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@Jamal@Michael

It is not my intention to digress, but it seems to me that you are resorting to ad hoc rationalizations to defeat my analogies instead of facing them as they are stated. Also, you are very accusatory I notice; what's up with that?

You added an extra condition to the story I told; namely, you demanded that there must be another way. You made this demand because it coheres with your understanding of God's omnipotence, an understanding that no classical theists would agree to; Bob Ross outlined what I find to be a quite good explanation of God's omnipotence in a classical understanding.

* parents could not intervene in suicidal missions,
* guardians could not stop terminally dangerous choices,
* authority would be morally hollow. — Truth Seeker

This is not so; you have misunderstood my argument. I stipulated that a parent can give permission to goals that the parent themselves find to be good goals. So, a parent can intervene if a goal is not good according to them; a parent who believes suicide is wrong would not give a child that permission. Guardians can stop dangerous choices. Authority would not be hollow.

“Parents must prevent all foreseeable risks.” — Truth Seeker

It might not have been your intention to make the claim, yet I think it is an implication of your position. If greater responsibility attaches to preventing harm, as you have asserted, then it follows that any preventable harm must be prevented or else the agent is responsible. In other words, if there is even a potential for harm that turns out to become actualized, the supervising parent must be responsible for not having prevented it. According to your argument, it would not even be morally acceptable for a parent to let their child leave the house, because the child might get a bruised elbow.

* Parents do not have certainty of death if their adult son joins the military.
* Parents do not have the authority to prevent adult children from joining the military.
* Parents do not have the power to prevent the harm even if they disapprove. — Truth Seeker

*It does not matter if death is certain, the possibility of death that the parent knows about should render them responsible on your account.
*Assume at least one parent in the world does have that authority and if they say "no military" then their child will obey them; it is not an inconceivable situation. You can deny that this is possible, but that would seem ad hoc, to me at least.
*By ordering the child not to join, they would thereby prevent any harm that would have occurred. The parent does have power in the relevant sense.

just say "water" means "H2O" — Richard B

Why is that controversial?

the term "water" when used in science refers to a collection of H2O molecules that under particular temperature and pressure conditions exhibit the macroscopic properties we typically call a "liquid." — Richard B

Okay then, "water" is interchangeable with...

a collection of H2O molecules that under particular temperature and pressure conditions exhibit the macroscopic properties we typically call a "liquid." — Richard B

So the whole practice of referring becomes pointless. — Ludwig V

I do not see the problem; could you say it in another way?

Thanks for answering and in a clear manner.

So you think the father should have forbade his son from going if I have understood you correctly. You think the responsibility to prevent harm has greater weight and therefore commanding the son not to go would be the right thing to do.

For the sake of transparency, I will say now that I disagree. I think the father's greater responsibility is to observe what his adult son wishes as long as that wish is a legitimate wish in the father's eyes; that is, the father agrees that the goal (mission) achieved is not a bad or undesirable goal.

Do you think all parents should command their children not to join the military, because the military entails foreseeable danger and therefore entails the potential for a harm that could have been prevented?

That would seem to follow from what you said earlier.

It is a separate question how such speakers come to agree on the meaning of a term.

But then I want to know how it is that other people can "get" what I am referring to, given that they may or may not be using the word in the same way as the speaker. — Ludwig V

Well if they aren't using the term the same way I would think that they would not get the meaning. If the meanings of the speaker diverge, they cannot have a discussion; but this appears to be something like a rule of conversation (see rules of conversational implicature by Grice).

But please provide your response to this: If you discovered "air" is composed of 78% Nitrogen, 21% Oxygen and 1% Argon, what is rigidly designated in every possible world? Which one do you say, if you don't have X you do not have "Air"? — Richard B

I do not think "air" is a rigid designator, and so I am happy to not designate any of the components, whether a majority component or not, as the necessary referent of the term "air."

This is the problem Kripke has with using the natural language term "water" and trying to call it identical with the scientific term "H2O". His only choice is to massage that vague term "water" into a precise term like "H2O" to fit in with his domain of logic. Chemistry sort of does that by applying the chemical naming convention by calling H2O, "dihydrogen monoxide". — Richard B

Is this Chomsky speaking?

I think the author is right that in everyday use, natural language terms can be multivalent as to what they refer to (example: "dont drink that water" in reference to saltwater, not H2O). On the other hand, water can, in the scientific sense, refer to H2O. And if water so refers, then when it so refers it will be the case that necessarily water is H2O as a result of the identity between the stuff and what is referred to by the term in that context. In that case, a posteriori necessary truths are retrievable as long as someone doesn't know that the stuff referred to as water is the same as the stuff referred to as H2O a priori. "Is that water H2O?" "I do not know, because I did not pay attention to chemistry in school."

Have they made some error in this case? — Richard B

My sense is that: yes, an error was made. The community thought that the stuff that was NaCl was H2O in a solid form, they were incorrect. They can refer to both as warder as long as they don't mean "H2O is NaCl" if they were to say "warder is warder."

Hi Richard,

I am not sure if I am well-versed enough in Kripkean semantics to respond to your objection. That being said, here are my thoughts:

Your objection appears to be that all instances of water are some mixture. And, if all instances of water are some mixture, and if it is impossible to refer to a part of a mixture, then it is impossible to refer to a part of "water mixture," namely, the part that is H2O. Compositionally and scientifically, you claim, water is not H2O. But if water is not H2O, then we appear to be limited to identity claims that we could know a priori (i.e. H2O is H2O) and cannot have access to a posteriori necessary truths. It is an interesting objection.

I think intensionality is relevant in matters of reference. My point here is that, when I refer to water, what I am referring to, what I mean, is not the NaCl or the mud or whatever else is in the water, what I am referring to is the H2O stuff. In that case, maybe I can refer to a part of a mixture. I think if you take the view that reference is fixed by the thing that is referenced, then the issue becomes an issue. In other words, if my composition of H2O and NaCl is what determines what I am referring to, then yeah, that would also determine what is meant by water. On the other hand, if what I mean by water is in some sense prior to or co-relational to the thing in the world that is being picked out, then I am not so sure that we have to use the actual-world instantiation of something when we refer.

The SEP article on rigid designation discusses another objection. The objection there is that water is H2O is in terms of content the same semantic statement as H2O is H2O. But if this were the case, that water is H2O would again appear to fail to be an a posteriori claim about the world. However, I think that this objection, similarly to yours, defines reference as an extensional matter; that is, as being based on what is in the world out there. If instead intensionality factors into reference, it seems that we can refer to the stuff that is water without meaning the stuff that is H2O even though water is H2O.

Would be interested to hear what you think about it.

Does the father have a responsibility to be mindful of his son's wishes?

There was once a young man who lived in a village. One day, he decided to go to the city; it was very important to him to go. But, if he goes, he will be killed and he knows this; nevertheless, the young man decides to go because there are people in the city that he is trying to save; he knows only he can save them. The father knows these people and wants them to be saved too. However, the father loves his son and does not want him to die. The father knows that the son will die if he goes, and he knows he can forbid his son from going and that his son will obey his commands. And yet, the father knows how important this mission is to his son. The father lets his son go to the city. The son goes and saves many people but is killed. Who is responsible for the death of the son: the father, the son, or the people of the city?

(at least the specific form of it that I defend) — Relativist

Right, so I would need a reason that physicalism, on every interpretation, entails determinism; or alternatively, a reason why your specific form of physicalism is the correct one (were I to agree with you that determinism is entailed by physicalism).

but since it's inconsistent with physicalism, I lean strongly away from it. — Relativist

Why is physicalism inconsistent with a libertarian free will account?

Rigid designation
The person in PW 5 predicated by “is a man named Aristotle” is the same person as the person in PW 6 predicated by “is a man named Aristotle”.

Non-rigid designation
I agree that the person in PW 5 predicated by “is a man named Aristotle” Is a different person to the person in PW 6 predicated by “is a man named Aristotle” — RussellA

Correct.

So the person predicated by "is a man named Aristotle" is a different individual or "entity" in each PW. This individual that has that predication does not change in that PW.

Right so given rigid designation the extension of Aristotle is Aristotle in all PWs where Aristotle exists. The extension of "Aristotle" in PW 5 is different than the extension of Aristotle" in PW 6 because the name "Aristotle" refers to different entities if there is no rigid designation.

I don't think "the pig" is a predicate as it appears to refer to a specific pig or individual. "Is a pig" on the other hand could be predicated of Babe as well as other pigs. Predicates appear to designate a "kind" to which individuals belong.

I agree with most of what you said except -->

Therefore, the thing that belongs to the predicate, such as “the pig”, can change dependent on which system of modal logic is used, one with rigid designators or one without. — RussellA

So it may be that there are no rigid designators across possible worlds. In that case, we may appear to have adopted Lewis' counterpart account, wherein a pig named "Babe" in PW 5 (possible world 5) is different, but similar to, Babe in PW 6. Point is, if there are not rigid designators, then we are dealing with different "entities" across worlds. These entities can have different predicates, but like I said, the things that belong to those predicates, per each PW, will not change. If pigs can fly in PW 6, then the version of Babe that exists in PW 6 will belong to the predicate "can fly" in that PW.

A statement about pigs generally spoken of would be de dicto. A statement about this or that pig would be de re.

Now you'll have to excuse me, I need to go get ready for Santa Clause, who must be a real existing person because people can describe him. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nobody tell him; let him have this one

To try to reformulate the issue: if there is not something referred to, how can the sentence have a truth value? And yet, it appears to be true.

If the claim means that in the actual world, no individual satisfies the description “Frosty the Snowman”, and this holds in every accessible world, then this is a claim about the emptiness of a predicate, not about the non-existence of a named individual. (de dicto reading) — Banno

The de dicto reading makes more sense to me. If I am tracking the terminology correctly, the question I am running into is: if the predicate is an empty set, doesn't that mean there is no extension for that predicate? But if there is no extension, can we refer to anything intensionally? :chin:

"....a Tarskian interpretation I for ℒ specifies a set D for the quantifiers of ℒ to range over (typically, some set of things that ℒ has been designed to describe) and assigns, to each term (constant or variable) τ of ℒ, a referent aτ ∈ D and, to each n-place predicate π of ℒ, an appropriate extension Eπ — a truth value (TRUE or FALSE) if n = 0, a subset of D if n = 1" - SEP

My understanding of the above text is that predicating "swan" will refer to some subset in the domain (of all swans; that is, of all the things that conform to the predication).

I think the answer is: extensionally, yes; intensionally no, not until an utterance is performed.

i think there may be some confusion regarding God's omnipotence. As a Christian, I believe it is correct that God is in control of His providential plan and that this is so despite the evils that humans have chosen in opposition to that plan. However, I think it is incorrect that God forces or controls the choices of people in a way that would predestine their choices. Instead, God permits actions, even those contrary to His will. Meanwhile, the will is free to choose, and does so, but not against God's foreknowledge of what will happen.

I think foreknowledge does not imply responsibility. For example, a meteorologist may know that it will rain tomorrow, and yet be in no way responsible for the rain.

So I think if you take the definition of free will at face and read it in a way that supporters of God's omni-attributes do, you will find that an omni-attribute God is not incoherent.

I don't think I really understand the question here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why am I not surprised?

Wouldn't we have to check every snowman, and make sure that it is not Frosty before we conclude that Frosty the Snowman does not exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes Metaphysician, check every snowman in the whole world and double check that none of them is Frosty; that would be an excellent use of your reason.

The composition may change in terms of NaCl, etc., but if you do not have H2O then you do not have water. Your response?

I guess you can do possible worlds without rigid designators or across world identity, but then I am not sure what can meaningfully be asserted about these possible worlds other than that something can be anything else in some possible world. The range of possibility seems too "wide" in a way that would prevent meaningful discourse.

Truth is relative in both an intensional and extensional sense. — RussellA

I do not think so. You have changed the word that is used, and each utterance refers to a different thing, intensionally. But the thing that belongs to the predicates enumerated does not itself change. In other words, the thing of which "has strong hind legs" is predicated does not change.

Truth is relative between different language games, between different possible worlds. — RussellA

If swan = frog, in possible world 6, then intensionally truth is relative in a manner of speaking, but only because the words refer to different things. Truth is evaluated by what is meant, which can change between speakers or speakers in different possible worlds.

On the other hand, I would think that truth would not be relative in an extensional sense. So "that is a swan" will be true in one possible world and false in another, but only because swan means frog in one of the possible worlds. Extensionally, the referent is unchanged.

a house — RussellA

I don't think artifacts like houses have an essence.

How can one ever know what is essential to something. — RussellA

It seems to me that: knowing that something has an essence, and for example that the essence of a dog is different from that of a swan, is not the same as knowing what those essences are.

1.3

Approximate definitions of de re an de dicto:

De re = a specific thing that is meant.
De dicto = a nonspecific thing that is meant.

Intensionality appears to be something like --> the picking out of "something" as the referent; extensionality appears to be the "thing" that is picked out by reference, where "something" and "thing" may not need to be physical substances in the actual world.

Intensional definitions (properties, relations, and propositions) are defined by possible world semantics independent of any specific language.

The de re and de dicto distinction helps articulate essential as opposed to accidental properties by using modal logic. De re classification anticipates identity "across worlds."

The problem is, how can you go from the extensional definition of S existing in your mind to an intensional definition of S existing independently of your mind? — RussellA

Good question.

That’s the problem. — RussellA

I do not understand what the problem is; can you elaborate?

Notice that it is an intensional definition: it does not list the very things that are swans, but gives a rule for deciding of something is a swan. — Banno

I think it would be right to say that "Swan" defined in such an such a way, would be a de dicto proposition.

I think if you have defined "swan" correctly by reference to its essential properties, your definition may change by addition, but the essential properties you have identified will not have changed. Ifessential properties are not acknowledged, any kind of definition would appear to be rendered meaningless.

Can whether a statement has a truth value be answered only by whether the statement has terms that have extension?

I am thinking of the following statement: "Necessarily, Frosty the Snowman does not exist." I think you would say the statement lacks any terms with extension. However, it appears to be a true statement.

If the statement is true, by reference to what is it true?

Classical free will requires:

the ability to choose otherwise — Truth Seeker

Are we currently operating with that definition, or is free will now determined by one's nature or cognitive architecture?