I think good objections are being made to your positions. I realize I still have to reply to your post <here>, where you elaborate on this idea:

So If i were to for instance attempt to stop someone harming my child, it's not because I think its right, its because I, personally, don't want that to happen because it'll make me feel bad. — AmadeusD

For example:

No, no. It is narcissistic: I care to not feel like i violated my own moral principle. That's it. That's where it ends. — AmadeusD

There is circularity here: "My morality is based on my feelings; and I respect others' rights because I don't want to feel as if I violated my morality." If "violating morality" is just the same as a bad feeling, then it doesn't really make sense to talk about not wanting to feel as if you violated your morality. You could tidy that up, but I think is right. It is a kind of mischaracterization of the situation (and your verbiage betrays this).

Another way to see this is to ask yourself why you respect some putative rights and do not respect others. Is it really just a matter of your feelings? If that were so then you wouldn't be able to give an account of why you respect some rights rather than others (other than a non-rational appeal to your feelings or emotions). But I doubt the situation is as opaque as that. In fact if you give me an example of a putative right that you accept and a putative right you reject, I'll bet I could explain why in a way that is rational and not merely an appeal to emotion.

Your source has https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0091302211000252?utm_source=chatgpt.com <-

You need to be reading your own papers please, not typing into chatGPT and citing things. — Philosophim

That just means that he asked ChatGPT to do his homework for him, and it gave him that paper. The paper itself is not generated by ChatGPT.

Admiring and wanting the body of the opposite sex for yourself is an entirely different subject. — Philosophim

Okay, gotcha.

sex expectations as markers for correct sex identification are usually extremely accurate and easy to identify — Philosophim

Even for prepubescent children?

I'm not sure I agree even for adults. What are the specific "markers" you are thinking of?

Gender is always about sex. It is the expectation for how a sex should act. — Philosophim

Okay.

Anytime you think gender should shape anything sex related, you've elevated it over sex. — Philosophim

But what happens if people say that an institution should consider gender rather than sex? What if they say, "I am not saying gender should shape something that is sex-related. I am saying that gender should shape something that is gender-related. I think this institution should turn on gender, not sex."

I can draw this out if it's really necessary. My argument could be summarized as follows:

• L1. If something is "different from what is usual," then it is special
  
  • {from the definition AmadeusD provided}
• L2. Humans are different from what is usual
• L3. Therefore, humans are special

Your response is something like, "If everything is special then nothing is special," which results in the notion that this idea of 'special' is . This is your argument:

• A1. If that which is different from the usual is special, then everything is special
• A2. But not everything is special
• A3. Therefore, it is not true that that which is different from the usual is special
  
  • {modus tollens}

The problem is that you've made your argument an enthymeme by omitting A3, and this is significant given that A3 generates your self-contradiction. Namely, A3 is a rejection of a particular definition of 'special', and that definition is the one that you yourself provided. Hence my complaint. (Note that A3 contradicts (2) in my own argument.)

You keep implying that the definition that you picked out is insufficient:

The definition of special is "better, greater, or otherwise different from what is usual." — AmadeusD

The more rational route would be to simply admit that you want to revise your definition, namely by omitting that final clause, "or otherwise different from what is usual." This would result in a definition such as, "better or greater than what is usual." But that still leaves you with a difficult argument to make, namely the argument that humans are not better or greater than what is usual.

The argument didn't work. — AmadeusD

Why not? Again, in order to claim that a formal argument did not work, you must show that a premise or inference is incorrect. The only attempt you made at such a thing was your claim that other species use language, and so I revised the argument (because it never depended on that isolated claim anyway). So what premise or inference is incorrect in my revised argument?

Here it is again with the language part removed for your benefit:

1. Humans are the only species which "uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God"
2. If something is "different from what is usual," then it is special {this is from your definition}
3. The only species which "uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God," is a species that is different from what is usual
4. Therefore, humans are special — Leontiskos

As I pointed out in my first post to you, the issue is that liberalism provides no grounds for the preservation of the realm (and your example of martial law is but a single, more extreme, example of this). Combine this with the common liberal view that that which cannot be justified by liberalism is "very problematic," and you arrive at a remarkably deep level of political incoherence. The pure liberal can't justify martial law, but it's so much worse than that. The pure liberal can't even justify the distinction between citizens and non-citizens. Again, smoothing this over as if it were a minor problem with liberalism is wild.

Thus liberal democracies [...] do have legislation that basically is illiberal. — ssu

Right, and that's my point. I'm not sure how this fact can simply be smoothed over.

I gave you the definition. It is not mine, I did not make it up - I am adhering to the given definition. — AmadeusD

But if you are adhering to it, then what is wrong with the argument I provided you?

Think about it, Amadeus. You claimed that humans are not special. I asked what you meant by 'special'. You gave me a definition of 'special'. I gave you an argument showing that, according to the definition you provided, human beings are special. Then in response you start waving your hands around in the air, as is too common on your part.

If you accept the definition you provided, then what is wrong with my argument?

So a relativist has a conundrum -- how to make an argument against foundationalism without making a universal or truth-based claim? — L'éléphant

A very cogent post. :up:

Just to give an example of how political leadership can dismantle political landmines: When Finland closed totally it's border with Russia and stopped to follow the earlier guidelines on treating asylum seekers as before, several legal experts raised questions of this going against the current laws. The Prime Minister simply acknowledged this indeed "this was very problematic", yet that national security overrode this. The Russian intelligence services were actively pushing undocumented immigrants to the border (something that was extremely easy to verify from interviewing the immigrants) and making a "hybrid attack" in this way, which everybody understood. There was no criticism from EU, which understood the situation. — ssu

The problem is that liberalism does not acknowledge the value of the preservation of the realm, and therefore what Finland did is not justifiable on liberal principles:

Standalone liberalism results in a very strange view of public life. Consider the first
duty of the sovereign: to preserve the realm. I can think of no liberal principle,
classical or modern, that justifies such a duty. Today’s debates about immigration and
borders turn on this venerable imperative. I don’t see how the great liberal theorist
John Rawls could have found a reason to distinguish between citizens and non-
citizens, at least not in his great work, A Theory of Justice. The same holds for his
libertarian adversary, Robert Nozick.

There are other political imperatives that fall outside the scope of liberalism. From
time immemorial, regimes have sought to promote marriage and religion. These are
not liberal ambitions. More generally, the imperative of solidarity, however
understood, falls outside the scope of liberalism. In many instances, efforts to
promote solidarity run counter to liberal ideals. Although a Fourth of July parade is in
many respects a celebration of liberalism, there’s nothing in liberalism that endorses
grand expressions of collective loyalty. Indeed, I can well imagine John Stuart Mill
warning us about the subtle coercive effect, the insidious tyranny of a social
consensus. — R. R. Reno, The Return of Strong Religion

The whole notion that opposition to immigration, or transgenderism, or Islam, is per se wrong, is a classically liberal position. In our day and age the problems with liberalism are becoming increasingly obvious, and the ruling class in Europe is slow to admit this.

One of the most prominent examples, someone made a racist tweet about immigrants and included the line "Set fire to all the fucking hotels full of the bastards for all I care."

I couldn't find an example of someone going to prison for a tweet that didn't include some kind of actually violent rhetoric. — flannel jesus

We are seeing political censorship trying to pass itself off as something legitimate. If someone argues against immigration they are called a "racist" and that's the end of the story. They must be silenced.

Regarding violence, if Linehan had spoken of punching a pedophile, or a rapist, or an anti-immigrationist, he would not have been arrested. It's obviously not about inciting violence, given that the form of speech that is censored has to do with political points of view, and if someone had the "right" political perspective then the same level of "violence" would not be prohibited.

The other point about violence is that the lower classes will of course resort to violence if you destroy their lives with bad policies and then gaslight them whenever they attempt to voice their concerns within the system. You can only gaslight the majority for so long, especially in democracies. If you don't allow them to have a say within the political arrangement, then they will disregard that arrangement. They are very naive who think they can carry on with the censorship and the gaslighting and the problem will just go away.

If I may - it means that your identity formulated by your brain... — Questioner

Emphasis added to help provide clarity.

And that identity is something like, "I identify as a woman, even though I am not a woman; and what this means is that I am due all of the privileges and rights that a woman is due, even though I am not a woman."

I would be hard to overestimate the confusion of such a position. It requires first separating gender entirely from sex, and then taking everything that is socially correlated with sex and transferring it to be socially correlated to gender, and then saying that one's gender is just whatever one says it is. The whole idea is hilarious. It naturally induces laughter.

A parallel would be, "You must pretend that I am a rattlesnake, and anyone who does not so pretend is legally liable." "You must feel fear when I shake my rattle. You must train your dogs to abstain from attacking me. You must become poisoned when I bite you. If you fail to do these things we will throw you in jail." Again, laughter is the involuntary response and the proper solution here. :lol:

Thank you! That's a rare compliment. Also thank you for drilling into it more, its good to test it further. — Philosophim

You're welcome.

But suddenly the man thinks because they've dressed a particular way, and that they enjoy doing this so much, that they must be an actual woman. That is sexist. That is taking an expectation of how women should act, then identifying yourself with the sex of that woman. If the man thinks, "I should be able to go where women are because I'm a woman," that's sexist. The reality is this is a man who enjoys certain behavior some would prejudice towards women. But the enactment of that behavior in no way makes that man a woman. — Philosophim

Would it then follow on your view that the woman who uses a woman's bathroom because she looks like a woman rather than because she is a woman, is engaged in sexism? Or it this incorrect because she is not acting "over and against" sex?

To speak quickly, I think one difficulty with the position is that sex and gender actually are interrelated in a social sense, especially if we consider everything pertaining to appearance as pertaining to gender. If we get away from the rule which says that everyone who looks like a woman should use the women's bathroom, and everyone who looks like a man should use the men's bathroom, then it's not clear how we will "police" bathroom use without invasions of privacy.

Second, it's not clear what the error actually consists in, namely, "Elevating gender over and against sex." It seems to me that if we enforce that consistently, then we can never talk about gender in a way that does not presuppose sex. I guess I'm okay with that, but is that what you're saying? If not, what does it mean to elevate gender over and against sex? And instead of mere examples I would need an actual explanation of what this means. (Does it mean something like believing that one's gender is more important than one's sex, and is contrary to one's sex, and acting on that belief while at the same time requiring others to do the same? I.e. creating public policies that are gender-based rather than sex-based?)

That definition is in quotes, indicating it is not mine. It is the definition of the word. — AmadeusD

I asked you for a definition of 'special' and you that definition. Did you give me a definition you do not accept? :yikes:

(Just so you know, the level of quibbling and evasion that you are engaged in within this thread is precisely what gets people onto my ignore list. So if you enjoy our conversations I'd suggest upping the ante.)

I think this is important. I’m interested in people who think differently from me (part of the reason I joined) and in understanding why they think that way. I also think we’re in a terrible place, even in Australia, where conservatives and progressives (for want of a better term) talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient. We need to listen. Having said that, I’m not especially fond of activism on either side. — Tom Storm

That makes sense to me.

I hear you. I'm probably on the progressive side compared to you but I have conservative intuitions such as wanting to preserve certain institutions and traditions. — Tom Storm

Yeah, I think conservation of at least some things is something most people are interested in.

I’d be interested in what you find. He’s a contentious figure.

I’m intrigued by our own anti-immigration and populist politician, Pauline Hanson. A fascinating long essay was written about her party and its membership, which was useful in helping me get my bearings. — Tom Storm

Interesting. In some ways I think Fuentes is a red-pilled young man with an all-or-nothing attitude. He feels as though if he stops short of 100% he will not have the effect he wants to have. This leads to an iconoclastic attitude towards cultural shibboleths. In some ways it's fairly simple. For example, on race Fuentes has grown up in the midst of an ever-growing problem of black crime in Chicago, and because speaking up about the problem leads to gaslighting in the form of "racist" accusations, Fuentes ends up embracing or at least disregarding the label ("I'd rather be a 'racist' than be murdered"). I had a hard time understanding his anti-Semitism until I watched a video from a British guy (Connor Tomlinson) explaining Fuentes' position in the midst of the recent fallout of a Piers Morgan interview (link). Tomlinson seems to be representing Fuentes' ideas in a much more rational and polite way, and at the same time explaining the phenomenon of Fuentes and his followers. You spoke of the way the two sides, "talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient," and Fuentes is an example of how that approach can blow up in our faces.

The moral question for American conservatives is something like this: is Fuentes an anti-immigrationist who happens to be anti-Semitic? Or is he an anti-Semite who happens to be an anti-immigrationist? Or does it not matter?

The moral principle that few understand is that all immoral acts come down to a form of neglect (i.e. neglecting what one knows they are supposed to observe). Fuentes might say, "When I say 'Hitler is cool,' I am referring to a lot of the things he did apart from genocide, such as raising a nation out of the ashes, or his military prowess, or his style and skill at public speaking." The problem is that if it is impermissible to obliquely affirm genocide, then none of these reasons work as justifications. Or to give a simpler example, if one is not allowed to kill people, then one must also take pains to avoid being neglectful in ways that could cause someone's death. "It wasn't my intention for him to die," is not a sufficient justification if the person was doing something they knew could reasonably cause others to die. But if you back a young man far enough into a corner, he simply won't care about these nuanced moral distinctions, and that's sort of understandable.

Firstly, great post. — Tom Storm

Thanks. There is one thing I want to come back to:

My understanding is that [moral naturalism is] the view that moral facts, if they exist, are grounded in natural facts about the world rather than in anything supernatural or non-natural. — Tom Storm

This specific understanding of moral naturalism is also something I am okay with, especially as pertains to the OP. There is a notion in the Anglophone world that moral realism goes hand in hand with divine command theory, and my guess is that this stems from Anscombe. I'd say it is really hard to overestimate how faulty such a thesis is. Divine command theory is a latecomer to the theological scene, especially in Christianity, and it doesn't really solve any meta-ethical questions. Connotatively, moral (or ethical) "naturalism" more often refers to the alternative to the ethical non-naturalism of the 20th century. But that's why I asked what you meant by the term. I am fine with it on either reading, but if you mean something like "non-religious," then it is much easier to agree that it is a reasonable view.

Yes, I have often thought this too. For me, as a non-philosopher with finite time and years left, there is an issue around what I can legitimately acquire in terms of knowledge and perhaps more importantly understanding and wisdom. It's clear to me that most of the significant debates in philosophy, including moral philosophy, require some significant reading and study. Most of the recurring questions of philosophy have not been conclusively answered, and some of those answers are more complex than the average person can ever hope to understand. It's hard to know what to do. Sometimes a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing, as we sometimes see on this forum. — Tom Storm

I understand what you are saying.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

I don't think of you as a non-philosopher. I don't think academic philosophy has a monopoly on philosophy. In fact I think academic philosophy is oftentimes positively unhelpful, unphilosophical, and ivory tower-ish. For example, in I argued that my four year-old nephew engages in philosophy, and I did this in response to some TPFers who seem to think that if you're not rearranging existential quantifiers then you must not be doing philosophy. I don't mean that as hyperbolic. That exchange with my nephew was philosophical. It was more philosophical than many of my exchanges on TPF.

So whether or not you are reading through the academic philosophical positions on meta-ethics, I think you are doing philosophy. In all honesty, I think the best moral philosophers are probably not academics (and that some of the worst moral philosophers are academics). Judges, school teachers, counselors, pastors, business managers, sports coaches - these are the people who are actually competent moral philosophers. The best objection to this claim of mine would be, "Well they are morally skillful individuals insofar as they routinely navigate and adjudicate deeply complex human interactions, but they may not be able to explain any of that on a theoretical level." That would be a fair objection, and I might amend my claim by saying, "Okay, but some of them really can explain the theory behind it, and those people tend to understand the theory better than the academics. They engage the theory on a day-to-day basis with real stakes and real consequences."

For example, the person who tries to think through the problem of their estrangement from their adult child is doing moral philosophy in a pre-eminent way.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

Yeah, I get that. Aquinas says that we should enter the ocean through small streams, not all at once. So you start where you are, and build out from what you already have. Maybe you think twice about your wife's perspective in the last argument you had. Maybe you step back from an unfortunate decision that your boss made and try to understand the way he sees the world, and then compare it to the way you see the world (and try to deeply understand and even justify why you would not have made the decision he made).

If you're thinking about literature then Plato comes to mind. He is remarkable insofar as he exercises everyone, from beginner to advanced, with the exact same texts. Beyond that, good fiction literature is extremely fruitful in a moral sense, because it provides insight into the complexities of human life and human persons.

If you really want to do the academic thing then you probably want to start with handbooks or overviews.

it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

The more general question here has to do with the tension between improvement and contentment. "Have I devoted sufficient energy to improvement? Is it okay to be content with where I am? Is my contentment really complacency?" It's always a balance, and it changes with age, duties, the availability of leisure, etc.

For my part I try to devote more attention to the perspectives and moralities in my immediate vicinity (e.g. family, friends, local community, my own country...). It might be fun to read about Confucian morality from 2500 years ago, but if you're talking about a "mandate" then it's not to the point. For example, I am currently trying to understand Nick Fuentes and the movement that he represents, because he is relevant to my country, to the region where I live, to my conservative political sensibilities, to the young men who I interact with, etc. To illustrate, someone like Fuentes says, "I live in Chicago where there is rampant gang violence committed largely by blacks. Therefore for my own safety and the safety of my family I must be racist towards black people, avoiding the neighborhoods where they live and taking extreme caution when interacting with them." The moral philosopher is the person who takes that perspective seriously and tries to interact with it in a fruitful way instead of just writing it off as malicious and irrational racism. The attempt to respond rationally and effectively to those racist perspectives is currently a topic of interest in the U.S.

I would say yes (phrased this way because I can't view myself from the outside with my own set of beliefs etc..). I can recall a couple of occasions on which I went to help someone, mucked it because I didn't know what I was doing and walked away laughing because it entertained me as best I could be entertained. One of these occasions was to leave a child without a parent at an event at which they were bound to get lost and likely hurt. I am not proud of this period of my life in any way, to be clear. — AmadeusD

Okay, that makes sense.

But it seems clear to me that a thought, or a decision to cross the road is not an act in, at the very least, the same sense as crossing the road. Could that be agreed? — AmadeusD

Sure.

They (tend to)follow one another and are of different kinds "That I have decided to act" is probably better put for this discussion, but I see a clear and meaningful distinction between "acting or not acting" on the one hand, and what the act is on the other. An example might be the trolley problem. Doing nothing gives us one impression - and either of the choices gives us a separate, slightly askance impression. Dovetailing, to be sure and so I was wrong to be quite so stark about and thank you for that. Is "killing a child" immoral? Well, imo yes. Is "deciding to kill a child" immoral? Well, also probably yes but if then you are prevented from doing so, we're talking about different things as the 'act' (in my use) hasn't actually occurred. — AmadeusD

Okay, this does help. Let's revisit that initial formulation that you maintain is clear, "That I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral, in this case." Taking the child case, you seem to say that the decision and the act are both immoral, albeit in somewhat different ways. If this is right, then your principle only holds in certain cases, namely the principle, "That I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral." That's not inconsistent, as you did follow it with, "...in this case."

Still, the problem is that if someone gives a principle and then follows it with, "...in this case," or, "...sometimes," then they have effectively nullified the principle. It is one thing to say, "Decisions to act are moral but physical action is not." It is quite another to say, "Decisions to act are moral and physical action is not, sometimes." The "sometimes" immediately raises the question, "Well when does your principle hold and when does it not?" Without that explanation the principle can't actually function in an argument.

If you "didn't care a lick" then you wouldn't have tried to help in the first place. — Leontiskos

You are confusing whether i care to help, or whether i care to succeed. Remember, my form of morality is essentially narcissistic. I care that I tried. I don't care much about the success. I understand and don't fault you for not believing this. But I can tell you it's true as many times as you like. — AmadeusD

You're telling me that you try to do things without trying to succeed at the things you do. I'm sure you understand why I don't believe you, given how strange your claim is?

If you speak to someone then you already desire that they listen. If you have no desire that they listen to your words, then you will not speak. — Leontiskos

As with above, no, I care that I spoke. It's pretty self-interested. That's, as I see it, the discomfort with emotivist. It is by definition self-interested and not concerned much with outcomes other than insofar as they make one feel a type of way. I understand why people don't like it. — AmadeusD

The problem is that speaking and being listened to are "two peas in a pod." No one speaks to someone without wanting that person to listen to them. A cooperative activity cannot be purely self-interested in the sense you require. It's like saying, "I get on the teeter-totter and I push off the ground. I care that I pushed, I don't care whether the other person provides a counterweight. It's pretty self-interested." The problem is that teeter-totters make no sense without a counterweight.

Is it? I don't quite think so. If that's what you've gotten, I have far more work to do about the semantic issue. — AmadeusD

Here is an example from a previous conversation, where you critique the use of the words 'right' and 'wrong' in relation to morality:

If "right" and "wrong" are to inform moral systems [...] then that supposed fact is contradicted by the obvious fact that 'right' and 'wrong' give us nothing which could inform the system as they are too ambiguous and essentially self-referential. — AmadeusD

-

I guess the novel aspect of my position is that once I've begun to act, the morality isn't involved until something changes in the context — AmadeusD

Well, would you agree that all along you are running the "background process" of "helping," and that this "background process" is moral? The whole time you are helping him construct the cardboard box you are helping, and so if helping is a moral act then it seems to be operative throughout. If you stopped running that "background process" then you would also stop building the box.

Some rights I couldn't give a flying F about. — AmadeusD

And I am obviously not speaking to those.

So I can recognise that someone has right x, understand they enjoy that right at Law, and still not give a shit. — AmadeusD

Well you've literally claimed in this thread that there are certain rights of others that you would not transgress, so obviously there are some rights you give a shit about. Obviously my argument had to do with those rights rather than ones we haven't spoken about at all. Given that you are averse to transgressing some rights, you surely care what effect your actions have on other people (who possesses those rights).

Moral systems have, over the centuries, existed and exerted certain power over people. Those systems are essentially incompatible (Catholic, Islamic, Secular, NAP, what have you..). So a system must be put in place to adjudicate between them. I do not think it a moral exercise to essentially mathematically work out (although, this is a little bit misleading, I do think it amounts to a calculation-over-centuries) what the most people would assent to and agree with. — AmadeusD

I do. In fact I think your "mathematical assessment" is itself a moral position, namely a quantitative form of democratic morality. If someone says, "This moral disagreement will be resolved by a majority vote," their method of adjudication is itself moral. There are other ways to resolve moral disagreements than a majority vote, or a mathematical assessment.

Given huge numbers of people disagree with laws and in fact, often violate them for specifically moral reasons, tells me that laws are not moral creatures — AmadeusD

That's an invalid argument. "This law can be broken, therefore it is not moral." The same is true with, "This law can be broken for moral reasons, therefore it is not moral." But the second claim rests on an equivocation on the word 'moral' (which I incidentally address in my OP, beginning with the third sentence of the introduction). Indeed, when someone breaks a law for moral reasons they are presupposing that the law itself is immoral, and an immoral thing is a "moral" thing in the broad sense (just as a murder is a moral act, albeit not a good act).

Essentially, what I think is that a law of the land operates as a neutral arbiter between competing social interests. — AmadeusD

How do you figure it's neutral? We literally argue over laws. How does the outcome of that vociferous argument become "neutral"?

So law just goes "Well, mathematically, that's a small group so we wont take that into account - we've observed that most people prefer x outcome" — AmadeusD

Again, you are appealing to a kind of majoritarianism, which is clearly a moral position. "We ought to do whatever most people want," is a moral claim.

Now, I may be overselling this - I can see good arguments for your point of view - they don't move me much as laws are not there for the purpose of making people feel good. They're there to maintain a mathematically(non-moral) deduced middle ground that most people will be ok with (moral). It is a very, very fine line and it's possible I am incapable of wording things correctly 'on paper'. I cop to that. The people are moral, the law is not. As I see it. — AmadeusD

Fair enough. In a technical sense you are elevating a classically liberal notion of law as if it were the only possible or reasonable notion of law, and given that you have grown up in a classically liberal society that is totally understandable. Most societies do not consider their "normal" to be moral/idiosyncratic. Classically liberal societies assume that all societies function via a "mathematical" notion of law.

Fuck. I should have read this first.. .LOL. Thanks man. Enjoying this one a lot. — AmadeusD

Haha

I don’t have one.

My understanding is that it’s the view that moral facts, if they exist, are grounded in natural facts about the world rather than in anything supernatural or non-natural. But I have encountered a range of uses of the term.

I imagine that if you’re going to pick a goal for morality, like wellbeing or flourishing, moral naturalism woudl identify facts that support that choice. But does this start to look like a secular substitute for transcendent grounding? — Tom Storm

The contemporary thinker I personally follow most closely is Peter L. P. Simpson, who defends what he calls "ethical naturalism," but it's hard to specify the contours of such a thing without getting into his book. Also, I don't think that level of detail is necessary in order to avoid the problem I've pointed to with regards to relativism. I think 180's approach does a fine job avoiding the problem I've raised in this thread.

Part of the issue here is that I don't think we ever did get back to your question about the is-ought objection. We could do that, but it would inevitably take us into the weeds a bit. Without getting into those weeds I would just say that most people with common sense are not troubled by the is-ought objection. Arguments like, "It will cause exceptional and avoidable suffering, therefore I should not do it," or, "This will contribute immensely to the wellbeing of me and everyone else, therefore it should be done," do not strike them as invalid inferences. There are some is-ought inferences which seem to be plainly valid.

That seems tedious. — Tom Storm

Maybe, but it's not fruitless. "Stop eating candy or you will ruin your dinner," is one example of prioritizing long-term pleasure over short-term pleasure, or a robust notion of well-being over mere pleasure-seeking. My issue with that utilitarian move isn't that it is incorrect in itself, but rather that it is hard to justify all of the well-accepted moral truths with that idea.

Ok. So I always assumed a foundation for morality meant something philosophically important, serious and disciplined or potentially transcendent in source. Can one not say that the foundation of my moral thinking is whatever gets me money? I’m assuming that a foundation need not involve beneficial concessions toward others? — Tom Storm

I think so. I admit that I didn't follow your conversation with Fire Ologist very closely, but I myself think well-being is a perfectly reasonable and defensible moral standard. When people want to argue for a more "transcendent" standard they are usually concerned with specific, rarefied moral truths or norms (e.g. "You should be willing to sacrifice your life for the good of your family if push comes to shove"). That's an interesting argument, but my objection in this thread is much more mundane and universally applicable.

Can one not say that the foundation of my moral thinking is whatever gets me money? I’m assuming that a foundation need not involve beneficial concessions toward others? — Tom Storm

I'm fine with that. I knew that I was talking to you, and I knew that you held to things like, "One ought not allow the strong to harm the weak." Obviously you need more than a money-aim to justify that sort of moral claim. Also, some might object that the person who acts out of avarice is not moral in the traditional sense of the word. I am happy to concede that, but I am also not as fussy about the word 'moral' as many others are. I think it is a matter of semantics whether we allow ends like avarice to be counted as moral ends.

Note, though, that the person who seeks money will have a harder time rationally justifying their position than the person who seeks well-being. This is because—as Aristotle points out—money is a means of exchange without intrinsic worth. If one does not seek money for the sake of the things that money can buy, but rather seeks money and the accumulation of money as an end in itself, then they would seem to be acting in an intrinsically irrational way. Put differently, you should be able to give someone everything money can buy and at that point they should have no real desire for money. If they still desire money at that point then they desire a means without an end, and are therefore irrational.

-

When I talk about positions, I mean (as one example) how one constructs the notion of human flourishing. I know a number of academics who are conservative. They are often steeped in Greek philosophy and hold the familiar Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia as the goal or telos of a good life. Yet they are also right-wing, Liberal voters who are happy to cut people off welfare and dismantle safety nets. — Tom Storm

I think this is a good observation. You are obviously right that there are different moral positions and approaches. :up:

Or opt out entirely, which is also tempting. — Tom Storm

I would suggest that no one can opt-out entirely, except perhaps the hermit who abandons all civilization and lives self-sufficiently in the wilderness. Aristotle calls such a person a 'god' given that this is basically impossible to do. If we interact with other human beings then we must also decide how to interact with other humans beings, and anyone who does that already has moral positions, whether they understand them or not.

I do think it's knowable in a serious way. I think human worth is infinite, regardless of the utility of the human, as a matter of belief. — Hanover

And I'll believe you as soon as you replace "think" with "know" and "as a matter of belief" with "as a matter of knowledge," in that second sentence.

I quite literally did. — AmadeusD

Let's look then:

Language is not specific to humans. The others work, and I may need to think on them - But i still can't see how that makes us special. — AmadeusD

"The others work but I can't see how that makes us special." The argument is literally explaining to you, step by step, how it makes us special. I don't know how to make it any easier for you. It's mind-boggling to me that I even had to write out such an obvious argument. Here it is again with the language part removed for your benefit:

• 1. Humans are the only species which "uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God"
• 2. If something is "different from what is usual," then it is special {this is from your definition}
• 3. The only species which "uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God," is a species that is different from what is usual
• 4. Therefore, humans are special

What are you talking about? It's not 'my own' definition — AmadeusD

It is your definition (link). I asked you for your definition of 'special', you gave it to me, I constructed an argument showing that humans are special according to your own definition, and now you are trying to backpedal out of your conundrum.

I understand your point but (and I'm not trying to be a dick here) I'm under no obligation to be consistent. My views on many things are inconsistent. I do concede that wilful inconsistency may exclude one from most reasoned arguments and discourse. — Tom Storm

Right, one could say that there is no problem because they are happy to be inconsistent, or incoherent, or to have double standards, or to be hypocritical. I have only met one person who said such a thing, and they are inevitably on my ignore list (for obviously it isn't possible to talk to a person who flip-flops back and forth constantly without admitting it). Such a person will also end up with a malady like schizophrenia. But I grant that someone could embrace all of this, sure.

Interesting. But it depends on what you mean by a foundation. — Tom Storm

I mean basis, rationale, justification, grounding, etc. "I have no reason to maintain this position, but I am going to do it anyway."

I would put it like this: X is my belief about what is right, and I situate it within a contingent, revisable understanding of what seems to work better for promoting wellbeing. It isn’t grounded in any ultimate moral foundation... — Tom Storm

The foundation here is well-being, plain and simple. If one didn't have a foundation then they wouldn't be able to appeal to well-being as a reason for their position. Someone who says, "I hold X because it promotes well-being," is someone who grounds morality in well-being.

That said, I also like the idea that moral judgments may be grounded in natural facts about people. Humans experience suffering as bad, and conditions that reduce it tend to support wellbeing and social functioning. For that reason, reducing suffering counts as morally better. — Tom Storm

This is a foundation of "wellbeing and social functioning," which is very close to what you said just before it.

One issue I have with this is that some people like suffering and the idea: "no pain, no gain" has some merit for any athlete or high achieving person who has to work hard and sacrifice many things (suffer) to achieve a goal. I guess the moral naturalist would qualify this by identifying unnecessary suffering and that which is not chosen. — Tom Storm

A utilitarian will just do a short-term vs. long-term contrast and say that some short-term suffering reduces long-term suffering, and is thus preferable on the utilitarian calculus. Someone who champions well-being would say that well-being means more than not-suffering, and that well-being may involve suffering in certain ways.

What are your challenges to moral naturalism? — Tom Storm

First I would need to know your definition of moral naturalism.

I simply disagree. — AmadeusD

You can't "simply disagree" when I give a formal argument using your own definition. You have to actually address the argument, and claim that a premise or inference is incorrect.

Using this definition, literally any species could be called special. That is precisely how that word loses meaning. — AmadeusD

Then you disagree with your own definition, but I already pointed out what you are saying and you denied it:

You say, "I say babies are not special, but none of this really matters because 'special' is an arbitrary concept that could mean anything and everything." — Leontiskos

That's not quite it. Special does mean something and we've been given that definition in this thread, and applying the label can be accurate or inaccurate. I just happen to think its inaccurate here. — AmadeusD

...and now you're back to saying that 'special' is an arbitrary concept, "Using this definition, literally any species could be called special." Well it's your definition that we are using, so if you have a problem with the definition then that's on you.

But of course, please disagree if you see something more. — Philosophim

So the argument here...

In a traditional sense it cannot given the way that it differs from the traditional possibilities that constitute sexism. Namely, it is a cross-genus favoritism rather than favoritism within a single genus. — Leontiskos

...is that sexism involves an oppositionality between sexes or between genders. Or we could put it this way:

Having a preference for one sex or the other is not sexism. Sexism would be if you had a preference for one sex, and treated that sex better in ways that were only backed by your personal like, disregarding merit, capability, or objective good of the person. — Philosophim

Which sex or gender does the trans activist prefer? Which do they discriminate against? Which are they prejudicial towards?

The answer seems to be "none of them," and this is why I'm not sure the trans activist is sexist. Each one of your examples gives a case where someone is unfairly privileging one sex or gender over the other, and it's not clear that the trans activist does this. The trans activist does not opt for any of the positions outlined <here>; they show no favoritism with respect to individuals of a particular sex or gender. If you disagree, then where would you say the trans activist indulges favoritism on the basis of a particular sex or a particular gender?

(I suppose "elevating gender over sex" could mean a number of different things.)

But gender is based on sex. — Philosophim

Okay, I agree.

An 'ism' happens when someone insists on their prejudices despite clear facts to the contrary. — Philosophim

Okay, I understand your reasoning.

So to be clear, I don't think its sexism to declare gender, or even declare a gender identity. It is when the prejudice of gender elevates itself above the reality of sex that it becomes 'sexism'. — Philosophim

Would you say that the elevating of sex over gender is sexism?

Going back to our previous example. If the man said, "Since you work outside of the home, you aren't a woman, you're a man." — Philosophim

Okay, I see what you are saying.

Hopefully with the above you see that this is not categorized as sexism. Having a preference for one sex or the other is not sexism. Sexism would be if you had a preference for one sex, and treated that sex better in ways that were only backed by your personal like, disregarding merit, capability, or objective good of the person. — Philosophim

That's fine, but aren't you disagreeing with the definition from Merriam-Webster that you provided? That definition makes no distinction between culpable and non-culpable sexism.

Hopefully my deeper dive demonstrates why it would still be sexism. — Philosophim

I think you make a formidable argument to the effect that all gender-based identifications at bottom implicate sex, and are therefore also sex-based. I think that's probably right, and I understand your position much better after reading this post. :up:

...But the other strange thing about the trans activist is that although their position is based on gender, it does not involve "prejudice or discrimination" in the way that those words are commonly understood. The way those words are commonly understood, one is only discriminating on the basis of gender if they prefer one gender over the other (and they are only discriminating on the basis of sex if they prefer one sex over the other, or act in a way that ends up favoring or controlling based on sex). In the case of the trans activist what is occurring is not any kind of gender favoritism (such as preferring masculinity over femininity or vice versa), but rather an elevation (as you say) of gender itself. — Leontiskos

Another way to put this is to provide an exhaustive list of the possibilities:

Sexism (based on sex):

• Favoring males over females
• Favoring females over males
• Doing something which harms females more than males
• Doing something which harms males more than females

Sexism (based on gender):

• Favoring the masculine over the feminine
• Favoring the feminine over the masculine
• Doing something which harms feminine individuals more than masculine individuals
• Doing something which harms masculine individuals more than feminine individuals

If this is an exhaustive list of the possibilities of sexism (as prejudiced or discriminatory), and the trans activist does not attach to any of the options in this list, then the trans activist must not be sexist. So the question is whether, "favoring gender-based categorizations over sex-based categorizations," can be called a form of sexism. In a traditional sense it cannot given the way that it differs from the traditional possibilities that constitute sexism. Namely, it is a cross-genus favoritism rather than favoritism within a single genus.

That's not quite it. Special does mean something and we've been given that definition in this thread, and applying the label can be accurate or inaccurate. I just happen to think its inaccurate here. — AmadeusD

Okay, so:

The definition of special is "better, greater, or otherwise different from what is usual." — AmadeusD

I don't know of any other species which uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God. If humans aren't special then I don't know what is. — Leontiskos

• 1. Humans are the only species which "uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God"
• 2. If something is "different from what is usual," then it is special
• 3. The only species which "uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God," is a species that is different from what is usual
• 4. Therefore, humans are special

This is to support my claim that you denied:

Your definition seems to apply especially to humans, given the considerations I listed. — Leontiskos

Thank you, I'm grateful for someone addressing the OP. — Philosophim

Happy to help. :grin:

That's fair. We can say at this point that even if it is sexism, that isn't necessarily a bad thing. We can address it after we resolve if it fits sexism first. — Philosophim

Right.

Ah ok. Bob pointed this out earlier and I had given it some thought as well. — Philosophim

Regarding the term 'sexism', I think Merriam-Webster does well insofar as it does not deviate from those last three words in its definitions: "based on sex." Whatever sexism is, it is based on sex. Yet the trans activist is relying on a basis other than sex...

I thought at first there might be a better term for what I was describing and thought, "genderism". Turns out that word is taken and means something very different. — Philosophim

...and as you say, their position is based on gender.

'Sexism is prejudice or discrimination based on one's sex or gender.'
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexism — Philosophim

...But the other strange thing about the trans activist is that although their position is based on gender, it does not involve "prejudice or discrimination" in the way that those words are commonly understood. The way those words are commonly understood, one is only discriminating on the basis of gender if they prefer one gender over the other (and they are only discriminating on the basis of sex if they prefer one sex over the other, or act in a way that ends up favoring or controlling based on sex). In the case of the trans activist what is occurring is not any kind of gender favoritism (such as preferring masculinity over femininity or vice versa), but rather an elevation (as you say) of gender itself.

Such a person prefers gender-based categories over sex-based categories. As you rightly say, they elevate gender over sex. There is something new about this move. It doesn't fall into traditional categories such as sexism or racism, because what at bottom is being elevated is the act of self-identification or self-creation. The trans activist effectively says, "It doesn't matter whether you are male or female; what matters is how you self-identify, and that is what should be the norm for policy." As I said in my last, this is a form of nominalism, where human constructs are being elevated over reality-based concepts.

Both delineations are sexism, but we can now categorize them by types: biological vs sociological. — Philosophim

I'm fine with that. I see what you are saying. :up:

If so, feel free to propose that despite it being sexism, that is not inherently wrong in itself. — Philosophim

I think the Merriam-Webster definition is too broad for a moral concept of sexism, given that it would vilify even things like, "Men are better boxers than women." But maybe we really do need a non-pejorative usage of sexism.

As I read him, he's suggesting that it's often possible to sharpen up a contested term in a way that all the parties can agree to. But he's not saying we should do this by dubbing one use of "real", for example, to be the correct one, even for purposes of argument.

[...]

Instead, he thinks we can be upfront about needing a new (but related) term that "carves better at the joints." — J

This is pretty basic self-contradiction. "No one use of 'real' is more correct than another, even in the context of an argument, and yet we do need a substitute word for 'real' that 'carves better at the joints'."

Even the dogmatic pluralist must admit that something which "carves better at the joints" is something which is better, or more correct, particularly within the contextual fabric of an argument.

You seem to be saying that humans don't need to meet the criteria to be considered 'special' and Leon seems to be saying that actually they me[et] the criteria. — AmadeusD

Right, and I would say that you and @Hanover are very close on these sorts of issues. You share all of the same premises but simply fall on a different side of the issue. In this case you both think the question of whether something is "special" is arbitrary and generally undecidable in any serious way. Hanover says, "I say babies are special, and you can't gainsay this because the whole question is arbitrary and undecidable." You say, "I say babies are not special, but none of this really matters because 'special' is an arbitrary concept that could mean anything and everything."

Because gender is subjective and subject to the whims of an individual or group, and placing gender over sex in matters of importance matches the definition of sexism, I just can't see any good reason to consider gender as anything more than a prejudiced and sexist social pressure. We should seek to minimize gender as anything more than an ignorant and potentially bigoted human opinion about people based on their sex. — Philosophim

This is an interesting OP. I more or less agree that gender should not be elevated over sex, but I don't agree that this is sexism. Let's look at your argument:

2. Definition of sexism

prejudice or discrimination based on sex OR
behavior, conditions, or attitudes that foster stereotypes of social roles based on sex
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sexism — Philosophim

I actually don't like this definition as grounding a moral argument, but let's accept it for the sake of argument.

Lets imagine we have a society that only has one gendered difference between men and women. "Women should cook in the kitchen. Martha does not cook in the kitchen, therefore she is not a woman," that would be sexist. The proper thing would be to tell Martha, "People's expectations of how you should act based on your biology can be ignored. it does not change the fact that you're still a woman." A social belief of how a woman should express themselves elevated above and counter to the realities of their biological existence is simple social sexism.

On the other hand, if William, a male, decided to cook in the kitchen and someone said, "William isn't a man," this would also be sexist. Once again, this is the elevation of a social expectation above and counter to their biological reality. — Philosophim

There is an equivocation occurring here between two different definitions of sexism:

• 1. Sexism would include behavior, conditions, or attitudes that foster stereotypes of social roles based on sex
• 2. Sexism would include the elevation of a social expectation above and counter to biological reality

The examples you give will not allow us to distinguish (1) from (2), but other examples would. For example, suppose someone says, "Men are better boxers than women." This claim is sexism on (1) but probably not on (2), given that the social expectation is not counter to biological reality.

More simply, the definition of sexism on which you are relying says nothing about the social expectation being "above" or "counter" to biological reality. In fact it says that any behavior, condition, or attitude that fosters stereotypes of social roles based on sex is sexism, regardless or whether such things do or do not elevate the social expectation above and counter to biological reality.

What this means is that the definition of sexism that is operative in your argument requires defense, given that it is different from the dictionary definition you provided. I do not think someone who elevates gender over sex—such as a trans rights activist—is sexist. Rather, they are nominalist. They want to elevate self-identity claims over biological norms. They desire a social order that is in no way based on biological sex.

I lack the capacity to learn nuclear physics. That is true. — Hanover

Is it, though? I think you're just saying something like, "It would be really hard, therefore I lack the capacity." I think this is another invalid claim.

An infant born without a brain lacks any ability to learn Spanish ever. To say he has the potential to learn Spanish if he has a brain inserted and that is simply an impediment is to say the same of trees. If only the tree had a brain, it could speak Spanish. — Hanover

But you're just reaching at this point. You're pretending that it makes sense to talk about infants born without brains, as if human beings could live without a brain. You've fallen into a form of eristic. If someone without a brain comes out of the womb then it would not be valued in the way you say all babies are valued, because we do not value dead things equally with living things.

No, I hold that the murder of a Down's Syndrome child is just as much murder as murdering one without that disability. — Hanover

Well you claimed that you wanted to talk about common opinion. Now it turns out that you don't, because it doesn't help your point. You've abandoned the standard that you yourself erected when it became inconvenient, and this is a sign of bad faith argumentation.

But anyway, I thought there was more confusion here than there was. You truly didn't follow my counterexamples. The reason I reject your claim that human specialness is linked to the complex intellectual capacities found in human adults is becuase many humans lack those characteristics, both currently and in the future. — Hanover

Lol, you're just reiterating your confusion and your strawmen. You're still failing to address the idea of final causality and falling into Humean probabilistic thinking.

But part of me also wonders: if Leon is right, does it really change anything? All it means is that I can’t argue meaningfully with certain members on a philosophy forum because they’ll probably claim my position fails a test of reasoning.

What really matters is the world. I can still vote, belong to organizations, and support values and promote alliances based on my view of what constitutes a better way of organizing society. Do I need any more than this? — Tom Storm

I think what you've already recognized nullifies this sort of argument:

It has always seemed self-evident that one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak. But perhaps I should never have intervened, and in future, perhaps I won’t. — Tom Storm

"Perhaps I need to change my behavior." What I've done is pointed to a kind of inconsistency between your actions and your words. It follows that if you want to be a consistent person and you think what I've said is true, then you must change either your actions or your words. So it seems fairly clear that it does change something.

I’m tempted to pose what if no one really has a foundation for morality, some just think they do and therefore believe their views are grounded? — Tom Storm

Again, we are talking about you (and me). If you don't think you have a foundation for morality, then your behavior will change on that basis. No one says, "I don't have any foundation for my position but I am going to maintain it anyway."

I don't follow. In my example, I said I had no capacity to learn Spanish. I therefore lack that potency. I just can't do it. It's not within my ability. It'd be like teaching a pig to sing. — Hanover

But that's not true, is it? You do have a capacity to learn Spanish, and you know it. Pretending you don't isn't to the point.

No, that is what is infants usually do. I'm talking about an infant named Bob and Bob's brain is malformed, he has cancer throughout his body, and he has every other imaginable problem that will absolutely interfere with any ability for him to grow into an adult. That infant has infinite worth and to kill him would be murder. His abilility, potential, capacity is to never have any of the things a fully capable adult will have. — Hanover

If an infant is born deaf then we might say he lacks the potency to learn Spanish, but we might not. In one way he does, in one way he doesn't. The intelligent person would say, "This infant would be able to learn Spanish if he were not deaf" (even though Hume would apparently have trouble with that). What this means is that the infant has a potency to learn Spanish, but that potency is being impeded by an impediment, namely deafness. To say that an infant born deaf has no potency to learn Spanish isn't correct. It would be correct to say that a Maple sapling has no potency to learn Spanish, but not that the deaf infant has no potency:

That you've again misconstrued the position proves my point. We are talking about a telos of human babies, not "what mostly happens." If you actually understood what was being said, then your claim that it only "mostly happens" would entail that human babies sometimes grow into adult giraffes or oak trees or something other than mature humans. — Leontiskos

-

That infant has infinite worth and to kill him would be murder. His abilility, potential, capacity is to never have any of the things a fully capable adult will have. — Hanover

Nevertheless, your position here is still wrong based on the metrics you have provided (common opinion, etc.). For example, common opinion deems it much more permissible to kill an unborn baby if it has certain disabilities, such as Down syndrome. Similarly, if the impediment in question is more easily removable, then the baby is deemed more "special." For example, a baby with the impediment of a heart problem that can be fixed by modern science is deemed more "special" than a baby with the impediment of Down syndrome.

The same thing happens at the end of life, where we literally call those who have irreversibly lost characteristic human functions and potencies "vegetables," and our ethical deliberation hinges on this distinction. So when you claim that, according to common opinion, all babies or all humans are treated the same regardless of their potencies, your claim is false as a matter of fact.

Where does this leave the original question? It seems there remains an inconsistency, or something left incomplete, when asserting there can be “shared practices” and “inbuilt awareness that needless harm and suffering are bad” or “moral naturalism”, while also maintaining aversions to beliefs in a “single universal truth.” — Fire Ologist

Yeah, I think it's a good observation.

For example, if is constrained to maintain , "one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak," then it would seem that he is committed to the universal (moral) truth, "One ought not allow the strong to harm the weak." This idea of, "My morality does not require universal truths," does not seem to hold up.

You're not saying "I think a thing can be special in virtue of potencies that it does not currently possess." You're saying a thing can be special in virtue of potencies it will never possess but that those like it likely will possess. If speaking Spanish makes something special, then I am special if I can one day speak Spanish. My counter is suppose I can never learn Spanish. I have no such capacity. Can I still be special just because most humans can learn Spanish? — Hanover

Your premise is invalid, "If an individual never ends up possessing X, then that individual did not have a potency for X." You have a potency to play jazz music whether or not you ever actually do.

If speaking Spanish makes something special, then I am special if I can one day speak Spanish. — Hanover

This is a variant of the error I've already pointed out. The claim is not, "Every individual who will eventually speak the Spanish language is special," but rather, "Every individual who has the potency (or capacity) to speak the Spanish language is special."

A talent scout for NASA may have a goal of building rockets. They will seek out individuals with a capacity for rocket-building, not merely individuals who can currently build rockets. It would make no sense to object to their choice by saying, "But this person you picked can't currently build rockets, so it was a bad choice. They lack the specialness or value you are seeking." ...Nor would it make sense to claim that only individuals who have built a rocket have the capacity to build rockets.

You use "naturally" here to mean "usually" — Hanover

No, I certainly don't. Put Hume out of your head for a moment. A human infant does not grow into a human adult because this has happened in the past. A human infant grows into a human adult because of their telos; because their natural manner of growth has the term of human adulthood. If God made a human infant it would still naturally grow into a human adult, even if this had never happened in the past.

I referenced norms, not differences. Holding the door for the person behind me is a norm where I live, but not so up north. That's socially derived. If you're saying that people have hands and dogs have paws, I think we're in agreement, but surely you couldn't have thought I didn't know that. — Hanover

But what does talk of norms have to do with the thread, or my claims? Why are you suddenly talking about norms?

We're talking past each other if you've missed this. I have all along consistently said that ability does not equate to worth. If all you're saying is that "special" means "different," then this conversation amounts to just itemizing the differences between two things. I already said that in my reference to what an anthropologist might note, all of which I'd agree with. "Special" connotes a positive attribute, which is why we're asking why a person is special. If special just means different, then we can say what is so special about cars versus trucks or whatever. Is that what we're talking about?

What I mean by special includes the concept of norm governed behavior surrounding the thing. That is, we can break a glass, but not kill a person. The specialness of the person demands it be treated differently and the social response to the behavior shows how the thing is considered. — Hanover

Okay, that is helpful. It sounds like you want, "The baby is special," to mean something like, "The baby has value." Still, I don't see how this functions in relation to my argument. The special nature of the human being that I outlined also brings with it a specific kind of value.

I've been pretty openly attaching your specialness to moral worth. — Hanover

"Moral" doesn't appear very often in this thread. It does appear in the OP, but only in the claim that what is being spoken about is not a moral attribute. So if you think the thread is about "moral worth" then I think the OP itself should correct that misunderstanding.

Do you think I have difficulty in understanding that most infants grow to adults or that every adult was once an infant? — Hanover

That you've again misconstrued the position proves my point. We are talking about a telos of human babies, not "what mostly happens." If you actually understood what was being said, then your claim that it only "mostly happens" would entail that human babies sometimes grow into adult giraffes or oak trees or something other than mature humans.

Your position is that the specialness derives from ancestory. — Hanover

Nope. "Human babies naturally grow into human adults," does not come to, "The specialness of human babies derives from ancestry."

Just for the fact that my kin is special, so am I. — Hanover

No, that's not even close.

I require something inherent within the actual entity to designate it special. — Hanover

Again, you deny final causality.

Let's pretend that the special-making quality of human beings has to do with their speaking of the Spanish language. I might say, "Humans are special because they can speak the Spanish language." Your rejoinder in this thread would be, "On that reasoning, only Spanish-speakers are special, and that's absurd." Or else, on this new reading, it has something to do with ancestry or kinship with Spanish speakers, but I don't know how to make sense of such a thing.

When evaluating a particular human being, you restrict yourself to what they currently possess. If they do not currently possess the ability to speak Spanish, then you will say they are not special. I do not restrict myself in that way. I am talking about human potencies, not human acts (energeia). I am saying that a human is special because they have the ability to speak Spanish, whether or not they currently exercise that ability. I think a thing can be special in virtue of potencies that it does not currently possess; you do not. You refuse to talk about a potency that the individual does not currently possess. That's the difference.

Regardless of generation, there will be axioms, first principles we adhere to. That is required, and we can root them in whatever we want — Hanover

But you're equivocating. An axiom and a first principle are two different things, and axioms are by definition not "rooted" in anything.

Let's look at use. I break a glass: I sweep it up. I murder a man: sirens, helicopters, dogs, questions, evidence gathered, lab tests, prosecutors, judges, juries, etc. Why are people "special"? Why isn't the dead guy just swept up? You can pretend it has nothing to do with their moral worth, but you'd be wrong. — Hanover

The Moorean position does not turn on words, it turns on whether the [special]-making reason can be "empirical" (or more precisely, Lockean).

-

That means that my statement that people are special in a metaphysical way isn't vacuous, but that it exists yet can't be referenced. — Hanover

It looks like you are saying something like, "Humans are special, and we can know this by the way that they are treated, and yet there is no reason why they are special." Do you see how odd that position is? I bring up Moore because I know you're influenced by him, and I don't think such an implausible position would ever be put forward apart from that sort of influence.

Hey man, great set of questions/objections etc.. I have to prime you that I'm blunt in a few of these responses. Its not personal, or meant to indicate a shortness with you. — AmadeusD

Okay, but I think you need to actually revise your rhetoric if you really want to avoid coming off as "short." It's a bit like the person who says, "No offense, but [now I'm going to say something that is offensive]." If someone really wants to avoid offense, then they have to actually stop saying offensive things. It doesn't make sense to say offensive things and then slap on the disclaimer, "No offense intended." What I'll do is limit myself to those parts of your post that are substantive rather than "short."

Roughly, yes. I think difference cases would be phrased slightly differently, but that's the delineation I am illustrating. It's 'good' in my view to help my younger son build legos. Building legos has absolutely no moral valence at all — AmadeusD

Okay good, I understand what you are saying.

When i was sociopathic I often "helped" other people. Largely out of boredom. There was no moral decision. At all. The difference is my internal intention — AmadeusD

So are you saying that when you were sociopathic you helped people without thinking that helping people was right, and now you help people because you think helping people is right? It's the "because it is right" that changed, and made the non-moral act a moral act. Is that right?

If I getting this right, from you, then yeah pretty much. I guess it would be cleaner to say that i act is morally, but what my action is is not, in this case. — AmadeusD

See, I really don't know what that means, and I don't think you understand how unclear these sorts of claims are. There is nothing clean about the statement, "that i act is morally, but what my action is is not, in this case." Even if I try to clean up the grammar it still isn't clear to me: "that I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral, in this case." If you really think what you are saying is obvious, then it should be easy to express clearly and lucidly.

Contrasted with perhaps dragging a struggling kid from a pool - I'm not going to check if the kid wants to drown or not. My morality tells to do a moral act, in that case and the moral act is the entire act in that case. In our example here (helping someone put a box together lets say) only the decision to act, or more closely, that I act is the moral element. The actual instruction could've just been handing a sheet of paper over and walking away in disgust at how inept old mate is. — AmadeusD

I still don't understand what you are saying. So in your example of helping someone put a box together, you say that your decision to help them is the moral element. Or else "that I act" is the moral element. But those are two different things. Is it the decision or is it the "that I act," and what does "that I act" mean? Everything we do can be construed as an act. A decision is an act. Box-building is an act. Helping is a form of acting. So "that I act" is very vague given how broad the term 'act' is.

I should add that what you are attempting is quite difficult, philosophically speaking (i.e. the specification of moral acts or else human acts). It is not something which has easy or obvious answers. Tackling the problem requires a thoroughgoing application of one's mind. It requires careful thinking, and in turn, carefully constructed sentences.

Well, maybe, but you've got this the wrong way around: that is a result, not an act on my part. I don't actually care whether the person listens to me to be honest. My decision was simply to help. If that's rejected or misunderstood, I don't care a lick. — AmadeusD

Eh, I don't believe you. If you "didn't care a lick" then you wouldn't have tried to help in the first place. No one speaks to someone without caring whether they listen. If you speak to someone then you already desire that they listen. If you have no desire that they listen to your words, then you will not speak.

Because in making the decision, i am weighing explicitly where it sits ion my internal spectrum of right ad wrong. — AmadeusD

Okay, and I am glad to see that you're acknowledging that you have an internal spectrum of right and wrong, that you engage in moral activities and decisions, etc. That is different from conversations we have had in the past.

Violating others rights (although, that then begs the question of what rights I consider moral and not... that notwithstanding...) makes me feel shit. So I do my best not to. It doesn't actually matter too much what effect it has on the other person unless I've done it unintentionally. Then, their reaction is what makes me feel shit because it was unintended. If i intended to do something I knew would violate a right that i feel is immoral, why would I care about them being hurt? — AmadeusD

But I think you do care what effect it has on the other person. The whole concept of "violating another's rights" has this built-in. Someone who cares about violating another's rights eo ipso cares about the effects of their actions on other people. It is not possible to recognize another's rights without caring about the effects of one's actions on others.

No. The law is not a moral institution. It may appear that way, because collective moralities over time have shaped it - but in a pluralistic society it is a practical guide to disputes of morality in most cases. — AmadeusD

I certainly disagree, and yet it's not even clear that what you say here is coherent. "The law is not a moral institution; it is a practical guide to adjudicating disputes of morality." Does that make any sense? I think it makes more sense to say that an institution that adjudicates disputes of morality is necessarily a moral institution. I'm not sure how one would adjudicate moral disputes while remaining non-moral.

Law emerges from morality, as such, but is not itself a moral arbiter. It's just as best we can get to a "middle way" to decide issues for which people have strong moral beliefs. — AmadeusD

The same would apply here.

...But we don't need to get too deep into the nature of law, as it might make the conversation too long and unwieldy.

I thought the point of modern-style logic was precisely to avoid metaphysical issues. — Ludwig V

That's true, but such a goal is a fool's errand. For example:

Anything that is distinguishable as a distinct entity (within its category) can be substituted into the formulae, — Ludwig V

The modern logician wants to say things like this while pretending that recognizing what is "distinguishable as a distinct entity" does not involve metaphysics. These are the sorts of basic confusions that naturally arise when one banishes metaphysics with his left hand and beckons it with his right.

At the end of the day you end up with incoherent reifications of "logic" as some sort of Platonic form:

Logic learned to free itself from ontology. — Banno

- Here you go:

I don't know of any other species which uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God. If humans aren't special then I don't know what is. — Leontiskos

Sure, we could call humans 'special' but that's somewhat arbitrary. Tuataras are the only beaked reptile in the world. And also a near-dinosaur. We could call any specie special. — AmadeusD

What is your definition of "special"? I don't think it's arbitrary at all. I think I am adhering to the definition of 'special' and you are not. — Leontiskos

The definition of special is "better, greater, or otherwise different from what is usual." — AmadeusD

Both of those quotes from you seem to imply that humans are special. Your definition seems to apply especially to humans, given the considerations I listed.

And your reasoning doesn't make much sense:

• Leontiskos: "I don't know of any other species which..."
• AmadeusD: "Sure, we could call humans 'special' but that's somewhat arbitrary. [...] We could call any specie special."

I literally explained how humans are different from every other species, and you responded by saying that "we could call any species special" along with, "The definition of special is [...] otherwise different from what is usual." Not only do humans adhere to the definition you have provided, but you simply ignored the fact that I gave reasons why humans are different from every other species (and therefore we simply can't "call any species special" in the way I called humans special - humans are especially special). So yeah, I don't get the sense that you're trying very hard in this thread.

Trying to shame people away from important conversations is how backsliding occurs. — AmadeusD

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