Let's look at some evidence, not that it will do any good, because they'll never admit they're wrong in any respect, which ironically they see as one of my greatest evils.
From the page before last:
Knowledge is a stronger judgement of truth than mere thought.
———————-
How did that change how we study the stars?
— ZhouBoTong
It may not, although the idea has been forwarded after the advent of QM that reason determines the nature of the experiment which in turn manifests in the experiment determining the nature of that which is being experimented on. This is because observation has been supplanted by the expectation given from mathematical prediction. Overall, however, in the macro world of direct experience, idealism in and of itself doesn’t change how we study, but rather how we understand what we study.
those of alive today have made idealism a part of our lives without even knowing it?
— ZhouBoTong
They haven’t “made” it a part of their lives; it is an intrinsic part, exactly half, actually, of the system that makes us human. If you’d said without realizing it, I would be more inclined to agree.
———————-
How is it such a massive paradigm shift? It seems to me nothing changed.
— ZhouBoTong
If one has no experience of what was, he thinks what is now has always been the norm. History books, the written record and imagination all say differently.
————————
concepts like math were a priori in that they already existed and humans discovered them
— ZhouBoTong
The thesis:
Those certain natural relations already existed; that which became mathematical conceptions and the principles legislating their truths are determined in the mind a priori, sufficient to explain and necessary to understand those natural relations.
The proof:
In the absence of a priori knowledge, no figure is possible to conceive from the thought of two lines. Given a 6 and a 3, no concept of 9 is possible from them alone. Given a triangle, it is impossible to conceive from it, that perpendicular lines drawn from the midpoints of each line will meet at a point central to all of them.
With respect to th OP, humans will retain knowledge of post-human rocks in general via their extant experience, but that a priori knowledge is not the same as the direct a posteriori knowledge of a particular set of extant rocks required by the OP. The former is given from intuition, the latter is given from sense.
Think of it this way: instead of asking after rocks post-human, ask about the temperature. There were humans, humans look at thermometers, humans henceforth have indication of a natural phenomenon. Vacate all humans, then ask about the thermometer. Just because there’s no reason to think there’s no natural phenomenon to register on the thermometer doesn’t lend itself to any possible knowledge of what the indication is. Hell, I can’t even tell you the temperature in the next town over and I haven’t been deleted from anything. — Mww
There's a way of talking about idealism that most of us on the forums are familiar with. It's a no-nonsense wryness. It's meant as a corrective to out-there thought that's lost its grounding. And that can be a good thing.
— csalisbury
At least you understand where I'm coming from, and accept that this can be a good thing.
Here's the problem:
Before I had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as river.
— Qingyuan Weixin
The wryness only really works for the transition from non-mountain back to mountain. It doesn't work if you never understood the 'more intimate knowledge' to begin with, if you've always only seen mountains as mountains. Kurt Vonnegut went to war, Mark Twain was knee-deep in life, before retiring from it to reflect ironically. Their wryness was earned.
What I see in this thread, and many thread like this, is common sense masquerading as a knowing wryness, one it hasn't earned. It's mimicry, a borrowed veneer of knowingness.
— csalisbury
That's how you see it. The following is how I see it.
Here's the problem. There's this assumption that because of my similarities with the average guy on the street, the same criticisms that apply to him, also apply to me. It's basically a guilty by association error. And your reply is also basically an ad hominem where you're calling me unthinking and unworthy. How judgemental of you. It's a shame you didn't go about replying in a better way.
Here's the difference. Believe it or not, I have actually thought about this a lot, and I feel like I've reached a point where I've come out the other side, only to find that my initial assumptions were pretty much right all along (albeit perhaps with a few qualifications here and there), kind of like your quote. And I've gained the insight of why it is that others go wrong, and get stuck at an earlier stage. This is basically the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. You perhaps see my position as one of the first two. I see my position as the synthesis. You think that you're right and I'm wrong, and, funnily enough, I think that I'm right and you're wrong. — S
Maybe this is part of our problem. I do not think I have once in this thread attempted to argue against idealism. I am more asking, "why idealism?" "what does it explain?" (I get that these questions could be seen as an argument against idealism, but that takes an extra step) Similarly, before I engage in an argument against god, I will want someone to show me something that god does. Until then, I will remain agnostic.
— ZhouBoTong
I just listed the argument for the sake of completeness. I understand your position. As to your question: Idealism tells us what we can know about physics and how we can know it. In this sense, it is relevant for our formulation of the scientific method. Enpirical Knowledge is based on subjective observation, and not some other "direct" access to objective reality. There are also rules for constructing a theory (simplicity and parsimony, for example, often called Ockham's razor) that will change slightly based on what you think you are doing when you construct a theory.
I agree that rocks in the past does not refute idealism (as you mentioned some idealist could easily say we don't "know" there were rocks in the past - I suppose the king idealist would say we don't "know" there are rocks now, even this one I am holding in my hand), but I just view this as one of those extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence. Surely to say "there is a rock", is far more ordinary (far less extraordinary) than "you know there might not even be such a thing as those entities we erroneously label as rocks". So not evidence, but decent reasoning...no?
— ZhouBoTong
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is one of the colloquial sayings that are really hard to apply consistently. Who defines what an extraordinary claim is, and how? Either way metaphysical questions are not decided by evidence in the way physical questions are. How would you even apply evidence to the question of what evidence actually represents?
If S admitted that it is possible we are all in the Matirx (he did so in this thread), then I think that places him more in line with me (sure idealism is possible, but it is meaningless whether it exists or not). I also think the varying degrees of idealism also vary in how coherent they are, and so you may have noticed S vehemently attacking a particular interpretation of idealism.
— ZhouBoTong
I wasn't able to extract much information about S' post at all. But that is somewhat beside the point, I don't want to talk above someone else's head.
"It must be emphasized that measurement does not mean only a process in which a physicist-observer takes part, but rather any interaction between classical and quantum objects regardless of any observer." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle
This line can be found at the end of the second paragraph (attached to reference #10).
By mentioning that "measurement" exists outside of any observer, it seems the author is worried about what idealists will do with his ideas...right? (I really am wondering if I am right or not here, not just driving my point home)
— ZhouBoTong
I don't know if they thought about idealism as philosophy or the consciousness interpretation of QM. In any event I don't think that the author is worried about a misinterpretation is the same as sqauring the theory with idealism. That'd be actively advocating a theory of QM that references the mind of the observer. But other interpretations, such as many worlds, seem to be essentially realist metaphysics.
And if I am reading that correctly, I think it addresses an important distinction in how idealism can be interpreted. If this is a definition of idealism (I tried to find a simple general one, please correct me if it is wrong or incomplete): Idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. This could be interpreted as "we can not know reality except through the mind" which I would say is fine and I think S would agree (how else would we know anything?), but so what? It changes nothing, and explains nothing. However, if the above definition is interpreted as "nothing exists outside the mind" then we have a problem (and I think this is where S starts saying things that imply idealism is incoherent). I am not even saying I know it is false. But if it is true, it implies (directly states?) that we have NO IDEA WHAT REALITY IS. I am fine with being agnostic toward a claim like that. However, how SHOULD one live if they have no idea what reality is? Do you see the question itself becomes meaningless. Again, I am not arguing against idealism, just saying "why should I care?"
— ZhouBoTong
Well why does anyone care about philosophy? For the love of wisdom, no?
I also don't think either realism or idealism can tell you what you should do. Both are speculative, not normative. That the world really is what it looks like doesn't tell you what to do, either.
That nothing exists outside the mind is the position of solipsism, which is a very specific version of idealism. I haven't seen anyone here argue for metaphysical solipism.
But apart from that, why is it a problem if we don't know what reality "is"? Isn't it sufficient to know how our reality works, what observations to expect, or rather not to expect? — Echarmion
A rock is just a rock. By which I mean that it is just as it is defined. And the way that it's defined says nothing of how it looks or feels or whatever to an observer. What it says is what it is. What it does is describe it terms of objective properties.
Of course, I could have humoured him by answering the question by adopting his funny way of speaking, but I don't approve of his funny way of speaking, so that would be counterproductive. In case it hasn't become apparent to you by now, I'm a proponent of ordinary language philosophy, not Kantian language philosophy. — S
"No philosophy left in the discussion" - Baden.
"The philosophical content had shrunk to almost nothing" - jamalrob.
@ZhouBoTong,
@Mww,
@Echarmion,
@csalisbury.
Of course, this leaves out other comments, but they're not in dispute. Am I going to deny, for example, that banter like "Now fetch me a beer" is not representative of philosophical content? No. If it was that big a deal, comments like that could have been deleted. And who would've complained? Or, again, the staff could have actually communicated with any of us responsible for these comments which were judged not to meet the standards. And again, who would've complained?