Hate against a group because god told you so is a responsibility that one has to answer to. The same way a person would act on a dream of end of the world -- this person has to answer to some authority if he acted badly. — L'éléphant
That's why atheists want proof. Because belief in god can never be treated like how we treat self-evident pain, fear, and dreams. — L'éléphant
And again, I ask, why is the experience of god -- sensation of the holy ghost, or whatever it is one experiences with god --as a private sensation like dream or pain, something to be proven? — L'éléphant
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm#link2HCH0009
...a philosopher: that is a man who constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as if they came from the outside, from above and below, as a species of events and lightning-flashes peculiar to him; who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings; a portentous man, around whom there is always rumbling and mumbling and gaping and something uncanny going on. A philosopher: alas, a being who often runs away from himself, is often afraid of himself—but whose curiosity always makes him "come to himself" again.
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...to live in a vast and proud tranquility; always beyond... To have, or not to have, one's emotions, one's For and Against, according to choice; to lower oneself to them for hours; to seat oneself on them as upon horses, and often as upon asses:—for one must know how to make use of their stupidity as well as of their fire.
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...the genius of the heart, which teaches the clumsy and too hasty hand to hesitate, and to grasp more delicately; which scents the hidden and forgotten treasure, the drop of goodness and sweet spirituality under thick dark ice, and is a divining-rod for every grain of gold, long buried and imprisoned in mud and sand; the genius of the heart, from contact with which every one goes away richer; not favored or surprised, not as though gratified and oppressed by the good things of others; but richer in himself, newer than before, broken up, blown upon, and sounded by a thawing wind; more uncertain, perhaps, more delicate, more fragile, more bruised, but full of hopes which as yet lack names, full of a new will and current, full of a new ill-will and counter-current...
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...having been at home, or at least guests, in many realms of the spirit, having escaped again and again from the gloomy, agreeable nooks in which preferences and prejudices, youth, origin, the accident of men and books, or even the weariness of travel seemed to confine us, full of malice against the seductions of dependency which he concealed in honors, money, positions, or exaltation of the senses, grateful even for distress and the vicissitudes of illness, because they always free us from some rule, and its "prejudice," grateful to the God, devil, sheep, and worm in us, inquisitive to a fault, investigators to the point of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and stomachs for the most indigestible, ready for any business that requires sagacity and acute senses, ready for every adventure, owing to an excess of "free will", with anterior and posterior souls, into the ultimate intentions of which it is difficult to pry, with foregrounds and backgrounds to the end of which no foot may run, hidden ones under the mantles of light, appropriators, although we resemble heirs and spendthrifts, arrangers and collectors from morning till night, misers of our wealth and our full-crammed drawers, economical in learning and forgetting, inventive in scheming, sometimes proud of tables of categories, sometimes pedants, sometimes night-owls of work even in full day, yea, if necessary, even scarecrows—and it is necessary nowadays, that is to say, inasmuch as we are the born, sworn, jealous friends of SOLITUDE, of our own profoundest midnight and midday solitude—such kind of men are we, we free spirits! And perhaps ye are also something of the same kind, ye coming ones? ye new philosophers? — Nietzsche
An Initial requirement is you have to have a pole up your behind. — Ansiktsburk
The captain of the ship of thought realizes that all the differences we make are based upon itself. He is after all making the map. He realizes that the ship is from the same matter as the land is and as the ocean is, but that all the differences made within this matter are made by thought. He realizes that even him referring to matter, invokes the history of philosophy, wasn't it Aristotle that called it such, he wondered. So yes, he realizes, all this mapping, all this thinking, it is based on the history of it, what we have considered important, what we have considered all this stuff to be. He goes to sleep, feeling puzzled and slightly confused, but not out of place. He realizes, he is not different at all. — Tobias
'Absolute knowledge' amounts to no more than the realization that thinking progresses dialectically. — Tobias
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_B._PippinAccording to Pippin, the Hegelian "Geist" should be understood as the totality of norms according to which we can justify our beliefs and actions. The important point is that we cannot justify anything except in such a normative logical space of reasons. So no kind of distinctively human rational cognition and action is articulatable or intelligible independently of such norms. In a phenomenological-hermeneutical jargon, these norms constitute a horizon, a perspective in which we can make anything intelligible to ourselves. Additionally, these norms are socio-historically articulated. Geist is the dynamic process of these norms and their transformations in human history.
The atheist's challenge is not to 'put up' but is to put up or shut up. — Gregory A
No more, as far as I can see, than in hanging up on a telemarketer or a robocall. We do not owe one another our ears. As a believer in free speech, I think we owe one another only tolerance. I do try to hurt you or lock you away because we disagree and you do the same.It is an attempt at censorship. — Gregory A
The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg. — Jefferson
effectively meaningless and is either trivial or points towards nothing. — Shwah
You are also young and egotistical — Shwah
You did not know the reference — Shwah
you referred to late witt's language games — Shwah
Now what makes us it difficult for us to take this line of investigation is our craving for generality. This craving for generality is the resultant of a number of tendencies connected with particular philosophical confusions.
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The idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular instances connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language. It is comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things which have the properties; e.g. that beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things as alcohol is of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty, unadulterated by anything that is beautiful.
There is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression, to think that the man who has learnt to understand a general term, say, the term "leaf", has thereby come to possess a kind of general picture of a leaf, as opposed to pictures of particular leaves. He was shown different leaves when he learnt the meaning of the word "leaf"; and showing him the particular leaves was only a means to the end of producing 'in him' an idea which we imagine to be some kind of general image. We say that he sees what is in common to all these leaves; and this is true if we mean that he can on being asked tell us certain features or properties which they have in common. But we are inclined to think that the general idea of a leaf is something like a visual image, but one which only contains what is common to all leaves. (Galtonian composite photograph.) This again is connected with the idea that the meaning of a word is an image, or a thing correlated to the word. — Blue Book
The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results. Very often the way the discussion of such a puzzle runs is this: First the question is asked "What is time?" This question makes it appear that what we want is a definition. We mistakenly think that a definition is what will remove the trouble (as in certain states of indigestion we feel a kind of hunger which cannot be removed by eating); The question is then answered by a wrong definition; say: "Time is the motion of the celestial bodies". The next step is to see that this definition is unsatisfactory. But this only means that we don't use the word "time" synonymously with "motion of the celestial bodies". However in saying that the first definition is wrong, we are now tempted to think that we must replace it by a different one, the correct one.
Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us.
All this insipid philosophical bickering over God occludes the unspeakable presence of the world, which can be powerful, profound, beautiful, like those first few minutes of Mahler's 9th. Or Barber's Summer Knoxville 1915. This is where one should live. I dare say. — Constance
https://biblehub.com/bsb/job/39.htmThen the LORD answered Job out of the whirlwind and said:
“Who is this who obscures My counsel by words without knowledge?Now brace yourself like a man; I will question you, and you shall inform Me. Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell Me, if you have understanding. Who fixed its measurements? Surely you know! Or who stretched a measuring line across it? On what were its foundations set, or who laid its cornerstone, while the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy?"
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Do you give strength to the horse or adorn his neck with a mane? Do you make him leap like a locust, striking terror with his proud snorting? He paws in the valley and rejoices in his strength; he charges into battle. He laughs at fear, frightened of nothing; he does not turn back from the sword. A quiver rattles at his side, along with a flashing spear and lance. Trembling with excitement, he devours the distance; he cannot stand still when the ram’s horn sounds. At the blast of the horn, he snorts with fervor. He catches the scent of battle from afar—the shouts of captains and the cry of war.
Does the hawk take flight by your understanding and spread his wings toward the south? Does the eagle soar at your command and make his nest on high? He dwells on a cliff and lodges there; his stronghold is on a rocky crag. From there he spies out food; his eyes see it from afar. His young ones feast on blood; and where the slain are, there he is.
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Would you really annul My justice? Would you condemn Me to justify yourself? Do you have an arm like God’s? Can you thunder with a voice like His?Then adorn yourself with majesty and splendor, and clothe yourself with honor and glory. Unleash the fury of your wrath; look on every proud man and bring him low. Look on every proud man and humble him; trample the wicked where they stand. Bury them together in the dust; imprison them in the grave. Then I will confess to you that your own right hand can save you..."
We are tied with uncuttable strings to brain and outside world, and both are necessary for us to exist, to walk, talk, sleep, dream, sing, and even philosophize. — EugeneW
That really is adorable. A wolf in sheep's clothing. Just got that one. — Constance
That's why we talk about private-subjective-Mental-concepts in terms of analogies to public-objective-Material-things — Gnomon
Words are clearly dependent on meaning — Shwah
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Wittgenstein
One might use the word as an order to have someone else bring you a glass of water. But it can also be used to warn someone that the water has been poisoned. One might even use the word as code by members of a secret society.
If I told you I had a dream last night and you responded by saying you don't believe me, the conversation stops right there. — L'éléphant
You might say you are awake but what if I say that I don't believe you? The fact that you say it is no proof. How can I know you are awake like me? — EugeneW
Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the important, the meaning. Surely, one wishes to say, mathematics does not treat of dashes on a bit of paper. Frege's ideas could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same, of course, could be said of any propositions: Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing. And further it seems clear that no adding of inorganic signs can make the proposition live. And the conclusion which one draws from this is that what must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere signs.
But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we have to say that it is its use.
If the meaning of the sign (roughly, that which is of importance about the sign) is an image built up in our minds when we see or hear the sign, then first let us adopt the method we just described of replacing this mental image by some outward object seen, e.g. a painted or modelled image. Then why should the written sign plus this painted image be alive if the written sign alone was dead? -- In fact, as soon as you think of replacing the mental image by, say, a painted one, and as soon as the image thereby loses its occult character, it ceased to seem to impart any life to the sentence at all. (It was in fact just the occult character of the mental process which you needed for your purposes.)
The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. (One of reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a "thing corresponding to a substantive.")
The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language.
As a part of the system of language, one may say, the sentence has life. But one is tempted to imagine that which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. But whatever accompanied it would for us just be another sign.
He would be saying what I would. You would find the reference in the language game but he very specifically speaks about everything having a reference. — Shwah
So there's still a reference there or there is no way to meaningfully parse the statement "King of America". — Shwah
How can you parse the phrase "king of america" without a referent at all? I feel it's necessary to emphasize that the referent does not need to be material but if you don't know what a king is or what america is or what they are when conjoined (a linguistic conception, a monarch of america game simulator) then you can't meaningfully decide whether it's true or not. — Shwah
I taught WWI British poetry once to high school students (in India, no less). — Constance
That really is adorable. A wolf in sheep's clothing. Just got that one. — Constance
Forget the "truth" (Maybe truth is a woman, Nietzsche wrote) and its antiseptic pathology. Nietzsche really liked Emerson, a Unitarian minister, for a good reason: He took the soul to such heights and revealed something of what the age of reason buried deep: a fathomless and impossible affirmation — Constance
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htmThe recluse does not believe that a philosopher—supposing that a philosopher has always in the first place been a recluse—ever expressed his actual and ultimate opinions in books: are not books written precisely to hide what is in us?—indeed, he will doubt whether a philosopher CAN have "ultimate and actual" opinions at all; whether behind every cave in him there is not, and must necessarily be, a still deeper cave: an ampler, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abyss behind every bottom, beneath every "foundation." Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy—this is a recluse's verdict... — Nietzsche
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part2-section3.htm#s1The true content of romantic art is absolute inwardness, and its corresponding form is spiritual subjectivity with its grasp of its independence and freedom. This inherently infinite and absolutely universal content is the absolute negation of everything particular, the simple unity with itself which has dissipated all external relations, all processes of nature and their periodicity of birth, passing away, and rebirth, all the restrictedness in spiritual existence, and dissolved all particular gods into a pure and infinite self-identity. In this Pantheon all the gods are dethroned, the flame of subjectivity has destroyed them, and instead of plastic polytheism art knows now only one God, one spirit, one absolute independence which, as the absolute knowing and willing of itself, remains in free unity with itself and no longer falls apart into those particular characters and functions whose one and only cohesion was due to the compulsion of a dark necessity.
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God in his truth is therefore no bare ideal generated by imagination; on the contrary, he puts himself into the very heart of the finitude and external contingency of existence, and yet knows himself there as a divine subject who remains infinite in himself and makes this infinity explicit to himself. — Hegel
Oh, this is Wilfred Owen. I didn't recognize. — Constance
I wonder if the oatmeal cookies will be done in time for dessert. — Constance
Christs finest moment is his cry of dereliction. — Constance
Then, the withdrawal of God was the moment he became a human being. — Constance
You want to be there at the foot of the cross screaming up, Oh, so now you get it. It takes a jolt. — Constance
Science involves more induction issues the more empirically-laden you make it. — Shwah
One doesn't need an experiment to do science otherwise pure physics is thrown out the door (and the higgs boson, as well as general relativity and all science shows this is not true). — Shwah
So, the "Universal Mind" is infinite & eternal, hence prior to, and outside of the space-time world. PED is an abstruse philosophical concept, not a popular religion. — Gnomon
Irony plays against, metaphors play with something else in language, but whether there is an inroad to existence that is NOT language is the big question. Ask Derrida. Can language ever really touch the world? If not, what is this horrible tennis elbow experience? It ain't language....but it IS there. — Constance
I stick my finger in existence — it smells of nothing. Where am I? Who am I? How came I here? What is this thing called the world? What does this world mean? Who is it that has lured me into the world? Why was I not consulted, why not made acquainted with its manners and customs instead of throwing me into the ranks, as if I had been bought by a kidnapper, a dealer in souls? How did I obtain an interest in this big enterprise they call reality? Why should I have an interest in it? Is it not a voluntary concern? And if I am to be compelled to take part in it, where is the director? I should like to make a remark to him. Is there no director? Whither shall I turn with my complaint? — Constance
Move him into the sun—
Gently its touch awoke him once,
At home, whispering of fields unsown.
Always it woke him, even in France,
Until this morning and this snow.
If anything might rouse him now
The kind old sun will know.
Think how it wakes the seeds—
Woke once the clays of a cold star.
Are limbs, so dear-achieved, are sides
Full-nerved, still warm, too hard to stir?
Was it for this the clay grew tall?
—O what made fatuous sunbeams toil
To break earth's sleep at all?
One day, you're a ballerina, the next Putin has drops a bridge on you.
Suffering and happiness, these are the stuff of the only meaningful philosophical issues. — Constance
That "intellectual minority" would preclude Aristotle, Plato, Newton, Godel etc. — Shwah
For instance commentary can be written about God in particular ways and still refer to God in other commentaries (e.g. Aquinas can quote Augustine and still be speaking about the same catholic trinitarian conception of God). So a proof can have overlap as a sense with another sense assuming a similar reference. — Shwah