I'll try to make the argument clearer. Consider a dialogue between your Relativist and, if you like, an Objectivist, who puts forward my own line of thinking.


Relativist: I don't believe in objective truth.

Objectivist: Of course you do! What you just stated is something you think is objectively true. You think it is objectively true that you don't believe in objective truth.

Relativist: No. My assertions should be understood using the ordinary notion of truth, not this new-fangled "objective truth" that you philosophers speak of.


Objectivist: What do you mean the "ordinary notion"? What is this notion?

Relativist: The ordinary notion of truth is something like what one believes.

Objectivist: Right. So, your assertion "I don't believe in objective truth", is to be understood as a claim that is true in the ordinary sense.

Relativist: Right.

Objectivist: So when you say "I don't believe in objective truth", you really mean to say "I believe that I don't believe in objective truth".

Relativist: Right.

Objectivist: But isn't this assertion something you claim to be objectively true? Don't you claim that "I believe that I don't believe in objective truth" is objectively true as you assert it?

Relativist: No. I want this new assertion to be understood in the ordinary way as well. I don't mean to assert that it is objectively true. I mean to assert that I believe it.

Objectivist: So your assertion is... that you believe that you believe that you don't believe in objective truth?

Relativist: Good. Now you are getting it.

Objectivist: I'm not sure that I am. Your initial claim that you don't believe in objective truth seemed simple enough. But you want it to be interpreted so that it entails an infinite number of qualifications. You don't mean to say that it is objectively true that you don't believe in objective truth. You mean to say that you believe that you believe that you believe.... ad infinitum, that you don't believe in objective truth, and in saying this, you don't mean to assert the objective existence of any beliefs at all.

Relativist: You understand me completely. Tis too simple!

Objectivist: I really don't understand..

Perhaps I have put the wrong words in your Relativists' mouth.
PA

Not quite what I said. The academic discipline that goes by the name of "Philosophy" today does not have the sciences as sub-disciplines. Go to any Philosophy department and see if you find any Biology or Chemistry classes. Look in any philosophy journal and see if you find the latest on human genetics. The discipline contains certain subjects and not others.

I agree with you that if you define Philosophy in the way ancient philosophers did, and even early-moderns did, it includes the sciences.

Is there something you disagree with in this?

PA

What exactly is the disagreement about? I don't remember disagreeing with you about anything.

PA

Well I'm not saying that it's good or bad. I'm just describing the academic discipline of Philosophy as a means of answering the OP. Philosophy has its own specific subject matter, like Biology does.

PA

Hi Devans, my thought is that the arguments as you present them are far too brief to be convincing. Take just this one:

A. Argument From Nothing

Can’t get something from nothing so something must have existed ‘always’. IE if there was ever a state of nothingness, it would persist to today, so something has permanent existence. It’s not possible to exist permanently in time, so the ‘something’ must be a timeless first cause. — Devans99

The first premise is an ancient metaphysical principle, and one which is difficult to challenge. Some doubt it, but I don't. So I grant that something must always have existed - a first cause. But I don't see how you can get from here to the claim that the first cause has to be timeless. I am not sure what the justification is for supposing that it is impossible for something to exist permanently in time. Seems perfectly possible to me. You would need some argument for that claim.

PA

Fun fact, the "division" between philosophers and scientists is a historically relatively new development. Back in ye olden days, they were considered one and the same thing. That's literally why it's called a PhD! — NKBJ

Yes, I know. The distinction is a useful one.

Ah, and how do you distinguish those two things? — NKBJ

Between Philosophy in the wide sense and Philosophy in the narrow sense? Philosophy in the wide sense is any form of enquiry or rational thought into anything. Philosophy in the narrow sense is the sort of thing you see in contemporary philosophy articles. Because the distinction arose, as you point out, in a quite organic way historically, it isn't possible to draw the lines very sharply. What ends up in Philosophy (in the narrow sense) is largely a mish-mash of topics that (a) have not been taken on by other accepted forms of enquiry, (b) do not have a largely agreed upon method for their resolution, (c) are discussed by the great philosophers of previous eras without firm resolution, (d) seem to be relevant in the assessment of other philosophical issues (e) continue some project carved out for philosophy by past thinkers, or any combination of these things. These things are often assumptions of other discourses, but, on reflection, I see that they are not always. It is quite easy to list examples of things which fall into these categories and things which don't. "Does God exist?" falls in, "Did Caesar cross the Rubicon?" doesn't. There are of course boundary cases and things which seem not to fit neatly into either/or, but the distinction is useful all the same.

In the wide sense you can philosophize about anything. In the narrow sense, only certain subjects count. There isn't any deep reason why. It's just what's left over when you start with the whole range of enquiry and take away anything which has branched into a new discipline with its own identity.
PA

I think she punishes Jemimah for lying, and lying is deliberately saying something you don't believe.

In everyday language, someone is telling the truth if they are saying what they believe. When talking about the truth in general, the idea seems to be that the truth is what most people would believe if they had witnessed whatever it was,

None of this has any bearing on 'absolute truth' or 'objective truth', which could be absolutely anything in the presence of Last Thursdayism or Descartes' demon. — andrewk

I think there are still problems afoot here. Mum could well punish Jemimah for lying, but it would also make perfect sense for her to punish Jemimah for not going to school, would it not? Children are punished for lying sometimes, but also for their actions. And that presupposes that there is some objective truth about whether Jemimah actually attended school. Relatedly, defining truth as "what most people would believe if they had witnessed whatever it was" appears to presuppose that there is an "it" to be witnessed - an objective fact which is not just what someone believes (Of course, it also presupposes that there are people and beliefs).

It is right that sometimes we say that someone is "telling the truth" when they are saying what they believe, but I don't think you can properly generalize this observation into a general thesis about the meaning of "true", as you do above. We also have various other practices involving the word "true". For instance, if I am wondering about whether the Vikings raided Britain, then I am wondering whether a certain event actually happened. I am certainly not wondering what most people believe about it, or even what most people would believe about it were they shown bits of historical evidence.

But as I say, all this is really only a footnote, because even if the Relativist can appeal to the ordinary notion of truth, it doesn't change the fact that his position generates an infinite regress when you try to understand it.

PA

Can you explain how you'd be justified in claiming that you know that God doesn't exist, under the strongest possible conception of God? — S

No, I'm afraid I can't. I agree with most of what you said. I'm an agnostic about quite a lot of conceptions of God, but there are those against which there are good philosophical arguments and I am inclined to think that those Gods don't exist. I think the most pressing disagreement we have is only about Dawkins. I think Dawkins is a good scientist, but he's a philosophical amateur on his best day, and most of his attempts at Philosophy are full of basic mistakes. I find that to be true of most "New Atheist" types, which is a shame, because there are excellent atheist Philosophers who don't get anything like the same attention. I think Jordan Sobel died a while ago, but he was very good, as is Graham Oppy.

PA

I find this quite curious.

I would have thought that Mum, in saying "is that true?", is not merely asking Jemimah what she believes on the issue of whether she went to school, or even asking what is "consistent with Jemimah's knowledge". She is asking Jemimah whether some event actually occured. Mum will likely punish Jemimah if they say that they didn't go to school, and it wouldn't make any sense for Mum to punish Jemimah merely for believing that she didn't go to school. Mum sensibly punishes Jemimah for skipping school, not for having a belief about it.

Does that not show that "truth" in ordinary English invovles something the Relativist cannot accept?

Anyway I'm not sure that debates about the ordinary meaning of "true" are of much relevance. What is relevant is that your Relativist says "I don't believe in objective truth" and when he says it, he means us to understand it using (what you say is) the ordinary meaning of "true". So what he means to say is "I believe that I don't believe in objective truth". Of course, when he says that he wants us to understand it in the same way.. and so we still have a regress which prevents us ever understanding what the Relativist means to say. He means to say something like "I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe.....ad infinitum.. that I don't believe in objective truth", but he does not mean ever to assert the objective existence of any belief of his. Perhaps I'm just missing the point, but I just can't understand what is being claimed.

PA

Every scientist is using philosophy for establishing empirical data. The scientific method IS philosophy. — NKBJ

Yes that's true, but collecting empirical data is to establish that the earth is round or that man evolved from prior species is not doing Philosophy. It is doing science grounded on philosophical assumptions.

You might distinguish between Philosophy in the wide sense and Philosophy in the narrow sense. In the wide sense, absolutely every enquiry into anything is Philosophy, since it will always presuppose philosophical assumptions. But Philosophy in the narrow sense is directly about the assumptions of ordinary life and enquiry. It isn't using them as a basis for empirical work, but examining them directly.

PA

Let's try defining "need" by starting with the notion of purpose. You only need X for some purpose or another. For instance, you need food, but you only need it for the purpose of staying alive. If you don't make surviving a goal of yours, there is no need for food. So what you need is always relative to your purposes.

Let's say that S needs X for some purpose P if and only if S cannot acheive P without X.

PA

You can't philosophize about the content of empirical sciences. The philosopher doesn't tell you that Caesar crossed the Rubicon or that the earth is round. Those are not subjects of Philosophy. The philosopher might enquire by what methods these things can cogently be established and examine assumptions made in the course of establishing these things, but the historian and the scientist tell you that Caesar crossed the Rubicon and that the earth is round, not the Philosopher.

Couldn't you procede inductively? Ask a large and hopefully representative sample of people and infer that what they say is likely what everyone would say.

PA

Somebody that didn't believe in objective truth would not believe that, and hence would be liberated from a potential contradiction.

Of course they would also need to say "I don't believe in objective truth" rather than the "There is no objective truth" that you suggested, as the latter sounds like a statement that is intended to be taken as objective truth. But provided their position is the former and not the latter, there is no apparent contradiction. — andrewk

The Relativist would immediately run into the objection that when he says "I don't believe in truth", he means to state something which is true - namely, that he does not have a certain belief. He cannot then say "I don't believe in truth", but must instead say something like "I don't believe that I don't believe in truth", but this will only face the same objection. I am not sure that there is any way out of this tangle for the Relativist. He cannot state his thesis, even with the lemma "I don't believe", without seeming to claim something to be true.

Perhaps his best option is simply to refuse to talk about truth all together, although any time he says anything, it will be natural to understand him as claiming something to be true, and hard to understand what else he might be doing. There isn't a contradiction there, but it certainly is hard to understand what the idea of Relativism is meant to be.

PA

In casual conversation one can easily and reasonably say, "I know where I parked my car"; "I know the name on my birth certificate is..."; "I know that London is the capital of England"...and the like.

But saying "I know there are no gods" or "I know there is a GOD" or "I know it is more likely that there are no gods than that there is at least one"...demands a totally different sensibility...and incurs a great burden of substantiation. — Frank Apisa

Here is what I think I disagree with. Why does saying "I know there are no Gods" or "I know there is a God" require more substantiation than "I know that London is the capital of England"?

PA

My question to you is: why is it unacceptable to say something like "I know that God exists" or " I know that there are no gods" without having absolute certainty whilst it is acceptable to say something like "I know that London is the capital of England" without having absolute certainty?

My specific disagreement is this: I don't see why claims about the existence of God require a larger amount of substantiation than claims (for example) about the capitals of cities. It seems to me that it is perfectly sufficient - there is nothing objectionable about it - to base a claim that God exists/doesn't exist on good but inconclusive evidence. I thought you disagreed with this. Am I mistaken?


PA

Some interesting issues get raised here.

I am not sure at all that the "casual" and "philosophical" distinction makes sense, but let's see what can be done with it anyway. It isn't clear at all that in philosophical contexts "knowing" means being absolutely certain. Most philosophical arguments don't make their conclusions absolutely certain - not even the most influential ones. Most contemporary philosophical arguments are tentative inferences to the best explanation or else deductive arguments which rest on merely plausible or "intuitive" premises. So I suppose that you aren't trying to describe how "know" is actually used in Philosophy, but recommending a way it should to be used? But what could the grounds be for this linguistic recommendation?

At any rate, it would be quite uninteresting to me if this were just a debate about how the word "know" should be used. So, leaving the word "knowledge" out of it for a minute (since it often gets in the way!), you seem to think that it is unacceptable to make philosophical claims without a "great deal of substantiation" - presumably much more substantiation than is required for casual claims - but why must that be so? Why isn't it acceptable for me to make philosophical claims on the basis of pretty good, but not conclusive, evidence?

PA

there is a 0.01 percent that God does exist and a 99.9 percent chance that God does not exist, then you DO NOT KNOW if God does or does not exist. Period. — Maureen

"Knowledge" as you are using the word, requires complete certainty. Nothing wrong with that, but your claim that noone knows whether God exists is not very interesting given that definition. Most philosophers - atheist and theist - would agree that noone knows with certainty that God exists. They would say, rather that there are good reasons to favour one side rather than another. Moreover, so what if we can't know whether God exists with certainty? I can't even know with certainty some trivial matter like what I had for breakfast half an hour ago.

I agree with your claim, but then I don't think there are many philosophically educated folk who would disagree. Although, you can never be too sure what the consensus is on a topic..

PA

I sort of fell into Philosophy after having a bad experience with Psychology at University. I stuck with Philosophy, I suppose, because although a lot of the time you feel like you aren't getting anywhere with it, sometimes it surprises you, and something you thought was very clear and obvious turns out to be full of knots or difficulties and may even be completely wrong.

I guess I don't like to think that everything is settled; that the world is at least close to the way modern science and common-sense describe it, and that there are just minute details left to be ironed out. To me that is an incredibly boring prospect, and the sort of Philosophy I am into reminds us that all these things are not quite so settled after all.

PA

I don't think prison population as such is a particularly good argument for the superiority of anybody in any respect. There are all sorts of reasons why people end up in prison and it will likely be far more complicated than just "women are socially better than men". Here is just one factor: It's true that men are more likely to resolve their problems with direct physical violence than women, and women are more likely than men to deal with problems by verbal abuse and reputation destruction. Of the two, prison sentences are much more common for physical violence - especially long prison sentences. So part of the explanation - I speculate - has to do with the fact that men more often than women deal with problems in a way that is both easier to find out about and more harshly punished.

I don't think for a second that any of this shows that women are "socially superior". I'm not really sure what "socially superior" means. If we are looking at this one factor alone (and really we shouldn't be!) the suggestion is that women are better at dealing with problems in a way that doesn't get you put in prison, but it doesn't follow that women are superior unless you actually think that verbal abuse and reputation destruction are more acceptable than physical violence as such, and I don't think that's right at all.

I should say at this point that, obviously, not all men solve issues by violence and not all women settle issues by verbal abuse and reputation destruction. Both genders are capable of both tactics, and, mercifully, lots of people deal with problems without doing any of these things.

PA

The person's set of beliefs are, and beliefs are part of the mind. This would make minds the sort of objects that can have contradictory properties, no? — MindForged

Not at all. Is my bedroom contradictory because it has a red pillow and a different not red pillow in it? The pillows/beliefs are distinct objects. It would be different if there were 1 belief that was both P and -P, but there is no such case.

PA

Say the subject reports believing some business is located in certain location relative to their home and they draw a map of how to get there. They believe the locations are correct.... — MindForged

As far as I can see, there is no actual contradictory state of affairs in this example. There is the computer and it's program. There are various maps which are drawn differently, and there is the person who drew the maps. None of this is contradictory, is it?

Now, the reason I said "sort of" is because this isn't necessarily a physical contradiction because this is about ones knowledge — MindForged

Is it right that the idea is that the contradiction lies in what the person who drew the maps believes? That is, he believes both A and Not A. If so, I don't think the example really works. The content of my beliefs is contradictory, but there is still no actual state of affairs that is incoherent, is there? Let's try to make this clear. If you have found a case (instantiated in the real world) where the law of non-contradiction is false, then there must be some proposition you can state, about the world, which is both contradictory and true. What would that be?

That's not really explaining what you mean though. Is conceivability defined in terms of consistency? If so, it's question begging for the LNC. If conceivability is defined in terms of mental pictures, that's not going to work since lots of actual states of affairs cannot be pictured and mathematics has it's own notion of conceivability (basically deduction). — MindForged

What I had in mind is simple imaginability. If it is at least humanly possible to actually imagine what things would be like if P, then I take it that P is intelligible. I am tempted to think that the mental pictures idea is a little crude, but let's run with it. What's wrong with the mental pictures definition? You say lots of states of affairs cannot be pictured. Could you give an example? I should note that the picturing need not be absolutely precise. I can't really mentally picture what the atoms which compose my laptop are like, but I can at least picture billiard balls interacting in certain ways, and perhaps picture billiard balls that have smaller parts that produce certain effects. I can picture that much, and I know that the atoms in my laptop are a bit like that.

As to the point about mathematics, I don't see why it is relevant. Let mathematicians define conceivability however they like for their purposes - I have no objection. But that they define it one way does not show that there is anything wrong with defining it another way for some other purpose than mathematics.

I suppose my view is just this. When it comes to thinking about the empirical world, if no human being can picture, even in simplified form, what the world would be like if P, then we can have no idea what it would mean for P to be true. In such a situation, we find something (NotP) indubitable - something which cannot be doubted because we have no idea what it even means to doubt it. I don't think there are many of these indubitable truths. There might even be only one of them; the law of non-contradiction.

PA

thanks for the clarification Andrew. Yes that is exactly what I meant to say.

Yes smart people deny the law of non-contradiction, but even they do so only because it solves certain paradoxes and not because any of them can imagine any concretely obtaining contradiction. When it comes to thinking concretely about the world, and not about abstract formal systems, my sense is that there is just no choice but to think under the law of non-contradiction. It is indubitable in that sense, whatever we say about the liar paradox.

my reply to your post is the same as Andrew M's, so I'll move to your latest post if you don't mind.

Andrew asks us to imagine a switch which is both on and off at the same time, which I think is plainly inconceivable, as he notes. But your example is much more complex.

I take it that your aim is to describe a conceivable situation where a contradiction obtains. I'm not sure your example is really detailed enough. How does the switch work? The switch is hooked up to a person's brain and tracks their inconsistent beliefs. What exactly is the switch reporting? It "operates once a person is operating under contrary beliefs". Does that mean that the switch reports "true" when the person is operating under contrary beliefs? If so, why would the switch show 0.5? I don't get it. In any case, suppose that the switch does report 0.5. Where is the contradictory state of affairs? We have a person who has two different beliefs that contradict one another. Having the belief that A and the belief that -A is not a contradictory state of affairs, any more than having a blue pillow and a red pillow is. We also have a switch that is reporting "0.5", and that isn't contradictory either.

Regarding the charge that I used a question beginning notion of intelligibility, I didn't. Say that something is intelligible if and only if you can conceive how it would be.

PA

I would maintain that at least the law of non-contradiction is indubitable in just this sense: it cannot intelligibly be doubted.

Try to imagine any situation that violates the law of non-contradiction. My sense is that I just can't do it. I can't even understand what A and NotA both obtaining is supposed to involve. Some people say that various physics results should be interpretted as involving such a situation, but I think even the people who defend that interpretation will admit that they have absolutely zero idea what it means. I think it is unintelligible, and won't be made any more intelligible by inventing pretty new logical symbols and defining their relations to other symbols.

Non-contradiction is, in that way, a necessary condition of intelligible thought. Of course you can invent abstract systems that violate it, by defining various symbols in various ways, but substitute symbols for actual concrete things and what you get is meaningless.

PA

The thread is 3 months old, so the last two posts were probably a necro. But since they have been allowed so far, allow me a reply to Pattern Chaser, should they still be knocking around.



I agree that the issue gets muddy very quickly. I think your statement of it is already difficult. What exactly is meant by "direct access" to "objective reality"? In one plain sense, obviously I do have such access. When I open my eyes, I see the physical world. I see trees and tables and roads and such. But what relevance does that have on the question about underdetermination between BIV and RL? I know well that there are answers to these questions somewhere, but it is crucial to be clear what they are before debating this issue.

PA

Hi again Blue Lux,

The neurotic is labeled a neurotic, but his symptoms are his own, and in the concept of the neurotic there will only be abstractions that could relate to that specific neurotic — Blue Lux

The abstractions are based on observation of patients who present with common symptoms. That is to say, the application of the abstract concept of "Neurosis" is justified by experience. It is not a priori. It isn't as though psychological theory develops in the armchair Leibniz style (although you might think otherwise if you were to see the amount of psychological speculation that goes on in this forum!)

Also, it is worth pointing out that Psychologists understand that labelling someone "Neurotic" is a simplification and that any proper treatment of their issues requires attention to individual differences.

And a priori because the individual is no longer an individual but an impoverished representation in a model. Models work by virtue of their function and input/output.
"Something a priori isn't a contingent truth that may or may not be the case dependent upon experience, but a necessary truth that can be safely said to condition all experience." — Blue Lux

A number of mistakes lie here it seems to me. As I said, plenty of attention is paid to the specifics of an individual in any treatment or therapy. The individual is never just an "impoverished representation".

Second, you are conflating necessity and the a priori. Saying that a truth is necessary is not the same as saying that it can or is known a priori.

Third, you seem to be suggesting that because the model of a psychological condition is an abstract representation, it must be a necessary truth, and this does not follow. Psychological models are all simplifications of complex contingent phenomena. The models themselves are only contingently accurate. There is nothing necessary about them.

Fourth:

Therefore it is synthetic. — Blue Lux

A synthetic proposition is a proposition about contingent reality, but you seem to think it is something to do with whether something is abstract or specific. I suspect you are conflating synthetic/analytic with specific/abstract.

If by your OP, you are asking "what's the relation between Philosophy and making up abstract models of psychological conditions justified without any appeal to observation of real people and proclaiming those models necessarily true?", then my answer is "Philosophy is a reflective critical practice and the other thing is sheer confusion". But then that sort of confusion is nothing like what Psychologists do.

I must be misunderstanding you. Perhaps you could explain a bit more what you think is a priori about Psychology, cite some concrete examples in the literature and say a bit about what you think this has to do with Philosophy?

I should note that I am using the words "synthetic", "a priori", and "neccesary" in the way they are used in academic Philososophy and using "Psychology" to mean the empirical psychology which you could study at university. I wonder whether you sre using the words very differently?

PA

Psychology, as it so happens, is comprised greatly of synthetic a priori judgments — Blue Lux

Could you cite an article in a reputable Psychology journal that makes synthetic a priori judgements? Psychology as I've studied it is thoroughly empirical - in many places even Positivistic - and so a posteriori. The only a priori judgements I can think of are those involved in mathematical analysis of statistics, but these aren't what philosophers usually call "synthetic".

The relevance to your question is that the relation between Philosophy and Psychology is interesting, but I am not sure that what you are thinking of as "Psychology" is what is usually meant by that word.

PA

but do you expect it to ever convince anybody to change their view, other than the occasional rare exception? — andrewk

Hi Andrewk. Several people here hold the view that philosophical arguments about the existence of God are pointless because they don't convince very many people. I am not sure if you hold that view but I took this comment to indicate it.

Anyway, I think that view is quite superficial. First, I honestly doubt that good arguments very often convince anyone of anything important. If an issue is important, most people feel too strongly about it to be persuaded by logic - of course there are valuable exceptions, as you said. So in this respect arguments about God are, as I see it, no different to arguments about morals or politics or the soul, or even such things as whether animals have thoughts and feelings like humans.

Second, I think philosophical argument is valuable even if it cannot convince. It can be useful when coming to really understand a view and contrast if with alternatives. To really appreciate a view, it helps to see what reasons someone might have for believing it, even if you don't end up converting.

I should also point out that reasoned argument is one of our few ways of convincing others that doesn't involve guns and death.

PA

Hi Ram,

The problem I think most people are having with your post is multifaceted. You claim that there is a big "hole in Materialism", but there are really several holes. First you assert that it "leads to" Nihilism. Second you assert that it gives people a "pass to do whatever they want". Third you assert that it has no "objective basis for morality". One difficulty is that all of these assertions are vague and may be understood in different ways (especially the phrase "leads to". Does that mean "causes" or "entails" or what?), and you do not clarify their exact meaning.

Another difficulty, made plain by Willow already, is that you don't give any argument for any of these assertions. Noone is asking you to prove that there is a God, but if you assert those claims above, you are expected to give some reason for believing them, but you don't. Again, you are not being asked to do so from within the constraints of some special "Enlightenment Epistemology". You are simply asked to provide some reason of some sort for your assertions, rather than just speculate.

Lastly, the most obvious way to argue for your claims would be to look at the various attempts by Materialists to avoid the problems you see and to criticize them, but you outright refuse to do that because you don't like Western University research or professional western philosophy, because according to you its all either post-modernism or anti-religion. I work at a western university philosophy department by the way, and our department is neither explicitly post modern nor anti-religion as a whole. But if you refuse to criticize any attempt to patch the hole that you see by trained professionals, how can you expect anyone to be convinced by your post?

PA

Agnosticism thus becomes unthinkable for a sentient being, a human with higher faculties intact. How can we, as creatures of refined aesthetic, be so perfectly on the fence between two rival beliefs? Have we no aesthetic inclination either way, at the very least?

Also how can two rival beliefs be so perfectly matched as to justify Agnosticism as a permanent camp? — SnoringKitten

Seems easy enough to be an Agnostic to me. Suppose you hear a set of arguments in favour of God's existence and a set of arguments against. You find both arguments somewhat convincing but you also see some defects in them. You decide you don't really have enough information. You refrain from judging the matter either way. What is unthinkable about that? If you tell me that John robbed the safe and someone else tells me that John didn't rob the safe, and I have nothing else to go on, I might well find myself unable to decide between the two. I don't see why such a state of mind is so difficult for you to understand.

You should also note that your definitions of Theism and Atheism are in terms of what someone would be willing to say. I might have a very slight inclination towards the view that there is a God, but not be all that sure about it, and so be unwilling to say that there is a God. As such the mere inclination towards belief is not sufficient for Theism by your own definition. It is possible, then, for there to be a person with an inclination towards belief (or disbelief) who is still neither an Atheist nor a Theist. Why not call that person, as traditionally was done, an Agnostic?


I think it still useful to distinguish Agnostics from others. I wonder if this will make it to page 2 so that you never read it...

PA

Hi

insightfully noted that your discussion of free-will vs determinism fails to appreciate a third position which is very popular in Philosophy at present - Compatibalism. The Compatibalist view is usually expressed by saying that free-will and determinism are compatible. I think that is a misleading way of describing the view as it is defended by its most capable advocates. I understand Compatibalism as making two claims. First, radical libertarian free-will of the sort which classic Theists and Dualists affirmed does not exist. Nobody has free-will in the sense of the ability to make choices unaffected by physical causation. Second, you should not worry about this, because we do have free-will in a different important sense - roughly we can to do what we want to do, and this is the only kind of free-will we need to make morally responsible choice possible.

I am inclined to think that the first claim of Compatibalism is true, but that the second is false. That is to say, I think that there is no libertarian free-will, but that morally responsible choice is impossible without it. That we have a weaker sort of free-will is not enough.

PA

Many philosophers insist on debates about the meaning of words. I once got into a debate with my old PhD supervisor about the worth of the mass of literature which debates the meaning of the word "knowledge". I argued that the literature was pointless because it had no bearing on any substantive philosophical issue and because the sensible resolution to the debate was just to say "some people define 'knowledge' in different ways'. He insisted that the debates were crucial to philosophy. As we went back and forth, it turned out that he - an experienced, intelligent, well-read and capable philosopher - thought that Philosophy just is debate about how to define words. When I frustratingly said to him "debates about the analysis of knowledge are just trivial quibbles about how to use the word 'knowledge'", he replied "that's just what Philosophy is, isn't it?" (!!!).

I've never understood why anyone would come to have that conception of Philosophy, or why, if you have that conception, you would still be interested in it. Philosophy, as I understand it, just isn't about words. But it looks like you are tempted by it as well:

I eventually realized it was in fact a disagreement in the meaning of the words involved (which just about sums up philosophical disagreement...) — MindForged

To answer your question, there is no such thing as the essential meaning of a word. I don't think you have missed anything. Debates about the 'real meaning' of words often look like they are relevant in some substantial way, but as far as I can tell, they never are.

PA

RL and BIV are identical in their explanatory power. Both account completely, and without contradiction, for the human experience that results from either one of them being true. — Pattern-chaser

That is right, but power is not the only criterion of explanation. Simplicity is another and I argued that RL is simpler than BIV. But I understand now that these were examples used to illustrate your main point - that there are some hypotheses which cannot be decided between on the basis of the evidence alone. Philosophers often call this 'underdetermination of theory by data'. BIV and RL may or may not be instances of that. Your question is what do we do when we meet a case of underdetermination?

There are two kinds of underdetermination. One sort is underdetermination by current evidence. Given our currently available evidence alone we might be unable to decide between two theories, but if we had better technology, or more resources we could get evidence which would decide the issue. The other sort is underdetermination by all possible evidence. In such a case, no matter how much effort we expended, we could never get any evidence that would settle which theory is true. If BIV and RL were cases of underdetermination - and I say they aren't - they would likely be cases of underdetermination by all possible evidence. How do we handle the two sorts of underdetermination?

My own preference is quite old fashioned. If there is no reason to prefer one hypothesis over another, do not choose either. Suspend judgement. I see that your own suggestion is to admit that we have no reason and yet still prefer one hypothesis if it is more useful to us for some purpose. I have no in principle objection to that, but I hold that there simply are no real life cases in which both (a) the choice between two theories is underdetermined by either current or all possible evidence and (b) believing one theory would be more useful than believing another. In every case I can think of, you could make use of the useful elements of a theory without accepting the elements of it which could not be evidenced. BIV and RL might be exceptions, since it might be thought that I couldn't really live a normal healthy life if I suspended judgement on whether or not the whole thing is a fiction produced by my delusional mind. Perhaps so, but I deny that BIV and RL are cases of underdetermination.

PA

According to , an idea is transcendentally stupid if and only if it is trivial, arbitrary and

not motivated by the milieu in which they come to be: — StreetlightX

He implies that the discussion in another thread about the BIV hypothesis is transcendentally stupid:

Let's just say - because I have no desire to talk about brains in vats - that the idea for this thread did not develop in a vaccum. :eyes: — StreetlightX

I deny that the discussion is transcendentally stupid. In that thread, I explain that the technical and admittedly abstract and fantastic discussions about the BIV hypothesis are part of a long historical project to construct a worldview accepting only what there is some good reason to accept. The BIV hypothesis plays a prominent role in that tradition. In fact, I'd say that since Descartes hypotheses of that sort have been a vital part of the methodology of those engaged in such a project. But then, if so, discussions about BIVs are not "arbitrary" and they are "motivated by the milieu in which they came to be". That just leaves the charge that the discussion is trivial. If you think the project of building a worldview that there is good reason to believe is trivial then you will find BIV discussion trivial as well. For my part I don't find it trivial and so I conclude that such discussions are not transcendentally stupid.

This brings us more directly to the issue of transcendental stupidity itself. As has pointed out well, the notion is at least partly subjective. In calling an idea or discussion "stupid" in this sense, Streetlight wants to imply that his target is not worthy of discussion - that it is "trivial". There are two points worth noting here. First, that an idea is being interpreted in a way which is "not motivated by the milieu" which gave rise to the idea does not entail that the new interpretation is trivial and uninteresting. New interpretations can be interesting too, depending on audience. Second, and more importantly, what you find trivial, unimportant or not worth discussing I might find fascinating and vital, and vice versa. You might insist that I am just wrong - that there is an objective fact of the matter about what is worth discussing and my ideas are not. I find such a view quite hard to comprehend. What are the truth-makers of these facts, and how does one discover them? I do not see how calling an idea transcdentally stupid is anything more than a fancy way of saying that you do not like certain topics, and adding the - in my view fantastic - idea that the capacity to discuss topics which you don't like is woven into the nature of human thought itself.

Still, the idea of transcendental stupidity is itself an interesting idea.

PA

The curious thing about your reply Pattern-chaser, is that you assert that we cannot make a justified conclusion about whether BIV or RL is true, but you ignore my argument in which I tried to do exactly that. I argued that RL is more likely to be true than BIV because RL provides a simpler explanation of sensory experience than BIV. I detailed one specific respect in which this is so, but you didn't discuss that argument at all. You then conclude:

Having no means to assign probabilities of correctness to either speculation, we have no means to compare them. We can say that they are not both correct, as they contradict one another. We can say that one or both of them could be incorrect. Logic allows no further justified conclusions, isn't that so? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

To which I say: No, that is not so. RL is more probable than BIV, because of the argument I gave earlier in this thread about the superiority of RL as an explanation of sensory experience.

Having read some of your other posts here, I know what you will say here. You will point out that my argument is an explanatory inference, not a deductive one. In this connection you make two points:

And besides, inference is unreliable. I prefer deductions, or a simple admission that 'I don't know'. — Pattern-chaser

And again:

You seem to have mistaken Occam's Razor for something authoritative. :chin: It's just a rule of thumb, a way of guessing when we can think of no better way to proceed with our reasoning. — Pattern-chaser

I deny that all - in your terms - inference is unreliable. Explanatory inference is reliable and is not deduction. It involves considering competing explanations of a phenomenon and evaluating them in terms of how much of the data they explain; how many further problems are raised and, crucially, how simplistic the explanation is insofar as it involves unevidenced entities, unexplained coincidences and the like. It is not just an arbitrary "way of guessing". Do you think that this mode of inference is unreliable?

To contextualise what I was saying earlier, everything stated to happen in RL here also happens in BIV account. The measure of "I am in my apartment, etc." is given by the BIV world too (that is, my body in the experiential world in my apartment of the experiential world). In this BIV, the person is still in the ordinary world. They have been all those places (there body, as experienced was there). Being BIV would just be an extra fact they might not know about. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Thanks for your thoughts Willow. I think some formulations of the BIV and RL hypotheses that are standardly discussed are weak to the criticisms you have made, but I have tried specifically to avoid that Putnam-Chalmers style criticism in my own formulations. In BIV, as I formulated it, I begin in the real world and I live there for the majority of my life. That world is filled with tables, chairs, rivers and such. It is filled with humans who I care about deeply and things which have a great value for me. It is also a world in which I dream - I see things which are entirely creations of my mind, and which do not exist without my mind. Then, after some time, I am kidnapped without realizing it and my brain is put into a jar of fluids. What the kidnappers, in effect, do to my brain is put it in a permanent state of dreaming. Everything which I see from the moment I am envatted is a creation of my brain - they are mere images created by my brain being stimulated electrically. It is not just that I live in the ordinary world of trees and rivers and then it is a deeper fact about that world that it is a product of my mind. No. If "the ordinary world" is the one I was in before I was envatted - the world with those people that I really care about and those things that I really like - then how things are if BIV is true is radically different to how things are if RL is true. In BIV, I no longer have any contact with any of those people I care about or things I value. All I have are mere images of them produced by my mind.

PA

I see. I think you miss all of the historical and philosophical significance of discussions about BIVs. The hypothesis isn't discussed because some fantastical philosophers actually think it might be true, or because they like to think about wild stories. It plays a crucial role in a long philosophical tradition which tries to build a worldview only on the basis of what there is some reason to believe.

Consider the Realist hypothesis that I am in a physical and mind-independent world. Trees, rocks, rivers and such are all physical and exist independently of my thoughts and perceptions. Many philosophers - and non-philosophers too - have wanted to affirm Realism. So they have looked for a reason to believe it and usually always appealed to sense perception. The role of the BIV hypothesis is that, because it is compatible with all possible sense perception, it is supposed to illustrate that the information given in sense perception cannot be straightforwardly taken to support Realism (note the qualification 'supposed to').

Again, the significance of this isn't meant to be "uh oh, maybe we are BIVs after all". It is meant to be that there is no reason to believe Realism and so, if you want a worldview that is based only on good reasons, Realism cannot be a part of it, even though many of us are initially attracted to it.

Maybe you don't care about building a worldview that sticks to such standards, but I think you miss the point if you think its just for 'over-imaginative children'.

PA

"Entirely arbitrary"? You mean that there is no reason to believe that we are BIVs?

And what I can't help continue to ask is: why do you think the question is "a bunch of crap"?

PA

I don't understand your point. Do I have a good reason to believe I am in my apartment or not? If I do, I have good reason to believe I am not a BIV. If I don't, then for all I know maybe I am a BIV. Calling the BIV hypothesis "bullshit" is... well a lot of things. Its irrelevant. Its ad hominem. Its unnecessary. I just don't see what point it serves. I guess we are back to that: What is the point of saying that we should not ask the OPs question, when it obviously interests him? The mere fact that you think a hypothesis is bullshit is just not a good argument for the idea that it shouldn't be discussed.

PA

It isn't a disjunction its a conditional, isn't it? Anyway, what motivates it is quite simple. A brain in a vat is, obviously, a brain in a jar of chemicals being electrically stimulated to hallucinate that it is in an apartment (for example) when it is not. A human being in an apartment is not a brain in a vat. Therefore, if I am a human being in an apartment, I am not a brain in a vat. QED.

PA