Comments

  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    you have internal representations that map to objective features of it.hypericin

    That’s an open question too. I don’t think colours and sounds and smells and tastes “map” to objective features at all, and certainly not in a sense that can be considered “representative.”

    The connection between distal objects and sensory precepts is nothing more than causal, determined in part by each individual’s biology.

    The “objective” world is a mess of quantum fields, far removed from how things appears to us.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    I’ve only seen red things.NOS4A2

    I see red things when I dream and hallucinate. Those with synesthesia might see red things when they listen to music with their eyes closed in a dark room. These are visual percepts. They occur in ordinary waking experience too. The colour red as present in these visual percepts is not a property of distal objects.

    I have no problem understanding the argument, only the entities we’re dealing with. And that the indirect realist cannot point to any of these entities, describe where they begin and end, describe how and what they perceive, nor ascribe to them a single property, is enough for me to conclude that they are not quite sure what they are talking about, and that this causal chain and the entities he puts upon them are rather arbitrary.NOS4A2

    They can point to the visual cortex and temporal lobe. Visual percepts and rational awareness are either reducible to the activity in the brain or supervene on them. But the hard problem of consciousness hasn't been resolved yet so it's still an open matter.

    If you want an account that does not assume anything like mental properties or a first person perspective then the claim is that perception is the neurological processing of certain streams of information. By physical necessity any information processed by the brain is located in the brain. The unconscious involvement of the eyes may be a prerequisite (if you deny that we see things when we dream and hallucinate) but it itself is not a constituent of conscious perception - and the distal object itself is certainly not a constituent of it either.

    Hence the epistemological problem of perception. The brain has no direct access to the information that constitutes distal objects. We have to assume and hope that the information it directly processes is capable of accurately informing us about the existence and nature of those distal objects.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    But again, your position lacks a referent.NOS4A2

    It's what the sighted have and the blind (including those with blindsight) don't have. It's what occurs when we dream and hallucinate.

    As it stands, no intermediary exists between perceiver and perceived.NOS4A2

    If you define "perceiver" in such a way that it includes the entire body and "perceived" in such a way that it includes the body's immediate environment then what you say here is a truism.

    But this isn't what indirect realists mean which is why you've misinterpreted (or misrepresented) them.

    You might not believe in something like "rational awareness" and "sensory percepts" but the indirect realist does, and their claim is that sensory percepts are the intermediary that exist between rational awareness and distal objects. The colour red is one such sensory percept. A sweet taste is another.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The odour molecules are a part of that unperceived causal chain.Luke

    The odour molecules are perceived. I smell them.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    You seem you construe the perception as of an intermediary sensation which lays "between" the distal object and the perception, and thus perception is not of the distal object and thus is indirect.fdrake

    As referenced in the aforementioned article Direct Perception: The View from Here, "the view that perception is direct holds that a perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary mind-independent objects, rather than mind-dependent surrogates thereof."

    So, to say that my perception is directly of a distal object is to say that I am directly aware of a distal object.

    I do not believe that I am directly aware of a distal object. I believe that I am directly aware only of my sensations. Therefore, my perception is not of a distal object and so therefore perception is not direct.

    @Luke's position seems to be that perception is direct if sensations are (direct?) representations of distal objects.

    The first issue with this is that it doesn't explain what it means for a sensation to be a representation of a distal object.

    The second issue with this is that it doesn't explain what determines that the sensation is a representation of that distal object rather than of some other distal object, or even of the proximal stimulus (e.g. why is the sensation a representation of the cake in the oven rather than a representation of the odour molecules in the air).

    The third issue with this is that it is prima facie consistent with the indirect realist's claim that we are not directly aware of distal objects, as it may be both that a) we are directly aware only of sensations and that b) sensations are (direct?) representations of distal objects.

    The fourth issue with this is that (as mentioned in the SEP article) his position (and any other non-naive so-called "direct" realism) argues that "we directly perceive ordinary objects" and that "we are not ever directly presented with ordinary objects." Either his position equivocates on the meaning of "direct" or it contradicts itself.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    You don't directly perceive images formed by your brain. Those images are your perceptions.Luke

    This is where people are getting lost in the grammar.

    I see colours. Colours are a visual sensation.

    If you don't like the phrasing of the conclusion "therefore I see a visual sensation" then just don't use it. It is still the case that I see colours and that these colours are a visual sensation, not properties of distal objects. The same for every other feature of visual and auditory and olfactory experience. That's the substance of indirect realism.

    Perhaps adopt something like adverbialism. Rather than "I see colours" being a verb and a noun it's a verb and an adverb. Maybe that's the best way to understand "the schizophrenic hears voices" or "I saw a mountain in my dream." In each case, whatever is the direct object of perception it isn't some distal object. Waking, non-hallucinatory experiences are of the same kind, and only differ in that there is some appropriate distal cause.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    Did you read all of this article? It argues in favour of direct realism.Luke

    Yes, I wasn't offering it as a defence of indirect realism. I was offering it as an explanation that the problem of perception concerns whether or not we are directly aware of distal objects and their properties.

    The causal chain is prior to the visual percept. If, by "visual percept", you mean a "perception" of a distal object, then it cannot be a perception of the causal chain, since the causal chain is prior to, and is the cause of, that perception.

    Surely, the intermediary - whatever it is - does not provide a direct perception of its distal object, and allows only a representation of the object to be perceived without allowing the distal object to be immediately perceived.

    You do not perceive the causal chain that produces your visual percepts.
    Luke

    I'm not saying that we perceive the causal chain. I'm simply trying to explain the inconsistency in your position. You say that there are no intermediaries between visual percepts and some distal object, and yet there are; the odour molecules in the air are an intermediary between the visual percept and the cake in the oven.

    I'm also trying to understand why you say that the perception is of the cake in the oven, and not of the odour molecules, given that it is the odour molecules that stimulate the sense receptors in the nose. Clearly the causal chain has something to do with the object of perception under your account given that, presumably, the object of perception is never some distal object that has no role in the causal chain (e.g. you never see something happening on Mars). So how do you determine which object that is a part of the causal chain is the direct object of perception? You just say it's the cake without explaining why it's the cake.

    At least if you were to say that the object of perception is the odour molecules you could defend it by saying that the odour molecules are the proximal stimulus. There is at least some sense in such a claim.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    it just isn't the case that you see mountains in your dreams. It would be more accurate to say that you dream of mountains, in my opinion.NOS4A2

    Dreams, and hallucinations, have various perceptual modes. I see things and hear things and smell things. The things I see and hear and smell when I dream, and hallucinate, are not distal objects.

    Light is of the world. The eye is of the perceiver. It just doesn't make sense to me that the perceiver can be the intermediary for himself. The contact is direct, so much so that light is absorbed by the eye, and utilized in such an intimate fashion that there is no way such a process could be in any way indirect, simply because nothing stands between one and the other.

    ...

    Yes, more than just eyes are involved in vision. I would argue it requires the whole body, give or take. A functional internal carotid artery, for instance, which supplies blood to the head, is required for sight, as are the orbital bones and the muscles of the face. Sight requires a spine, metabolism, digestion, water, and so on. Because of this, I believe, the entity "perceiver" must extend to the entirety of the body. In any case, I cannot say it can be reduced to some point behind the eyes.
    NOS4A2

    There is such a thing as visual percepts. It's what the blind (even with functioning eyes) lack. It's what occurs when we dream and hallucinate, as well as when awake and not hallucinating. They come into existence when the relevant areas of the visual cortex are active. The features of these percepts are not the distal objects (or their properties) that are ordinarily the cause of them. The features of these percepts is the only non-inferential information given to rational thought; that inform our understanding. The relationship between these percepts and distal objects is in a very literal physical sense indirect; there are a number of physical entities and processes that sit between the distal object and the visual percept in the causal chain.

    This is what indirect realism is arguing. It's not arguing anything like "the human body indirectly responds to sensory stimulation by its environment" or "the rods and cones in the eye react to something inside the head" which seems to be your (mis)interpretation of the position.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    Since they point outward, you cannot see into your own skull, for instance.NOS4A2

    The indirect realist doesn’t claim that we see into own own skull. You’re misrepresenting what is meant by seeing something or feeling something. I feel pain, I see mountains in my dream. Nothing about this entails anything like the sense organs “pointing” inwards or anything like that.

    In most cases the sense organs play a causal role in seeing and feeling and smelling, but “I see X” doesn’t simply mean “the sense receptors in my eye have been stimulated by some object in the environment.”

    It’s direct because at no point in your chain is there any intermediary. I would distill it as such:NOS4A2

    There literally are intermediaries. Light is an intermediary between the table and my eye. My eye is an intermediary between the light and my brain, etc.

    Or when I point to a sensation I point to my body.NOS4A2

    That doesn’t make it right to. We know that people with certain brain disorders are blind even though they have functioning eyes, and we know that people can be made to see things by bypassing the eyes and directly stimulating the brain, so clearly whatever vision is it sits somewhere behind the eyes, either in the visual cortex or in some supervenient mental phenomenon.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    Since most of his senses point outward one would assume he mostly perceives in an outward directionNOS4A2

    What does this mean?

    But indirect realism undermines this relationship. It claims that even though the senses point outward, and interact directly with the rest of the world, his perception remains inward.NOS4A2

    The indirect realist recognises that in most cases the causal chain of perception is:

    distal object → proximal stimulus → sense receptor → sensation → rational awareness

    The indirect realist also recognises that the qualities of the sensation are not properties of the distal object (although in some accounts the so-called "primary qualities" of the sensation, such as visual geometry, "resemble" the relevant properties of the distal object).

    So in what sense is the relationship between rational awareness (or even sensation) and the distal object direct?

    And given that I see things when I dream and hallucinate, sometimes the casual chain is just:

    sensation → rational awareness

    What is the direct object of perception in these cases? Why would the involvement of some distal object, proximal stimulus, and sense receptor prior to the sensation change this?
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    Would be nice if everyone wrote down what they thought a a perceptual intermediary was and why it matters!fdrake

    I think this and this clearly set out my position.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    At this point I don't know if we're just speaking different languages. You seem to have a very different understanding of the meanings of the words "awareness", "perception", "direct", and "intermediary".
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The relevant issue is about perceptions of objects, not awareness of sensations. The directness or indirectness of awareness is irrelevant.Luke

    The directness or indirectness of awareness is the very issue under discussion. I don't understand what you think "perception" or "awareness" mean.

    Let's take Direct Perception: The View from Here as a starting point:

    The view that perception is direct holds that a perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary mind-independent objects, rather than mind-dependent surrogates thereof.

    ...

    The position that perception is direct begins with the common sense intuition that everyday perceiving involves an awareness of ordinary environmental situations.

    ...

    The indirect position, in contrast, argues that the common sense intuition of perception as the direct awareness of environmental objects is naïve. Upon closer examination, a perceiver is actually only in direct contact with the proximal stimulation that reaches the receptors, or with sense-data, or with the sensations or internal images they elicit - but not with the distal object itself.

    ...

    The perceiver is directly aware only of some mind-dependent proxy— the sense-data, internal image, or representation - and only indirectly aware of the mind-independent world.

    How do the causes of a perception act as an intermediary between the perception and its object?Luke

    In the very literal sense that light is the literal physical intermediary between my eyes and some distal object, "carrying" whatever "information" it can about that distal object into my eyes. If the lights are turned off then I don't see anything.

    So, sensations are an intermediary between rational awareness and the proximal stimulus and the proximal stimulus is an intermediary between the sense receptors and the distal object. Given this, there is no meaningful sense in which we are directly aware of the distal object. Therefore, perception is not direct.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    @Luke Also, you missed something I added in:

    What if, say, the cake has since been taken away and eaten, but the smell lingered. What am I (directly) smelling now? Nothing? The contents of my family's stomachs in the other room? Odour molecules in the air?
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The relevant issue is whether perceptions of objects is direct or indirect, not whether awareness of perceptions/sensations is direct or indirect.Luke

    If awareness of sensations is direct and awareness of objects is indirect then perception of objects is indirect.

    The cake emits the odour molecules, presumably.Luke

    So? Why is the object of perception not the specific thing that stimulates the sense receptors? Why do you get to go back a step in the causal chain and say that it's the cake?

    Earlier you seemed to be saying that smelling a cake and "smelling" odour molecules were equivalent, just like watching pixels/light and watching Joe Biden on television.Luke

    Yes, you can describe what happens as "smelling cake" or you can describe it as "smelling odour molecules", much like you can describe it as "seeing fireworks" or you can describe it as "seeing coloured light".

    That's not the same as saying that "perceptions are equal to their causes" (which I can't even make sense of), so your prior question is misguided.

    Secondly, if perceptions are not equivalent to their causes, then we can ignore the causes, which are irrelevant to the question of whether or not our perceptions are directly of objects or not.Luke

    Okay, let's ignore causes. What does it mean to say that some sensation is the "direct" perception of some distal object? What conditions must be satisfied for some distal object to be the "direct" object of perception? By your own remarks you cannot defer to some causal explanation.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The relevant issue is whether perceptions are direct or indirect, not whether awareness is direct or indirect.Luke

    If we are directly aware of sensations and not directly aware of distal objects then we do not directly perceive distal objects.

    The smell of cake is not a property of the cake either; it’s an interaction between the cake and the perceiver. That doesn’t mean the perception is not of the cake.Luke

    The odour molecules in the air are the more proximal cause. So why is it that the interaction between the odour molecules in the air and the sense receptors in my nose is the (direct) perception of a cake in the oven? What does it even mean to say that the interaction between the odour molecules in the air and the sense receptors in my nose is the (direct) perception of a cake in the oven?

    Is the perception of smelling cake equivalent to the cause of the perception?Luke

    No. The cause of the sensation is odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose. The perception is (the rational awareness of) the subsequent sensation.

    What's the connection between either of these things and the cake in the oven?

    You provide an accurate account of the mechanics of perception (odour molecules stimulating the sense receptors in my nose, leading to a sensation) but then just throw in the non sequitur "therefore it's the direct perception of a cake in the oven" at the end with no explanation.

    And what if, say, the cake has since been taken away and eaten, but the smell lingered. What am I (directly) smelling now? Nothing? The contents of my family's stomachs? Odour molecules in the air?
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    If the causal chain of odour molecules, olfactory system, etc. is equivalent to the perception of smelling cake, then what’s the intermarry? The causal chain can’t be both the perception and the intermediary. What’s between the perception and the cake?Luke

    Sensations are the intermediary that sit between rational awareness and distal objects. A sweet smell is not a property of some distal object but an olfactory sensation. I am directly aware of a sweet smell and through that smell indirectly aware of some food stuff that contains caramel. Hence the epistemological problem of perception.

    Your intentionalism seems to accept the existence of such sensations but nonetheless wants to say that we are directly aware of the distal object, and even though something like odour molecules are the more proximal cause of the sensation. I can't make sense of what you mean by "direct". Grammar notwithstanding, with respect to the ontology of perception it seems like indirect realism to me (and to Robinson).
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    I read it, and nothing about it conflicts with indirect realism.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    I don't believe so. I directly smell the cake. I do not smell an intermediary.Luke

    You're just reasserting the irrelevant argument about grammar.

    The indirect realist says that the painting is just paint. The intentionalist says that the painting is of a flower. There's no disagreement.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The causal chain of odour molecules entering the nose, interacting with the olfactory system, converting to brain signals, etc. can explain its effect: our smelling cake. But molecules entering the nose is not equivalent to smelling molecules, and molecules entering the nose, by itself, is insufficient to cause us to smell anything. Therefore, we don't smell odour molecules. The effect of this causal chain (the sensation of smell) cannot be its own cause. Moreover, it doesn't work the other way: the sensation is not an explanation for its distal cause. That is, smelling cake isn't an explanation for why odour molecules enter the nose, etc. So, I don't believe these are equivalent.Luke

    It means that we don't perceive things directly in the naive realist sense of taking physical objects directly into one's mind (somehow). It is just as I am describing: a perception (including representation) is the end result of a causal chain; for example, taking odour molecules into the olfactory system and converting them into brain signals, etc. The output of this causal chain is a perception such as a smell...Luke

    Everything you say here is consistent with indirect realism. Sensations/sense-data/qualia are (usually) caused by stimulation by some distal object. These sensations/sense-data/qualia are (at best) mental representations of that distal object. That distal object and its properties are not directly present in experience and so the epistemological problem of perception remains.

    The semantic argument over whether we should describe perception as "seeing a distal object" or "seeing a mental representation" is as irrelevant as arguing over whether we should describe what I do as "watching TV" or "watching Joe Biden's inauguration".
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    Are the pixels the perception or the cause of the perception? In your previous example you said that the odour molecules were the cause of the smell. Here you appear to imply that the perception and its cause are equivalent.Luke

    I'm simply explaining that the "semantic" approach seems to miss the point. You say you smell a cake. I say I'm watching Joe Biden's inauguration. These are both perfectly ordinary ways to describe what happens. But this ordinary way of describing what happens does not entail direct realist perception.

    Even though I describe what I'm doing as "watching Joe Biden's inauguration" (rather than, say, "watching pixels" or "watching light"), my perception of Joe Biden's inauguration isn't direct. Even though you describe what you're doing as "smelling a cake" (rather than, say, "smelling odour molecules"), your perception of the cake isn't direct.

    I think I am using language in an ordinary way when I say that you can smell the cake directly.Luke

    The ordinary way of speaking is not an accurate account of the ontology of perception. The ordinary way of speaking developed according to our naive, pre-scientific understanding of the world.

    It's odd, then, that Intentionalism was included in the SEP article you were quoting.Luke

    Even the SEP article adds:

    Thus, like sense-datum theorists and adverbialists, intentionalists reject Direct Realist Presentation, and admit that we are not ever directly presented with ordinary objects, not even in veridical experience.

    It's not clear to me what the intentionalist means by "we directly perceive ordinary objects that are not directly presented to us". It seems hopelessly confused. At best they're equivocating and mean two different things by "direct", at worst they are straight up contradicting themselves.

    And I'll refer once again to Semantic Direct Realism:

    The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    To put it bluntly:

    The perception is: the smell (of cake).
    The causes of the perception are: the odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors.

    What you perceive/smell is the cake.
    What you don’t perceive/smell are the causes of the perception.

    The perception is the final product; the smell. All you smell is the cake. You don’t smell the causes of the perception.
    Luke

    Your account is akin to saying: I'm not watching pixels activate on my television screen, I'm watching Joe Biden's inauguration.

    This "semantic" directness is so far divorced from the phenomenological directness that concerns the epistemological problem of perception and the dispute between naive and indirect realists that it seems entirely misplaced in these discussions.

    I don’t know how you could smell the cake more directly.Luke

    That it's "as direct as it can be" isn't that it's direct. The point made by indirect realists is that you can't smell the cake directly. Direct perception of a cake would require naive realism to be true, which it never is. This non-naive sense of "directness" is a misnomer.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism


    I don't understand why you don't understand what I'm asking and I don't know how to explain it in any simpler terms.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    One difference could be that qualia exist and sense data don't.RussellA

    Which is like saying "one difference could be that bachelors exist and unmarried men don't".
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    For example, the relational view of color does a good job explaining how the properties of the object perceived, the ambient enviornment, and the perceiver all go into the generation of an experience. Could an adverbial description do the same thing? Maybe, but not easily. And it's hard to see what the benefit would be.Count Timothy von Icarus

    So how do you make sense of this:

    Phenylthiocarbamide tastes bitter to 70% of people and doesn't taste bitter to 30% of people.

    What does the word "bitter" mean/refer to? What does the phrase "tastes bitter" mean/refer to?
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    Only if sense data exist. The Adverbialist doesn't need them. Why do you think sense data exist if they are not needed?RussellA

    I don't understand what you're asking.

    I'm saying that the terms "sense data" and "qualia" refer to the same thing. Therefore, if qualia exist then sense data exists. According to the SEP article, adverbialists accept that qualia exist.

    Your comments are like saying "I believe that bachelors exist but I don't believe that unmarried men exist".

    So if I'm wrong and there is a difference between sense data and qualia then what is that difference?
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The Adverbialist may accept qualia but don't need sense data.RussellA

    That's what I don't understand. As I understand it, sense data and qualia are the same thing.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The thesis of Direct Realism (at least, according to the SEP article) is that "we can directly perceive ordinary objects". Some of us believe this thesis but disagree with naive realism. We are also direct realists. I genuinely disagree that we always perceive an intermediary and that we cannot directly perceive ordinary objects. Call that a semantic disagreement if you will, but we can't both be correct.Luke

    In what sense is an olfactory sensation caused by odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose the "direct" perception of a cake in the oven?

    Any non-naive sense of "direct" seems to stretch the meaning of "direct" into meaninglessness, and does nothing to resolve the epistemological problem of perception.

    But again, if what naive direct realists mean by "direct" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "direct" then it's possible that perception isn't direct in the naive sense but is direct in the non-naive sense. Indirect realists argue that perception isn't direct in the naive sense. Indirect realists argue that perception is indirect in the naive sense.

    Indirect realism is compatible with intentionalism, even if intentionalists refer to themselves as being direct realists. Each group simply means something different by "direct". This is the argument made by Robinson in Semantic Direct Realism.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The Adverbialist rejects sense data. Sense data should go the way of the aether, of historic interest only.RussellA

    According to the SEP article adverbialists accept qualia. If sense data and qualia are the same thing then according to the SEP article adverbialists accept sense data.

    Maybe there's a distinction between accepting the existence of sense data and accepting the sense datum theory of perception. Perhaps it's a semantic distinction; an argument over whether or not "I see sense data" is correct grammar.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    I don't think there is a distinction. But the quote you were quoting also wasn't making that distinction.flannel jesus

    Russell was saying that adverbialism rejects the sense data theory but the SEP article says that adverbialism accepts (and even requires?) qualia.

    Hence my confusion.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    That's a very interesting piece of information, but I think it's still the case that most people talking about qualia here are talking about the experience, and not the data.flannel jesus

    I think you're misunderstanding what is meant by "sense-data". From here:

    The technical term “sense data” was made prominent in philosophy during the early decades of the twentieth century by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, followed by intense elaboration and modification of the concept by C. D. Broad, H. H. Price, and A. J. Ayer, among others. Although the promoters of sense data disagreed in various ways, they mainly agreed on the following points:

    1. In perceiving, we are directly and immediately aware of a sense datum.
    2. This awareness occurs by a relation of direct mental acquaintance with a datum.
    3. Sense data have the properties that they appear to have.
    4. These properties are determinate; in vision, we experience determinate shapes, sizes, and colors.
    5. Our awareness of such properties of sense data does not involve the affirmation or conception of any object beyond the datum.
    6. These properties are known to us with certainty (and perhaps infallibly).
    7. Sense data are private; a datum is apprehended by only one person.
    8. Sense data are distinct from the act of sensing, or the act by which we are aware of them.

    Whereas you seem to be suggesting that "sense data" is something involving light striking the rods and cones in the eyes?
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    I don't think it's that simple. From here:

    Historically, the term ‘qualia’ was first used in connection with the sense-datum theory by C.I. Lewis in 1929. As Lewis used the term, qualia were properties of sense-data themselves.

    So much like we might say that mass is a property of physical objects, he says that colour qualia is a property of sense data.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism


    But also from that article:

    As noted, adverbialism is committed to the view that experiencing something white, for example, involves your experience being modified in a certain way: experiencing whitely. A natural way to understand this is in terms of the idea that the experience is an event, and the modification of it is a property of that event. Since this property is both intrinsic (as opposed to relational or representational) and phenomenal then this way of understanding adverbialism is committed to the existence of qualia.

    I don't get the distinction between sense data and qualia. To me it's all just sensations, which are a mental phenomenon. Distal objects are not constituents of sensations. There is nothing more than a causal relationship (with physical intermediaries) between distal objects and sensations.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    However, if all knowledge is necessarily "indirect," and "direct" knowledge is an impossibility because of what knowledge is, then it doesn't seem like the adjective does any lifting at all, regardless of if you think it should be "direct" or "indirect."Count Timothy von Icarus

    The knowledge that I am in pain and am tasting something sweet is direct. The knowledge that I stood on a nail and am eating something that contains a lot of sugar is indirect.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    According to the SEP article, direct realism is the thesis that "we can directly perceive ordinary objects." It doesn't say only in the "direct" sense of naive realism.Luke

    So if "direct" in the naive sense doesn't mean the same thing as "direct" in the non-naive sense then there are two different meanings of "direct", and so two different meanings of "we directly perceive ordinary objects". Which meaning of "we directly perceive ordinary objects" do you think the indirect realist is arguing against?

    If the indirect realist is arguing against the naive sense of "we directly perceive ordinary objects", and if we do not directly perceive ordinary objects in the naive sense, then indirect realism is correct.

    It is this concept of an "unmediated awareness of objects" that I consider to be incoherent. Do indirect realists only hold the negative view that this concept is incoherent? Or do they also hold the positive belief in their position that we cannot directly perceive ordinary objects?Luke

    The naive realist believes that we are directly aware of the constituents of experience and that ordinary objects are the constituents of experience, and so that we are directly aware of ordinary objects. There is no intermediary between awareness and ordinary objects.

    The indirect realist believes that we are directly aware of the constituents of experience and that sensations/sense-data/qualia are the constituents of experience, and so that we are directly aware of sensations/sense-data/qualia. Sensations/sense-data/qualia are the intermediary between awareness and ordinary objects.

    This is explained in more detail here.

    What I find strange about your position is that you seem to accept the existence of something like sensations/sense-data/qualia, seem to accept that we are (directly?) aware of sensations/sense-data/qualia, but also claim that we are directly aware of ordinary objects. I just don't understand what you mean by "direct" in this final claim.

    What is the difference between claiming that awareness of sense-data is direct awareness of ordinary objects and claiming that awareness of sense-data is indirect awareness of ordinary objects?
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism


    As I suggested here, naming these non-naive direct realisms as being "direct" realisms seems to be a misnomer. At the very least they seem to mean something different by "direct" than what is meant by naive and indirect realists.

    On this point it is worth reading Robinson's Semantic Direct Realism:

    The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

    So, naive realists argue that perception is direct1, indirect realists argue that perception is not direct1, and intentionalists argue that perception is direct2.

    The claims that perception is not direct1 and that perception is direct2 are consistent, and so indirect realists and intentionalists can both be correct.

    And as I've mentioned before, the core of the issue is the epistemological problem of perception, and if perception is not direct1 then even if it's direct2 the problem remains.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    It follows that your criterion for a direct perception is to have the distal object somehow be physically present in one's phenomenal experience. In other words, your criterion is that the object is identical with one's phenomenal experience.Luke

    It's not my criterion. I'm summarising the various views as explained here:

    Direct Realist Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of ordinary objects.

    ...

    Direct Realist Character: the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary objects.

    ...

    On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it; in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event.

    It is not enough that some distal object causes some sensation (even a "representative" sensation) for perception to be in any meaningful sense direct.

    How would that work? How is that kind of perception possible?

    It's not, which is why direct realism is false.

    As I understand it, indirect realism asserts that we perceive representations (of objects). My position is not that we perceive representations (or some other intermediary), so my position is not indirect realism. My position is that perception involves representations. Representations are not the object of perception, as indirect realism asserts; instead, representations are formative in having perceptions. Or, as you put it earlier, representations are part of the "mechanics of perception".Luke

    I think you're just reading too much into the grammar. I see a mountain when I dream. What sort of thing is the object of perception when I dream? The indirect realist claims that whatever sort of thing is the object of perception when I dream or hallucinate is also the sort of thing that is the object of perception when awake and not hallucinating. The only difference is that when awake and not hallucinating the experience has an appropriate distal cause.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    That's my point. Michael was asserting that a direct perception must be when a perception is identical with its object. My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation, yet Michael calls this a direct perception.Luke

    I don't quite understand what you're suggesting I'm saying, but the representational theory of perception is indirect realism.

    What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness? The dispute is not over our (direct or indirect) awareness of our perceptions. This talk of "awareness of perceptions" is just another of your attempts to push our perceptions back a step; to create a gap between ourselves and our perceptions (much like your earlier talk of "experience of perceptions"). We do not perceive our perceptions; we perceive the world.Luke

    I'm aware of colours. Colours are not properties of distal objects. Colours are features of phenomenal experience alone. They are something like sensations/sense-data/qualia. Therefore, I'm aware of something like sensations/sense-data/qualia. The same with smells and tastes and pain and all other so-called "secondary" qualities.

    When I dream, I see things. The things I see are not distal objects. The things I see are features of phenomenal experience alone. Even the so-called "primary" qualities in dreams are something like sensations/sense-data/qualia.

    The indirect realist argues that the "primary" qualities of veridical experience are of the same kind as the "secondary" qualities of veridical experience and the "primary" qualities of dreams and hallucinations, and that the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when I dream and hallucinate are the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when awake and not hallucinating.

    This is the common kind claim.

    The difference between veridical and non-veridical experience is only that veridical experience has the appropriate distal cause.

    One argument against the common kind claim is that distal objects are not just causes of but actual constituents of (veridical) experience (in lieu of something like sensations/sense-data/qualia). That’s the naive realist view.

    If there’s such a thing as non-naive direct realism that can avoid the common kind claim without arguing that distal objects are actual constituents of experience then it needs further explanation.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    For Locke a primary quality belongs to the objectLeontiskos

    If primary qualities belong to an object then nothing in experience is a primary quality, because objects and their properties are not constituents of experience.

    and it seems obvious that one can interact with the same spatial property via both sight and touch. Some humans can interact with spatial properties via hearing, but there are other species which tend to be better at that.Leontiskos

    If by this you just mean that there is a causal relationship between an object's properties and our experience then indirect realists would agree.

    The relevant question is whether or not (and how) the relationship between experience and an object's properties is "direct".