems to match how I think of it. Your items were not on any of the lists, and are more theories of mind and/or ontology, but apparently you find pages that do list them under 'perception'. All three are realist views, and I'm not a realist (E1), but I could be a realist under E5 in that I acknowledge that certain things relate to other things. E5 explicitly confines this to a causal relation. See my response to Corvus below for more detail.

This topic is about ontology and realism, and not about perception.

By the objective state of this universe in E4, do you mean the domain of the mind or the domain of the mind-independent?

Please read the disclaimer in the OP if you still have to ask that.

I understand that Meinong uses "exist" to refer to the domain of the mind-independent.

Which is consistent with my disclaimer, and which eliminates E2 and narrows things down to 5 possibilities instead of 6.

I am not sure if E1,4,5,6 make sense or are meaningful for existence of time, when they are made up of abstract and obscure concepts which need clarification. — Corvus

What needs clarification then is your notion of 'time'. I said nothing so ambiguous as any of the definitions being applicable or not to time. I listed three very well known and very different kinds of time, all three of which are heavily defined, used, and discussed in literature, and are not obscure at all. Hence my ability to render a meaningful opinion about how the various definitions of 'exists' might apply to each or not.

Interestingly, your description of time in the prior post seems to correspond to my third kind, the kind whose existence I put on par with the tooth fairy. I suspect that it is this definition of 'time' is how you're using the word.

For instance, what do you mean by "part of objective reality"?

That's E1, which I did not list for anything, since I do not identify as a realist. As for what it means, that is unclear. The meaning needs to be clarified by anybody who asserts it, but from my standpoint, a thing that has this property is indistinguishable from a things that doesn't have it, but is otherwise identical. I cannot say that of any of the other 5 definitions. The other 5 are all meaningful in some way, and a distinction can be drawn.

All I can say about E1 is that it is objective, not a relation. So it just plain exists, and not 'is a member-of / part-of some domain', all of which are expressions of relations.

Are we supposed to be able to understand and grasp the full meaning of objective reality?

If somebody asserts E1 existence, then at least a partial meaning would be nice.

What is "this universe"?

The universe that has you in it, as opposed to different universes that don't.

How far and how much "this universe" supposed to cover, or be?

The bounds of 'this universe' is left to the user. Some define it to be only the visible universe, or only 'this world'. If so confined, then other visible universes or worlds become a multiverse of sorts (Tegmark listed four kinds of multiverse, the first and third of which are mentioned here). But at one's choice, these can be considered to all be just 'the universe'. Type 4 is more of an E1 definition: All that exists or all that is real. I find that pretty meaningless.

"the causal history"? What do you mean by that?

This has to do with the E5 definition (causal definition). It is an utterly explicit relational definition that only works with structures with temporal causation. X and Y are system states. Let's say X is a meteor. Y is a moon crater. State X is prior to state Y since it takes time for state X to evolve into a world including state Y.. Since state Y is a function of state X, then X can be said to exist in relation to state Y.
This is a classical example of a definition that comes from quantum mechanics.

For a more quantum example, take Schrodinger's cat. State X is the cat state, in the box. State Y is the lab outside. The cat state (being dead or alive) does not exist relative to the lab since the distinction between dead and alive has had no causal effect on it. Sure, the cat exists relative to the lab since it had an effect on the lab before the box was closed. The cat exists, but it's state of living or not is a counterfactual, and definition E5 denies the principle of counterfactual definiteness which states that systems are in a defined state even when not measured.

"existential quantification"? Surely that is not time itself is it?

No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (∃x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time.

Present exists, but it disappears before we notice it.
Past exists in our memories only. Time follows to the future. — Corvus

If you want my opinion, Proper time exists by E2,3,4,5,6. Coordinate time exists E2,3,6 The time you mention above exists E2,3 (pretty much the same score as the tooth fairy).
E1 thus far is meaningless and I cannot assign that to anything.

You are proposing Overdetermination, which is philosophically problematic. A solution to the Overdetermination problem would make a good PhD thesis.

From the Wikipedia article on Overdetermination
Overdetermination occurs when a single-observed effect is determined by multiple causes, any one of which alone would be conceivably sufficient to account for ("determine") the effect. — RussellA

Not overdeterminism because any one of my causes along would not have caused the injury. I already explained this.

I believe that things exist in a mind-independent world and I can justify my belief. — RussellA

Got it. Anything not proven (pretty much everything) doesn't count as 'knowing', so you know nothing. So maybe we should not talk about knowing and just go with what has evidence and what doesn't, looking for plausible conclusions rather than definite ones.

On the other hand, I know my perceptions of colour, smell, taste, etc, which are not matters of either belief or faith.[/quote]I agree with those beliefs. I don't agree that they're any more than beliefs, especially when one begins to question what the 'I' is doing the perceiving, or if it's doing any perceiving at all. Skepticism goes a lot deeper than intuitions. If you're going to play the 'don't know' card, I can play that card in a higher suit.

I know that my perceptions are real

What do you mean by 'are real'? Funny that I've hammered on that question dozens of times and you still use the word without mention of which definition R1-R6 you mean.

Generally, "real" and "exist" are synonyms

Which is why they correspond to E1-E6, but you still didn't pick one.
I got a quote that suggests that Meinong is perhaps using E4 as his definition of exists. He uses a relational definition. Maybe. I'd love to have asked him if the universe exists, because it doesn't fit the E4 requirement of having a location in space.

There are three theories of perception, Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism. — RussellA

What happened to 'none of the above'? I certainly don't identify with any of those labels. But then, I suppose it comes down to the definition of 'realism', which is not specified in the label 'realist'.

Anyway, thank you for actually considering each of the definitions. Remember that you can add your own if my list is inadequate.
Keep in mind that we're doing metaphysics and not epistemology.

E1 The only objective reality I know about exists in my mind

You're describing E2. If it's objective, it's not relative to anything.
In other words, suppose there are two minds, identical, except that one is real and the other not. How would either of them figure out which one they were? That's E1. It isn't a relation, so they both relate the same things as the other, except presumably the nonexistent mind relates to nonexistent cars and moons and forum posts and v-v. My assertion is that they cannot tell. There's no empirical test.

EPP doesn't hold since both of our candidates have the same properties and experience the same stuff.

E2 The only things I know about exist in my mind.

Sure, by definition. E2 is effectively solipsism or at least anthropocentrism. E2 is reality defined by perception. EPP holds since predication requires a mind in order for the predicate to be.

E3 The only things that have predicates exist in my mind.

No, that's still E2. I think you're stuck on E2. All your comments are about what you know, and none are about the metaphysics of what is. Use logic, not perception, to analyze the mind independent ones. EPP holds under E3 by definition.

E4 The only objective state of this universe I know about exists in my mind, although I believe that an objective state of the universe also exists in a mind-independent world.

Which is like saying that the universe is the universe. EPP apparently doesn't hold because things in other universe also have predicates despite not existing. This has nothing to do with anybody knowing about it. Most of the definitions have nothing to do with epistemology.

E5 I know the state that exists in my mind, and believe that it was caused by a prior state that existed in a mind-independent world.

E4 has nothing to do with me or the universe. It has to do with causality, any causal structure. E5 applies say to the set of all possible chess states. It does not apply to the Mandelbrot set. EPP does not hold because there are things with predication (17 being prime for example) but not meeting the E5 definition. E5 requires a temporal structure.

E6 I know the domain that exists in my mind and believe that there is another domain that exists in a mind-independent world

Again E2. E6 is another mind independent definition. Hard to judge EPP on this one but I think it holds since I can form a contradiction if you posit otherwise.

~E1- Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality. My premise above is an elaboration of this definition. Distance examples existence in two modes: a) distance as an interval of spacetime is a material reality; b) distance as an abstract thought is a cognitive reality. — ucarr

This is leveraging E4, not E1. All the examples are relative to our universe. Your prior definition was that it was 'material'.
BTW, distance is a coordinate difference in spatial coordinates, not a spacetime interval. Distance is frame dependent, and an interval is not. Irrelevant to the topic, I know.

b) Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things; c) Existence adds the context of symmetry and conservation to an emergent thing that has properties.

I have no clue how those words are to be interpreted. You wouldn't even define 'eternal' for me, even though I made it a multiple choice question.

Even the ancient Greek folks mentioned on the existence of time. — Corvus

But they also didn't know about the three kinds.

I have been just asking questions to various folks for their opinions and ideas, so I could compare them in order to learn more about it.

That's good. What was learned? I did peek at the tail of your topic when you mentioned it. Why post links to all those time-denial videos? Do you understand any of their arguments? Do you agree? None of that was posted, so all I can presume is that you're using them to promote an opinion of denying it, without even knowing which kind is being denied. Maybe I'm wrong, but that's usually why people post links like that without discussion of them.

Well, you need to have listens to, think and learn about them rather than just be narrowminded and trying to twist everything said.

I don't because I didn't participate in that topic, and this one isn't about time specifically, especially when 'exists' has not been defined when asking if any particular thing exists or not. This topic is about the necessity of doing that, and the justifications or lack of them for the various definitions.

What does Meinong say about the existence of time? — Corvus

Why would he mention that explicitly? He published his stuff before modern physics even gave us words for the three kinds of time, and even you don't know which kind of time you're denying despite not having that excuse.

There are lots of you-tubes claiming time doesn't exist, but I don't watch links whose arguments are not summarized by the posters, so I don't know what they're denying or how they go about it.

Existence is defined as the quality of being real. — philosch

That's just giving a synonym, pretty vague if 'being real' is not subsequently defined.
I called my 6 definitions of 'real' R1-R6 corresponding to my 6 definitions of exists E1-E6.

The OP [of the Ontology of time topic] started with little assumption and open mindedness on the definitions, because it is known to be historically abstract and contentious topic. It was looking for good arguments from different angles for exploration, which could offer us better understanding on the concept of time, and possible solid definitions and conclusions. — Corvus

I still don't know what kind of time is asserted to not exist.

It is a logical contradiction to say that we don't know the true nature of the apple, but we do we know that the true nature of the thing-in-itself is an apple. — RussellA

It would indeed be contradictory.

For example, suppose the true nature of a thing-in-itself is being green, but this thing-in-itself has been labelled pink.

Those are mental perceptions, hardly qualities of the apple itself. The only quality of the apple I'm interested in is whether or not it exists, and which definition of exists is being used when justifying the assessment one way or another.

When walking on wet gravel looking at a coyote, you slip. Simplifying the situation, you walk on gravel and slip. What is the cause of your slipping?

Walking and not gravel - don't slip
Walking and gravel - slip
Not walking and not gravel - don't slip
Not walking and gravel - don't slip

Again you discard my scenario. But you still have two causes: walking and gravel. Likewise, my injury would not have occurred had any of the four causes not have happened. So again you seem to argue support of multiple causes, but denying it all the same.

OK, so you label (cause1 & cause2) as a single cause. That's our disconnect. You reject gravel being a cause despite slipping not taking place in the absence of gravel, and also you cannot know the cause of anything since you don't know the entire list.
Crazy definitions, but at least the disconnect was identified.

Backwards in time, a single effect has more than one possible cause. For example, knowing the positions of the snooker balls on a snooker table gives no knowledge about the positions of the snooker balls on the snooker table at a prior time.

This presumes an epistemic definition of cause, not a metaphysical one.

Q1 The EPP principle is that there cannot be properties without being attached to something existing. How is this principle justified
— RussellA

The Indirect Realist perceives a set of properties in the mind, such as being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc.

This is true of far more than just indirect realism, and is also true of both horses and unicorns. Just saying.
The indirect realism is also already a realist of a kind. Starting on that foot seems to already beg a conclusion of which a justification was requested. That's the problem with 'beliefs' instead of reaching the conclusion without ungrounded premises.
All that said, identifying as a kind of realist doesn't define what is meant by 'real'. What is real? In what way is it real (R1-R6)? Some of those definitions have empirical backing and some don't.

The Indirect Realist believes that there is a thing-in-itself existing in a mind-independent world

OK, the bold bit seems to be a reference to either E4. If it was E2, it wouldn't be mind independent. 'world' indicates at least a portion of our universe.
You claim this indirect realist knows nothing about the thing, and yet he holds a belief that it exists in this way. Isn't that irrational? Is the belief just a matter of faith then? I mean, you can count =the apples there on the table, and so can somebody else (common referent), so it's not just a dream. Looks like evidence of EPP (E4) to me. Sounds like an absence of knowing nothing about them.
I can count the horses and the number agrees with the number you count, but the same cannot be done with unicorns. That makes the unicorns distinct by the E2 definition. Not so much by the E4 definition since I've not empirical access to the entire world.

Q2 If there can be properties in the absence of something existing, how do we know that horses exist?

You don't answer this one. You talk about indirect realists, but the question is not addressed. The question as worded is similar to Q3, especially if E4 is used.

Q3 If there can be properties in the absence of something existing, how do we know that horses are in a different domain to unicorns

The Indirect Realist may consistently perceive in their mind the constant conjunction of the set of properties being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, not being horned, not only being in a book, etc. They can then attach the mental concept "horse" to this set of properties.

They may also consistently perceive in their mind the constant conjunction of the set of properties being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, being horned, only being in a book, etc. They can then attach the mental concept "unicorn" to this set of properties.

Short story, by switching to definition E2. I mean, what other evidence is there that unicorns appear nowhere but in a book?


I'm not tearing apart your argument, but rather pointing out that almost everybody uses definition E2 when the say 'exists', but then convince themselves that some other definition must also be the case. I'm not arguing against the fact that we see horses and we don't see unicorns, but that is just a relation between people and the things we say exist. It is completely anthropocentric reasoning, but then somewhere we declare, quite unreasonably, that these distinctions are objective.

Example: You can't dig up earth without creating a pile of earth and a hole that shake hands symmetrically. — ucarr

This is not an example of a definition. If I didn't know the meaning of the word 'symmetrical', I would not know how to use the word after reading that.

This is my definition of symmetry, i.e., transformation without net change.

That wording sounds more like a definition, even if it's not one that is in any dictionary. But that one is not worded as a premise.

Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not.

Eternal universe existence uncaused is my starting point.

You start by presuming your conclusion directly? It is not going to in any way justify how we know what exists or not if you presume the list right up front rather than conclude it by some logic and/or evidence.

I am more into the idea that space and time is emergent quality from movements of the objects in perception, as in the other thread running at the moment. — Corvus

You mean the "ontology of time" topic. I didn't post to that since time was not defined clearly. I can think of three obvious definitions and yea, some of them exist (depends on definition of 'exists' of course), and some don't. Two of the three can be perceived, including the one I consider nonexistent.

I read not too many posts before it became clear that definitions were not a priority.

Because of the asymmetric flow of information in a causal chain between a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world and the experiences in our senses, we can never know the true nature of any thing-in-itself. — RussellA

That doesn't mean there's no apple. It just means that we don't know the true nature of the apple. Common referent (the fact that more than one mind can experience the object) is solid evidence that it is there in some form. You can deny the common referent, but that becomes solipsism.

I can say that the thing-in-itself is an apple, but that is not to say that in reality the thing-in-itself is an apple.

Sure you can. You just don't know the full nature of it. That doesn't stop anybody from applying the label or otherwise discussing the thing and not discussing only our concept of it. If you cannot do that, then your idealistic inclinations prevent communication on topics like this.

I agree that choosing to walk, a recently repaved road, a shoulder not properly filled and a coyote in a distant field all inexorably lead to your breaking your hip. — RussellA

So you agree that there are at least four causes to my injury? If not, which ones are not? If you cannot, then your single-cause assertion is falsified by counterexample.

You talk endlessly about indirect realism and information flow, but not how any of that leads to a conclusion of the necessity of a single cause for any effect.

E1 - "exists" may be defined as "is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — RussellA

Yes. The domain is objective in that one.

There is the domain of being within the mind

E2

and there is the domain of being within a mind-independent world.

E4

A horse exists because it has the property of being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc. In Meinong's term "exist"

Unicorn then as well, and even square circle, all existent by E3. Meinong certainly does not use E3 as his existence definition.


The question never gets answered. If EPP holds, how is EPP justified? If it doesn't hold, how do we know the horse exists? How does Meinong (somebody known to deny EPP) justify the horse as being in a different domain than the unicorn?

You see the objects and objects in movements, changes and motions, but where is time? — Corvus

If you consider time to be an object, then it is up to you to point to where it might be. I don't, so the question makes no sense. Start off by defining time, something you didn't do in your own topic about it.
My three I think of first are
1) proper time, that which clocks measure
2) Coordinate time, that which dilates
3) Progression of the present, one's intuitive sense of the flow of events.

None of those are objects with a location.

Do you believe a definition cannot be used as a premise? If not, why not? — ucarr

A definition takes the form "I am using the word 'X' to mean such and such in some context". A premise takes the form "X is being presumed here to be the case".

I suppose with some careful wording, a statement can be used as either. The closest example I could think of was the fallacy of using a definition as a premise (actually as a conclusion), resulting in Anselm's ontological argument.
Give me an example of a definition being used as a premise.

Consider: I will use E1 to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to a conclusion negating the possibility of predication standing independent from existence. — ucarr

That would be great. Nobody else has tried. You're saying that if definition E1 is used (I think Meinong is using it), then EPP must be the case, something Meinong denies.

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr

By 'eternal', do you mean unbounded time (everlasting), or do you mean that time is part of the universe (eternalism)? Either way, it is uncaused. If it's caused, we're not including the entire universe, just part of it.

I equate it with existence.

That's begging your conclusion. You need to justify it, not just assert it.

I equate existence with objectifiable reality (public, repeatable, measurable).

It isn't objective if it is confined to being public, repeatable, measureable. That's an empirical definition (E2). It exists relative to an observer. Putting the word 'objective' into a subjective description does not make it objective.

I read E1 as, "Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality."

But then you go and describe a subjective reality. As far as I can tell, there is no test for something objectively existing or not objectively existing. Any test would be a relational test, a subjective one.

We are asking where in the universe, space and time contained. — Corvus

The question seems to ask "what location is distance?" and "when is duration?", both circular. Perhaps you need an example to clarify the question because I have not. The question as you worded it implies that space and time are objects. They're not. They're properties, but so are objects.

And chatbots are notorious for wrong answers when it comes to cosmology.

E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe" — noAxioms

Poorly worded on my part. "Objectively part of the universe" would be better. 'state' implies a slice of it, a subset of the whole universe. The universe is not a state.

What do you mean by "the objective state", "the universe"

'State' shouldn't be there, especially since a universe does not have a state, but a world at a given moment in time does. One definition is that a thing is present at a moment in time. People exist, dinosaurs don't. That's a reference to state. The universe is all worlds, the entire structure, the initial state of which is what we know as the big bang.
Good question though since there are a lot of other definitions of 'universe', including something like 'all that there is', which renders meaningless the term 'multiverse' since there cannot be other 'everythings'.

Yes, our universe includes spacetime Space and time are different dimensions of the same thing, so it isn't space and time. The form and nature of spacetime is described in relativity theory, which is beyond my ability to describe to you. By 'contained', I mean what I said above. Spacetime is where everything is. There is no spacetime that is not our universe. That means that the universe does not have a location nor was it a thing created. It isn't an object. That would be a category error. Objects are created at a location and endure for some duration. They are thus contained by space and time.


I do include other worlds in 'universe', as well as distant observable universes, despite their states being counterfactuals. Some people define 'universe' to mean the observable parts of it, but that's more E2 than E4.

I'm defending the EPP. My defense stands upon E1 as its premise: "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — ucarr

Well good. Nobody else seems willing to engage with that issue. E1 was the definition (it's not a premise or any kind of assertion) that was problematic with EPP since EPP was difficult to justify. Perhaps you can attempt to do that, but I really have a hard time parsing your posts. Try to be clear.
Nowhere in your post do I see EPP justified given an E1 definition, mostly because you never reference E1 at all.

E1 is objective and mind independent, so talk about intentions doesn't seem relevant.
Talk about conservation laws is irrelevant since they're 1) not objective, but relevant only to our universe (E4), and 2) wrong, as I explained in my prior reply.

You seem to be speaking of some sort of objective conservation law, like there is some external objective time and that the demise of one existing thing leaves 'stuff' for the next. None of this is justified, it's just being asserted.

Everything in existence has been shifted around from some prior, reciprocal existence. When a guy digs a shovel into the dirt, he's got no choice about simultaneously creating a pile of shifted dirt and a corresponding hole of matching dimensions.

You seem to be speaking of material in this universe (E4, not E1). There is classical conservation laws, but our universe has been proven to not be classical.

I think perhaps you are confused and that you are defending EPP using an E4 definition of 'exists'. I actually support that. Denial of EPP using E4 runs into serious troubles.

If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the only answer is, "You exist because you do exist." This sounds like non-sensical circularity; it's because existence can only be examined by a thinking sentient, and there can only be thinking if the thinking sentient exists.

I agree with all this. It's called observer bias, and it references a relational definition of existence (E2,4,5,6).

You've never been dead and you never will be dead.

Excellent leveraging of EPP. Denial of that statement is a subtle denial of EPP. But you also have to explain why it is still meaningful to say "Isaac Newton is dead".

When death becomes an objective reality for you

This is a contradiction. If it's 'for you', it isn't objective.

it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way.

Nobody and nothing is alone because our existence is predicated upon an emergence that is configured such that every existing thing, as a fundamental of it existing, emerges as half-symmetry of a pairing across the line of mirror-imaging with the reciprocal partner.

You've never not been known to exist because the cost of your existence has always been a depletion reciprocating your addition.

A notification of orientation to the void the red apple can never transcend, "You will be assimilated resistance is futile." The red apple is the local part; the void is the non-local part. The void seems not to be paired with the red apple because that's the nature of a void. Why death? Because life costs something. What does life cost? It costs the expenditure of energy allowing you to swim above the waves of the void, for a while. Eventually, however, we must be ourselves. We are the void.

This is the sort of poetry that I cannot parse.

You actually exist because we as beings, capable of language, have defined a word "exist" to mean what ever it's definition is. — philosch

Not bad... But EPP principle, as typically phrased, uses the word without definition which meaning is being used.

or I could have said everything is relative

Sounds like me

This leads to an impasse, where a topic is being discussed yet there is no general agreement as to what the words being used mean. — RussellA

There does not need to be an agreement as to what a word means. A great deal (perhaps the majority) of words in the dictionary have multiple meanings. Most of the time the intended meaning can be gleaned by context, but where this is not the case, the usage of the word is either ambiguous or is in need of explicit clarification.

Your Webster definition gives a general but very imprecise definition, mostly only a synonym, although it seems to preclude anything existing under idealism since mental is not part of physical or spiritual.

As an Indirect Realist, I don't claim that there is no mind-independent reality"

But you claim exactly that. "For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind.". Do clarify this contradiction then.

If there had not been a Big Bang, you wouldn't have broken your hip. It depends whether it is valid to say that the Big Bang was one cause of your breaking your hip?

Since all the other causes (the coyote say) is also caused by the BB, the phrase "one of" implies a sort of redundancy. The BB caused everything in our world, so it's kind of empty (tautological) to identify it as the cause.
Imagine going to court and saying that I didn't cause the car crash, the big bang did. Or determinism made me do it (an argument frequently made in forums).

I notice that you still have not pointed out why my injury didn't have 4 or more causes, instead deflecting to an example that you think comes down to one clear cause, but pointing to one white swan isn't evidence for lack of a black swan. Tell me why my example is wrong, that nothing on my list caused my injury. I'm not saying you're wrong, but I am saying that you're using a very different definition of 'cause', one that you refuse to clarify, which tells me you lack confidence in it.

I think that Existential Quantification E6 points to an important feature of "existing", and that is the domain in which something exists.

Yes. E2, E4, E5, E6 all have a domain. E1 is the only one that lacks it, and maybe not even then. Not sure how to classify E3, since it seems to be a self-referential domain.

Integers exist in the domain of numbers, even if integers don't exist in a mind-independent world. Sherlock Holmes exists in the domain of literature, even if Sherlock Holmes is non-existent in a mind-independent world.

There you go. All different definitions, all valid, especially since the domain is explcit. It isn't at all explicit in the wording of EPP, which is why that wording of the principle isn't very clear.

Where in the universe, are space and time contained? — Corvus

Space and time are everywhere in the universe, and nowhere not in the universe, at least in the 4D spacetime model that cosmology uses. There are some naive models that have the universe contained by time, in which case things like big bang and black holes go away, to be replace by some other interpretation. There is no valid model of the universe being contained by space, which is akin to suggesting that the big bang occurred at some specific location and has been expanding into some kind of void since then.

I cannot explain it much better than that to somebody not familiar with even the basics of cosmology. To say 'in time and space' is no different than saying 'in the universe' and not in something else, some other domain. Hence E4 being the applicable definition to use.