Mate. ChatGPT is an Artificial Intelligence. That's a fact. That's what people call it. Is that what you want to debate? Semantics? And you have the nerve to call me disingenuous? How is this not an instance of Pot Calling the Kettle Black, mate? Do you see the irony in what you're saying? — Arcane Sandwich

And with that we're done. I'll be ignoring you from now on as you're either a troll or incapable of arguing sensibly.

I just gave you the case. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, you did that time, not before. And I refuted your case. Your argument was demonstrably unsound. Premise 1 is false is artificial intelligence means one thing, premise 2 is false if it means the other thing it might mean. Either way, it is unsound.

Then what premise are you actually denying, mate? — Arcane Sandwich

As I said, it depends on what you mean by an artificial intelligence. I'll quote me:

As for the argument you presented, premise 1 is false, or at least it is false if by an 'artificial intelligence' you mean 'not a real intelligence, but something simulating one".

By hypothesis, a fake intelligence cannot understand anything or have any thoughts, as it has no mental states (only simulations of them). Thus, it cannot belief anything about what I meant to convey by making the sound 's'.

On the other hand, if you think artificial intelligences are real intelligences - so actually do have thoughts and other mental states - but they're just artificially created, then premise 1 is true, but premise 2 will then be false, for then why wouldn't communication be possible? — Clearbury

As I say, someone who is so disingenuous as to think I mean that I have a right to a case from you is probably not worth debating with. The point - and that I need to spell this out is troubling - is that in order to be engaging with me, you owe a case. The point is not that everyone default owes me a case.

Whether the 'facts' you mention are facts and not falsehoods is what's under debate. Again, just saying something doesn't make it so.

As for the argument you presented, premise 1 is false, or at least it is false if by an 'artificial intelligence' you mean 'not a real intelligence, but something simulating one".

By hypothesis, a fake intelligence cannot understand anything or have any thoughts, as it has no mental states (only simulations of them). Thus, it cannot belief anything about what I meant to convey by making the sound 's'.

On the other hand, if you think artificial intelligences are real intelligences - so actually do have thoughts and other mental states - but they're just artificially created, then premise 1 is true, but premise 2 will then be false, for then why wouldn't communication be possible?

False. I already told you what is required for a language. I already said it. Here goes: — Arcane Sandwich

That's not a case! You're just asserting things. Now, maybe you're God and saying it makes it so in your case. But I don't think you are and as such you owe an argument. You need to show that something I said was false. Doing that requires more than just saying "I don't agree", as if reality conforms to your will.

Anyway, I think this isn't really going to go anywhere useful so I will be ignoring you from now on. I was really hoping that there might be some out there who know more about Wittgenstein's view than I do and who might be interested in defending him against what I said or clarifying that he did not hold the view I have attributed to him.

It was your idea. You presented it as what made communication possible. — Paine

But I supported it with an example. Do you think that I did not communicate with the other person in the example I gave?

Yes, you're derailing the thread in my view. Unless you can make a case for the falsity of something I said, then you're not engaging with me or the subject matter.

I think it is, for Wittgenstein does not say that a private language is unlikely, but that it is impossible. If something is impossible, then it is necessarily not so.

I don't see that it matters where or how a disposition arose, as that is not going to affect how effective it is at enabling communication between people.

I don't think you are. Plus those are just some more of your thoughts and they don't constitute any kind of case for anything.

Assume it arose randomly.

If not, then could you point me in the right direction, — Arcane Sandwich

Well, you need to engage with the case presented in the opening post. If someone makes a case for thinking that P is needed for S, then one is not engaging with that case if one simply says "I think R is needed for S". That's just a thought, not a case.

So, if you think what I said in the opening post was false, then to engage with my case you'd need to say what more particularly was mistaken in what I said and why.

I was engaging with Wittgenstein, who thought language requires socially agreed-upon rules, for instance. I was trying to show why I think that is mistaken.

My post was about language and what's needed for one. You seem to be taking things off topic.

Does that realization upset you somehow? I think it's marvelous. — Arcane Sandwich

Do you disagree with something i said? i am not clear what your point is

By the time we get to agree to things, we're already successfully communicating - and so don't actually need to agree to things (not that I'm against us agreeing to things or think it can't make things easier).

In my example, no one agrees that S means "i am having experience P". I just use the sound in the hope that it will convey that meaning, and because the person I am uttering it to is disposed to beeive I am having experience P when I make sound S, the communication is successful. No agreement was needed or had.

What happens next is that, because we talk to each other, we agree to use some of the same terms — Arcane Sandwich

But how do you agree to something unless a language is already up and running?

Suppose it just arose randomly. That doesn't seem to affect whether the communication was successful or not. All that seems to matter is that my making the sound with the intention of conveying to you that I was having experience P, successfully conveyed that information. That its doing so was, say, a 1 in a billion shot, seems not to matter.

So, I want to convey to you that I am having sensation P. I randomly make the sound "S" in order to do that. As it happens, you're disposed to form the belief that I am having sensation P if you hear me make sound S. Thus, I say "S" with the intention of conveying to you that I am having sensation P, and you consequently form the belief that I am having sensation P. That was a successful bit of communication, it seems to me. It's hard to see how it could be more successful, anyway.

But I have read works by Christian philosophers and I have met Christians and talked to them, and i also know that the word 'God' is not used by 99.99% of people who use it to mean 'nothing'.

There are no doubt people in mental asylums who use the word 'God' to refer to Tuesday, or to a sack of plums, but that is not sufficient to show that the word 'God' is used that way typically. It is not. And if you use the word 'God' to refer to 'nothing' then you're not using the word properly.

And you're not even using it consistently. As 'beyond conception' doesn't mean 'nothing'. There is really little to be gained from our discussing things further.

namely, what I think is an erroneous conception of God. — Wayfarer

'God' is not the concept of nothing. There's no point arguing with someone who thinks otherwise. It is akin to insisting that 'God' means 'turnip' and then insisting that God exists because there's a turnip in your vegetable rack.

No Christian who deserves the title believes God is 'nothing'. That's obvious. For there is now no difference apart from in the sounds they use to refer to themselves between an atheist and a theist.

Anyway, I can't be bothered with you anymore. Bye.

Excellent point. Look, rather than playing Judy to my Punch try and engage with something

That is precisely what 'creation ex nihilo' means. — Wayfarer

No. It means the act of creating something out of materials that did not previously exist. The creator already exists.

On the contrary, according to Christian doctrine, only God can create something from nothing. — Wayfarer

That's absurd. I am not a Christian, but I am quite sure that Christians do not believe that God is nothing.

Plus we are talking about the PSR, not Christianity. And the PSR says that EVERYTHING has an explanation. Not some things and not others. Everything.

Those who try (in my view, quite misguidedly) to use PSR to make a case for God, or a divine creator of some sort, do not suppose that something can come from nothing. Again, that contradicts the PSR.

It is another basic principle of reason - one that those who appeal to the PSR to make a case for a divine creator also endorse (if they're thinking straight, anyway) - that 'from nothing, nothing comes' (Parmenides).

They - the makers of the cosmological argument, or this version of it anyway - reason that as everything has an explanation, and 'nothing' explains nothing, then there must be at least one thing that explains itself. And that thing, they then argue, is God.

I do not think that argument is sound, but we should at least be clear about what it is.

I don't agree that God is a person. I have never heard anyone saying God is a person. Can you prove God is a person? — Corvus

Then you need to get out more (and maybe consult a dictionary while you're at it). It's what the term means. If you're using 'God' to refer to a brand of beetroot then you're just being misleading and tedious. Anyway, I'm not debating with you anymore as it's clearly not going to be worth the effort, plus you were needlessly rude.

I don't know if it does. It says that everything that exists has a reason for its existence. — Wayfarer

I don't see a difference. By 'everything' I am referring to everything that exists. So everything that exists has an explanation (according to the PSR). I'm not endorsing the PSR, but just noting what it says and arguing that the defender of it in this thread is substituting it for a different principle, one that says that 'everything except necessarily existing things' have explanations (though this too would not get him the right result either, as this principle would render all existing things necessarily existing, which would then amount to saying that nothing has an explanation).

The 'first cause', whether conceived of as a personalistic God or not, is not something that exists, but the condition of the possibility of the existence of everything that exists. — Wayfarer

That does not make sense to me. Something cannot come from nothing. One cannot explain the existent by citing that which does not and has not existed.

Those who try and use the PSR to show that God exists do not deny this, for if something can come from nothing then there is no need to posit God.

This seems to be the problem in your thinking, which is leading you to the faulty reasoning. You are equating God with a person. They cannot be the same. God and person are not the same being or class. No person is omnipotent from inductive reasoning. Only some God can be omnipotent. — Corvus

That seems conceptually confused on your part. God is by definition a person. If you're using the term 'God' as a label for a mindless object or something then you're just misusing the term. I think someone who misuses terms like that - or happily changes what they mean by a term whenever convenient - isn't worth debating with as it would just take too long to nail down what they're talking about.

If a being is omnipotent, then the being cannot die. If being can die, then it is not an omnipotent being. Therefore you are talking nonsense here — Corvus

That's both rude and untrue.

You don't seem to know what 'omnipotent' means. it means 'all powerful'. It doesn't mean 'unable to die' . I am repeating myself, but you seem to be having difficulty grasping the point, despite it being quite straightforward. If an omnipotent person is 'unable' to do something, then they're not omnipotent. So you are the one who is demonstrably talking nonsense, as it is not in dispute that contradictions are nonsense and in asserting that an omnipotent person is unable to die you are asserting a contradiction.

I take 'God' to mean a person who has the three omni properties (omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence).

What I want to know is what philosophical problem the ability of God to commit suicide raises? Do you think an omnipotent person can't commit suicide? That seems conceptually confused, for how could they qualify as omnipotent if there is something they cannot do? (It is sometimes held that God cannot do things that involve a contradiction. But this isn't one of those).

Is the thought that doing it is incompatible with being morally perfect? That doesn't generate a puzzle either as it is only the 'ability' that we are talking about, and even if it is wrong to commit suicide, that only implies that God won't do it, not that he can't.

So I just don't see a puzzle of any kind here. i think it is now on you to explain why you think there is one and what it is.

If you 'define' God as 'someone who can't commit suicide' then you haven't raised a puzzle either, for then 'by definition' God can't commit suicide and the question was like "are squares four sided?"

But the PSR says that everything has an explanation. If one stipulates that there are things that do not need an explanation, then one is rejecting the PSR.

Here's my example: 'A thing that exists and needs no explanation'. I am going to call that a ticketyboo.

Have I just proved that at least one ticketyboo exists? No.

Can I explain the existence of a ticketyboo by pointing out that, by definition, it exists and has no explanation? No.

The PSR says everything has an explanation. If there are exceptions, then it is false.

That's the main problem.

A second problem is that necessary things confer necessity on anything they explain. The things they explain would also exist of necessity. Yet they'd be explicable (so it is false that if something exists of necessity it lacks an explanation). Plus, not everything that exists seems to exist of necessity.

It seems to me, then, that it is illogical - a contradiction - to think that the PSR implies the existence of necessary objects. It doesn't - can't do. And it is false that necessary things lack explanations (for anything a necessary object explains will also exist of necessity, yet will have an explanation). And it is false that labelling something a necessary thing constitutes an explanation of its existence. That's how things seem to me at present. Not that I'm endorsing the PSR or denying that there may be necessary existences. I'm just pointing out inconsistencies in the original poster's position.

I'll unpack the explanation: if a thing has necessary or inherent existence, then the proposition "this thing, whose existence is inherent, exists" is a tautology, — A Christian Philosophy

So, an 'existent thing' is the label for something that exists. Now, by definition something that exists, exists. Everything that exists is an existent thing - there. Have I just explained everything? No, of course not. I've explained precisely nothing.

As far as I can see, that is what you've attempted above. It's not in dispute that a necessarily existing thing exists and can't not. But if the PSR is true, then there will be an explanation of that. You haven't provided one, I think.

There was nothing in this thread saying you have sat in a chair. — Corvus

That misses the point somewhat! There's no puzzle. There's nothing to discuss.

God is by definition an omnipotent person. So 'of course' they have the ability to kill themselves. Why would you think they don't?

I am just asking you to explain what is philosophically puzzling about any of this.

If I say that I am sat in a chair, that is not philosophically interesting. No puzzle that needs resolving is raised.

An omnipotent person can - has the ability to - commit suicide. What puzzle does that raise? Is there any reason to think God lacks that ability? If there is no reason to think God lacks that ability, then what puzzle is there? If there is reason to think God lacks it, what is that reason?

I do not see that there is any philosophical puzzle here. The answer to the question is surely just 'yes'? An omnipotent person has all abilities. Therefore, they have the ability to commit suicide.

What philosophical problem is that answer supposed to raise? I am not yet seeing it.

The PSR is logically incompatible with there being necessary existences.

A necessary existence is something that exists and can't not. That is just a description of what one would be, not an explanation of its existence.

Therein lies the problem. The PSR says everything has an explanation. Not some things and not others. Not contingent existences but not necessary existences. Everything.

Labelling something a necessary existence does nothing to explain it. THus, any necessary existence you posit has itself to be given an explanation.

Labelling something 'a thing that needs no explanation' or 'a thing that has its explanation in itself' is no explanation of why those things exist.

Here is a different way to make the same point. Let's just posit a necessary existence. And let's suppose that there is a necessarily existing light source behind this necessary existence. Well, now there is also a necessary shadow being cast by the interaction between the necessarily existing object and the necessarily existing light source.

But note that the shadow, though it exists of necessity, is explained by the light and the object. Thus, one cannot treat 'exists necessarily' as synonymous with 'needs no explanation'. The shadow exists of necessity, yet it clearly needs - and has - an explanation.

Well, that now applies to the object and the light source too and to any other necessary existent you care to posit.

The point is we seem to have reason to think there are no ethical principles if an evolutionary account of our development is true. I don't draw that conclusion, but it is not clear to me why it's mistaken.

If the PSR is true - and you think it is - then you can't just say that something is fundamental or basic. Such a status is precisely what the PSR denies.

The PSR says that everything - everything - has an explanation. So what's the explanation of it?

I do not see that you've really addressed my point.

This is, I take it, a paradigm example of a non-normative judgement: Jane is disposed to do X.

This, by contrast, is a paradigm example of a normative judgement: Jane is morally obliged to do X.

An evolutionary account of how we have come to be as we are is only going to justify judgements of the first sort, not the second.

In order for it to be true that moral principles exist, then it needs to be the case that some judgements of the second sort are true. But there is simply no reason to think any of them will be if the evolutionary account does no more than describe how we might have come to be disposed to believe in such principles and to make corresponding judgments.

This is precisely why evolutionary accounts of our development are held to present a challenge to the reality of morality. For again, even though there is a dispute over exactly what it would take for moral principles really to exist, there is no dispute that our own beliefs in them are not sufficient to make them exist. And so as the evolutionary account is only going to explain how we have acquired the beliefs - and acquired the beliefs without us having to posit the existence of what they are aboout - it is going to debunk those beliefs.

Moral beliefs rank alongside religious beliefs in being beliefs that we can provide evolutionary explanations for without having to posit their objects. And in both cases, the beliefs are not vindicated, but debunked.

Here is an argument against suicide. Killing another person is wrong (other things being equal) and that is not seriously in dispute. It is also not seriously in dispute that it is wrong mainly because of the harm it causes to the victim. The main ground of the wrongness of killing another is the harm death does to the victim.

It is implausible to think that death only harms a person when someone else kills them, but not if they kill themselves. If I accidentally step off a cliff to my death, my death is just as harmful to me if someone had pushed me off the cliff instead.

Therefore, whether self-inflicted or other-inflicted, death is harmful to the one who dies. (None of this is seriously in dispute; 'why' it is harmful - yes, that's in dispute...but 'that' it is harmful is not)

There is clearly a moral difference between inflicting death on another and inflicting it on oneself. That seems obvious too. But there is no difference in the amount of harm it does to the one who dies.

From this it follows that a person has powerful reason not to kill themselves under most circumstances - circumstances in which their continued living would not harm them more, anyway.

That's a case against suicide. It's not a moral case - the conclusion is not that it is immoral to kill oneself (though it may be), but that it is imprudent to do so. The reason it is imprudent to kil oneself under most circumstances is that doing so will harm the one who does it more than continued living would .

It seems like a very strong case too, as if you argue that death is not harmful to the one who suffers it, then you're going to struggle to explain why it is so wrong to kill someone else.

Logic is a first principle of epistemology. This is defended in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR", steps 1 to 4. As a first principle of epistemology, an appeal to logic is a valid form of reasoning that fulfills the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

You haven't answered the question. What explains it?

That's the PSR on the metaphysics side. The PSR on the epistemology side demands that explanations be no more than necessary. — A Christian Philosophy

We're going on circles. No, they're two completely distinct principles. One says everything has an explanation. The other says that, other things being equal, the simpler explanation is the true one. Or that we have reason to think the simpler is the true one (for it won't necessarily be true).

They're just quite plainly distinct

If others seek clarification about a point, why do not simply give an answer to clear it up? — Janus

I have told you numerous times what the word 'solipsism' means. If you haven't grasped it by now, then either you are being obtuse for kicks and giggles or you do not have the ability to grasp the concept. Either way, we are not going to get anywhere.

It seems that Clearbury is not at all clear on that point, so s/he wants to bury it so that others won't notice the central problem with the OP, namely the lack os a clear account of how s/he understands solipsism. — Janus

No, you just seem unable to understand or accept definitions when offered. Anyway, let's not have any more interactions as I don't think it's going to be profitable to either of us.