you haven't shown that anything is complete though. You say "exhausted", it seems like you just want me to take your word for it. You're not making a case for it.

I'm failing to see how any of that is an argument for "a function of" meaning a one to one mapping. I think that's just a deep confusion of yours, and unfortunately it doesn't seem like you want to hear that. In a mathematical sense, if you have "a function of" many variables (like a function of lower level properties), that function doesn't just have a one to one relationship between the many inputs and the output. That's not what anybody else means but you. You seem pretty locked into that though and I can't pull you out.

and who says the functions have to be one to one? Why does it have to be "a specific property that relates to a specific property"? I just don't think that's true at all - I think you've invented this conception of how a function has to work and you've imposed it too strictly.

Any number of properties can be combined in any number of ways to create any number of system-level properties. It's not a property-to property one to one mapping.

Think about a high level property in Conway's game of life - a glider has the property that it travels diagonally. This property doesn't come about because of a one to one mapping with some specific property of the little pieces, this property comes about because of the interactions of many of the properties of many little pieces.

It's not one to one at all, and nobody else but you is talking about properties being functions of other priorities like it has to be one to one.

exhausts all functions? What does that mean?

It seems like you think every property of a system has to have a 1-to-1 mapping to a property of the components, and that somehow you know that all the available mappings have been taken before consciousness can be accounted for. I don't see why you think either of those things are true. Have you mapped ALL the system properties before consciousness? And where are you getting this 1-to-1 idea from?

what I'm trying to get at is, the way you've described both strong and weak emergence, the higher level property is "a function of" what's happening at a lower level in either case.

I'm not equating lag with the classic understanding of memories. Or to put it another way, the definition of the term "real time" is from the perspective of the individual, not a third person observer with a stopwatch. — LuckyR

Sure, and I think that makes sense as well

strong emergence, by which they mean that the experience is the result of the properties of matter in the brain only — MoK

Up here you say experience is strong emergence because it's the result of the properties of matter in the brain only. That's "a function of". Why do you think that's not "a function of"?

ironically though, it turns out studies from neuroscience tell us that our experience of "the present" is constructed with a slight lag, and so your present ACTUALLY IS composed of some memories - things that happened to you at least a few moments ago, but which you still perceive as "effectively now".

Though that's still obviously very different from memories from a few days ago. You're not confusing your "smeared present" with memories from last Wednesday unless you have serious neurological problems.

okay, well at least I've done my part in informing you that you're using those words in a way other philosophers who are familiar with those words will be likely to misunderstand. Strong and weak emergence don't mean what you mean to most philosophers who use them.

Even the way you use the phrase "a function of", now that I've realised what you've been saying the whole time, turns out to be off from how everyone else uses it.

I truly think that you've got entirely turned around on what the difference is between strong and weak emergence. In your op, you worded certain things that made it sound like you got it right, but since then you seem to have doubled down into what looks to be interpretations that are the direct opposite of what those two terms mean.

Even in this last post, you say strong emergence is "properties of matter in the brain only" and weak is "a function of the properties of the brain". Something is mixed up for you.

and do you think they're talking about strong or weak emergence?

I don't see how those two questions are related to each other. I'm just saying, strong emergence is absolutely the opposite of saying emergent things are not causal - if anything, they're MORE causal than weak emergence.

I call it "radical lastthursdayism".

Lastthursdayism tells you, you should be skeptical that your entire existence didn't start last Thursday, with all your memories implanted but they didn't actually happen to you.

Radical Lastthursdayism says, that's constantly true, all the time - your existence is being renewed every moment and your memories are effectively implanted.

I've been struggling to fully wrap my head around it, hence why I've been watching videos like the above. It's fascinating and confusing

But “arena” has to be analogy — Fire Ologist

sure

It’s not like “space” can be a “thing-in-itself” like an arena is a thing. — Fire Ologist

Not so sure about this one though. Why are you sure? Why couldn't space be a thing? Relativity tells us spacetime can be stretched, compressed, and warped, and that doing so has measurable effects (effects we have actually measured, in real life).

If matter moves on its own, and experience is the result of how matter moves, then how could experience be causally efficacious? — MoK

that's not what "strong emergence" is saying. I think you might have strong and weak emergence mixed up.

what the hell is space- time — Fire Ologist

The arena upon which events happen

If consciousness is a strong emergent thing, then it cannot be causally efficacious in the world where physical objects obey the laws of nature — MoK

I don't think this is correct. I don't believe in strong emergence, but if there were strong emergence it would be casual - arguably more casual than weak emergence. With weak emergence, one can argue that it's the lower levels that are casual, and the higher levels of abstraction are noncausal. With strong emergence, that fundamentally changes. With strong emergence, high level objects have a sort of fundamental existence to them that they don't have in weak emergence

I had this thought too but not as clearly worded

since I couldn't find a video, I did ask an ai for a summary. https://g.co/gemini/share/11f0f523d7b3

In short, special relativity had to be derived as a consequence of Michelson Morley experiment as well as Maxwell's equations, and then General Relativity because he needed a way of keeping gravity fully local (in contrast to Newtonian gravity which involves instantaneous arrival of updated gravity information). Also he had this idea - that was explained in the video - about how a guy falling wouldn't feel that he is falling. The "happiest thought in his life", right?

Hmm I had a look and I'm not sure he has done that for relativity. He has many videos going into depth on many aspects of relativity, but I don't think he has one that explains the origins of relativity itself.

he has a huge video series that looks at different aspects of relativity. He might have one that goes over the reasons why it had to be thought of, I'll see if I find one like that.

I just watched two videos of his that explain the original inspiration for the idea of quantizing energy that led to quantum mechanics, so he does go into that kind of topic

I think there are small enough intervals of time such that nothing has changed in your brain to make you feel any different than the moment before. Even then, the argument would be that this is simply a new moment with a new you who is, in every consciously relevant way, the same as the old you.

We all go through an imperfect transporter, literally every moment of our lives. Your body is not physically identical to itself from one moment to another: it evolves continuously in time — SophistiCat

As if right on cue! After my last post.

EXACTLY!

Even without injury, or misplaced atoms from a transporter accident, even thinking about a perfect transporter and the question of continuity of consciousness...

I actually think there's an argument for consciousness NEVER being continuous, period. Like even just you, now, not being transported. There's an argument that the you that is experiencing the middle of this sentence now is a different you than the one experiencing the end of the sentence now. That continuity of experience is equally illusory in a way, all the time.

It's an interesting thought and I do find it genuinely compelling.

However, in the transporter scenario, there's a binary that we've introduced: either you've survived the process -- whether or not you have brain damage -- or you simply died on the source plate, lights out. — Mijin

Honestly I think it's the same question with or without transportation.

But, in his OP, MoK, derived the conclusion that there ought to be such a "function" from the premise that there ought to be a "reason" why the system has the emergent property that it has. But this inference isn't valid. — Pierre-Normand

Yeah it definitely seems like op is more just assuming it's weak emergence. I mean I agree with that assumption, but I agree with you that he kinda leaps in with that assumption rather than making a good case for it.

The condition that the macro-property, or holistic property, be a function of the properties of the parts of a system (including, presumably, relational properties) seems too weak to preclude strong (irreducible) emergence and also too weak to guarantee weak (reducible) emergence — Pierre-Normand

I wasn't entirely sure what op meant by "a function of" in this context, so I (perhaps embarrassingly) asked ai:

In the context of the provided text, saying one thing is "a function of" another thing means that the property of a system can be mathematically or logically described and derived from the properties of its constituent parts [textual content].

If the macro property is directly derivable from the properties and interactions of its parts - as in, it can analytically be confirmed to be a necessary consequence of the interactions of the parts - I would say that that IS what weak emergence is. It's not too weak to guarantee weak emergence, it's basically the definition of weak emergence.

Another aspect is that because it relies on commitment rather than deduction, the easy counter to it is, it's assuming they're committing because they WANT to leave. I don't think anything in the problem statement explicitly indicates that they want to leave, just that they do leave when they've correctly deduced their eye colour.

But this aspect is less important than the previous one. It really matters when it starts working

We all think this never works. You know this doesn't work at low n, but think it does at high n. Therefore it is incumbent on you to find the special n where it starts working — hypericin

Yeah this is definitely an aspect that still bothers me. And it will endlessly make the "guru says nothing" solution distasteful unless it's figured out.

I will say that it's food for thought for me. I might seem dismissive and like I'm refusing to accept it, but I'm running it around in my mind and there are moments where I think, maybe... maybe Michael actually does have it right and the guru doesn't need to say anything.

I'm leaning towards thinking it's not correct but it's only a lean.

too much mind reading for me personally. Not deductive.

I think adding "we all know the same thing" is something unnatural you added tbh. It's not in the problem statement. It's basically cheating yourself into a false solution.

but they all know they could, and they all, according to you, know exactly the same thing, so they all know they could subtract 95 and it would still work. That'll save them some waiting. Why not?

Either way, I know that everyone with my eye colour knows exactly what I know, and so knows that if every person commits to the rule: "if the n
people I see with X
eyes don't leave on day n-95
then I will leave on day n-94
and declare that I have X
eyes" then everyone will leave the island having correctly declared their eye colour.

Therefore, I know that if every person commits to the rule: — Michael

Yes but you don't know that every person will do that. Therein lies the problem

the point you were focusing on is it's validity.

You enter some premise - some premise that isn't derived from the problem statement - and if you can use that premise with the rest of the problem statement to get everyone to leave with the correct eye colours, then it's valid. That's the way you've been arguing.

You've inserted a "commitment" and once inserted it allows you to get everyone to leave. I did the same with n-95

but you also know it's a valid argument if you replace a2 and B2 with this premise:

Every person commits to the rule: "if the n
people I see with X
eyes don't leave on day n-95
then I will leave on day n-94
and declare that I have X
eyes"

it might be, but unfortunately it exists in a sea of equally valid arguments with equally arbitrary premises. Suppose they replace 2 with committing to leave on X + 5 days. Or even X - 10 days. Hell maybe even X - 95 days, why not?

Seems like it requires mind reading to me for them to assume that about everyone else.

If they all could assume that about everyone else, sure, they get off the island. But they have no idea what everyone is committing to. This isn't a commitment puzzle.