What metric or criterion do you use to detect evil? — Average

I think it's something like 'the will to cause gratuitous suffering in others', usually born out of resentment or hatred, which is usually born of out of a refusal to recognize and correct the defects in one's own culture or self. I don't know. Thoughts?

I personally think that words like evil can be used by people to refer to whatever they happen to dislike for whatever reasons they find convenient at the moment. — Average

I agree. I think it's a terrible thing to cheapen the word through such usage.

I'm not in a position to critique this at the level of mathematics or even to evaluate whether it's mathematically meaningful at all. As such, I'm sure it will come as no surprise that I don't see how it answers the OP's question. These 4D Plank-sized toruses and expanding 3D branes - where did they come from? How did they come to have the properties they have?

I think what he said is at least part of the reason “solidarity” is not only difficult but is also sometimes undesirable. — Average

Agreed. It's not always desirable. Solidarity is simply organization of human resources around a common goal or ideal. If the goal is evil, then solidarity becomes a means to achieving evil ends. See the Nazis.

Furthermore, (and also to your point) solidarity is difficult to achieve because it's difficult to get people to agree on ideals and goals. Getting a small number of people organized around trivial goals (like when to eat dinner) is difficult enough. Trying to get large numbers of them organized around unimaginably ambitious goals (like overthrowing the present world-order) is exponentially more difficult. It usually requires copious amounts of manipulation and control (e.g. propaganda, violence, etc.).

Well, I'd say there's some truth in Machiavelli's assessments. Certainly, there are many people living in the world who fit that description most of the time, and I do think that the so-called 'dark triad' is a genuine expression of human nature, though certainly not a complete expression of it.

Only our best geniuses can move us any distance at all, towards the correct origin story and I for one, am not in that league. — universeness

Nor am I. :smile:

To be honest, I think I know. Not because I'm the chosen one or whatever BS, but because I'm interested, gave it a lot of thought, and somehow my subconsciousness made all parts "click". The puzzle pieces fell into the right place. It clicked. — EugeneW

Interesting, and that's fair. Despite my comment about 'honesty' it's genuinely not my intention here to simply accuse others of dishonesty.

What answer would you give to the OP's question? I looked back in the thread a bit but didn't find your answer. Apologies if I missed it.

What do you have in mind when you mention human nature? I’m not trying to score intellectual points, I’m just curious. — Average

First, I want to acknowledge that term 'human nature' is loaded and doesn't pick out just one conceptual framework or level of analysis. With that caveat in mind, I'll say that I am thinking about in terms of the biological constraints on human thought, feeling and behavior. These constraints, when combined with various environmental factors, seem to produce something akin to 'attractors' toward which human behavior tends. Another (slightly different) way of looking at it is in terms of so-called human 'universals'. This might include things like fear of loud noises, formation of binary conceptual distinctions, division of labor by gender, engagement in moral hypocrisy and much more besides.

Fair enough. So, do you know?

Other options - please elaborate. — Benj96

I hold to "none of the above, because we don't know the answer".

It may not be 'sexy', but isn't this the only honest answer?

(2) That at the heart of these decisions is bad philosophy, or bad religion. The prevalent religion, in my view, is -- in particular -- capitalism and, behind this, nihilism. — Xtrix

That can't be right. Human beings have been making dumb decisions for millennia, certainly well before 'capitalism' and 'nihilism' were glints in our minds' eyes. The only difference between 'then' and 'now' is that we now possess superior means of destruction such that the consequences of our bad decisions have become horrifically magnified. If we're looking to blame something, I propose that 'human nature' is the only viable candidate. 'Nihilism' and 'capitalism' are nothing more than modern, highly intellectualized expressions of latent structures rooted within the constitution of the human being. If we want to change the world, we must first change ourselves.

Ha. Well at the very least is shows that Russell didn't skewer Meinong's position. He didn't even address it.

But philosophers are aware of that, are they not? — baker

I suspect that most are.

So why do they still advocate for criticial thinking? — baker

Because having such a skill make us less susceptible to manipulation via bad arguments. It can also enhance our power to influence others through its use and abuse. Critical thinking is thus a form of power.

Didn't Russell rather skewer that approach? (On Denoting.) — bongo fury

Thus "the present King of France," "the round square," etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This in itself is a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe on the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round; etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred. — Russell - On Denoting

Here Russell gets Meinong wrong. Meinong does not claim that such objects exist. He claims that some objects exist, some subsist and some don't exist at all.

Obviously you weren't moved by their arguments or else you would endorse them. Why aren't you endorsing them? What is it that you find lacking, or unreasonable, in their arguments? — Harry Hindu

I don't look at it that way. Dialetheism provides a way solving certain problems. Like any proposed solution to a problem, it has costs and benefits relative to other proposals. Which solution to use depends on the solution context. If I were writing a belief revision algorithm for an AI program, I would use whatever algorithm worked best within the resource constraints I was facing. If the dialetheic approach proved the most adequate to meet the requirements, I would use it.

When it comes to using dialetheism as the basis for one's personal metaphysics and epistemology, the same considerations apply. The class of situations/propositions to which dialetheism is purported to apply is exceedingly small. Again, I can only speak for Priest, but he applies it only to propositions/situations satisfying the semantics of the "enclosure schema". He feels that dialetheism provides the most "satisfying" solution for dealing with the semantics of such situations - for him, the benefits outweigh the costs.

Of course, things get fuzzy when it comes to evaluating the "truth" of metaphysical theories. Beyond insisting that such theories not be fatally self-contradictory, the criteria are mostly aesthetic and personal, although the behavioral consequences of holding such theories should also be a consideration (e.g. if a such a theory would prompt a person to become a suicide bomber, etc.). For me personally, while I can appreciate the beauty of Priest's metaphysics, and have no problems with the ethical commitments he derives from it, I ultimately find it too lifeless for my tastes.

It appears that Priest is confusing a misuse of language as a new logical system. — Harry Hindu

Priest (and other dialetheists) would obviously disagree. They present arguments. You should study them sometime.

I realize very well that I can make my own peace and take my own steps toward attempting to resolve this within my own circle, and I can have peace amongst my own life, but that is merely a side quest in all of this for me. — Lif3r

In my opinion, that should not be considered a side quest. That is the quest, and far too few people take it seriously. Imagine if literally everyone took seriously the responsibility for making their own little sphere of influence better than it already is. That's where we should all start. And if we succeed there, only then should we consider increasing our radius. I mean, if we can't consistently maintain/improve our own little personal lives, what makes us think that we have the wisdom to reform the whole world? I'm afraid that much evil and injustice has been done in the name of "reforming the world" by those who didn't possess such wisdom. That said, if you've got it, then by all means, take it to the world.

And per regarding belief revision, dialetheism could also have practical applications within the field(s) of artificial intelligence and machine learning. In fact, now that I look at it, the SEP article linked in the OP actually contains a short section devoted to this topic.

Mistakes can be made with language - which is the whole point in following logical rules - to avoid those mistakes. Dialetheism doesn't seem to recognize this, as if all contradictions in language are true - whatever that means as it seems to blur the lines between what is true and false. — Harry Hindu

The only dialetheist I've read at any length is Graham Priest, and he, at least, does not maintain that all contradictions are true. Rather, he argues that some contradictions are true. More precisely, he argues that there are actual situations containing statements that are both true and false, namely, those situations that fit the semantics of the enclosure schema. These situations involve self-reference and/or reference to absolute limits. Examples from his book "Beyond the Limits of Thought" include the limit of what can be known, the limit of what can be expressed and the limit of what can be conceived. He argues that all thought about such limits is intrinsically contradictory insofar as the very act of thinking such limits requires one to transgress them at the same time. Thought draws a boundary and then crosses it in the act of thinking it.

What use is a contradiction? To what use could dialetheism be applied? What problems does it attempt to solve? — Harry Hindu

Priest would probably maintain that the mere prospect that dialetheism is true should be sufficient warrant for pursuing it, but he also thinks it is useful. In his book "One", he develops a dialetheic metaphysics that he calls "gluon theory" and employs it in solutions to various metaphysical puzzles around identity, unity, universals, being and nothingness and intentionality.

Admittedly, his theories and solutions have not been widely adopted in western analytical philosophy. And while I find them fascinating and worth learning about, I wouldn't say that I endorse them.

Unlike with chemistry, there is no agreed upon fact to determine what people should value. Take equality versus freedom. Which is more valuable when they come into conflict? Depends on who you ask. — Marchesk

I don't think it's quit as different as you're making it out. People make a lot of hoopla about the "facts" in science, and yet we still have flat-earthers, climate change deniers, young-earthers, intelligent design theorists, alchemists, astrologists, etc. Furthermore, what was accepted as scientific "fact" 100 years ago (let alone 500 years ago) is now reckoned as falsehood. And yet these considerations don't prompt most of us to abandon science as hopelessly subjective. That's because there is tangible progress in the sciences, but I'd argue the same can be said of ethics, even taking into account the horrors of the 20th century. How many of us would prefer to live in an ancient democracy, a medieval absolute monarchy or a contemporary communist dictatorship? Are we not justified in reckoning the moral underpinnings of some societies tangibly inferior to others?

You're only looking at one side of the equation. Bitter Crank is right - contradiction is at the heart of things. This implies the existence of good as well as evil, joy as well as suffering, growth as well as decay, cooperation as well as conflict, love as well as hate. For whatever reason (if any), it seems that you can't have one without the other. The best we can do is to choose hope and work for progress despite all of the madness.

What's the alternative?

- In my opinion, you're going to run into the same problem whether it's with the "subject", "point-of-view" or anything else. Again, the fact that you're making claims about these things implies that the understanding and reason have some purchase on them. But if they have enough purchase on them to support judgment and inference, then clearly it can't be the case that they are unknowable. We can't simultaneously claim "there is no knowledge of knowing" and "knowledge is a relation between subject and object" because the former disallows the latter. In fact, the former is self-undermining all on its own. You need to find a model of self that allows the subject to become the object of understanding and reason. This will allow you to make claims about the subject without undermining your own model.

The Subject is felt, it is not known as one of the Objects present to-and-for-itself. — PessimisticIdealism

Ok, but your argument contains claims about the subject, which implies conceptualization and pretensions to knowledge.

Actually in the argument I give at the beginning, I am speaking of exhaustive explanations as opposed to something as general as "knowledge." — PessimisticIdealism

You defined knowledge in a later post, it's true, but presumably "explanation" would fall under that general definition.

Yeah, I see what you're saying, but if there is an aspect of the subject that cannot become an object-for-a-subject, this would imply we could never know it. You're dividing the world up into that which can be known (objects-for-a-subject) and that which cannot be known (subjects qua subject) and defining knowledge as a set of one-way relations from the latter to the former. This implies that any claims made about the latter cannot count as knowledge. The model you have laid out in your argument implies that the claims in your argument (including the conclusion) can never qualify as knowledge.

But the statement "I know that I am knowing" implies knowledge of self as the subject of knowledge. Right? Such statements only count as knowledge (per your definition of knowledge) via the objectification of the subject. Even the statement "knowledge is a relation between subject and object" also implies an objectification of the subject. How can you know that knowledge is a relation between subject and object unless you can objectify both the subject and the object?

I'm going harp on this a little. You said:

All "Knowledge" is a relationship between a knowing "Subject" and a known "Object." — PessimisticIdealism

If subject can never become object, then subject can never know itself as a subject. But your entire argument depends on knowledge of the subject (e.g. it contains knowledge claims about subjects). Therefore, your argument is self-undermining.

Ok. but what function does punishment play among animals? Presumably it provides some utility or it wouldn't have evolved. The question, then, becomes whether it provides any utility within the realm of human society and culture, or whether it can safely be discarded. For my part, I'm not convinced it can be discarded because I do think the threat of punishment deters many people from doing terrible things. That said, I think some temperaments respond better to punishment than others, and so the use of punishment could be better modulated within society than it currently is.

Why?

P6) The “Subject” is unable to become an Object-for-a-Subject (i.e. an Object for-itself). — PessimisticIdealism

This seems to be denying the possibility of self-knowledge.

Speaking in evolutionary terms, I suspect that the emotional satisfaction associated from seeking retribution evolved as a mechanism for preventing individuals from being exploited by others. Generally speaking, a "bad actor" will think twice about harming someone who is likely to seek retribution.

So when Dennett says, 'oh yes, I'm a materialist, all that exists is matter and energy - and information' - then is he still a materialist? — Wayfarer

I'm not so sure. The closest Dennett has ever really come to laying all his metaphysical cards on the table (that I am aware of) was in his paper "Real Patterns". The metaphysics laid out in that paper is (perhaps unwittingly) much closer to Platonism than traditional atomistic materialism. In the paper he basically describes the world as a great mass of data in which various patterns can be found. For Dennett, patterns are just algorithmic compressions that can be used to reproduce the original data to some degree of accuracy. If you understand "data" as "sense data" and "real patterns" as "Ideas", then you're basically knocking at Plato's door.

It's a bit of muddle, but you can read the paper here if you haven't already:

https://ruccs.rutgers.edu/images/personal-zenon-pylyshyn/class-info/FP2012/FP2012_readings/Dennett_RealPatterns.pdf

Usually folks who label certain acts "unnatural" will presuppose some kind of "natural law" position. For instance, this is basically how the Catholic Church has defended its position on homosexuality over the centuries. The idea is that the moral law is woven right into the fabric of the cosmos by it's creator via the "essence" or "nature" of each thing. So a "good" triangle is one the one that best exemplifies the "essence" of a triangle - the one that has the straightest edges and that has angles that sum most closely to 180 degrees, etc. Likewise, a "good" human is one that best exemplifies it's god-given human nature (that is, human nature as god originally intended it be, not the sinful one that resulted from Adam's little mistake in the garden). In any event, in systems like these the meaning of the terms "goodness" and "nature/essence" are basically convertible, so that what is good is natural, and what is bad is unnatural by definition.

Infinite being can effect any possible act either directly, or by indirection. — Dfpolis

Ah, I see. That helps clarify things for me.

It strikes me that the only possible act that God engages in directly is the act of creation ex nihilo. If this is true, then it would imply that God's existence and the existence of some logically possible universe are mutually dependent. In other words, if God exists only when he is exercising some capacity, and if the only capacity he has is for creation ex nihilo, then God exists iff some logically possible universe of his own creation exists.

Are there any other direct actions God can take besides creation ex nihilo? If so, what are some examples?

Using this line of reasoning, we could say that a finite being acting as only an infinite being or as only any other finite being can is also not a possible act. Therefore, finite beings can engage in any possible act. — Theorem

I haven't heard back from you on this, so I am going to assume I have misunderstood your claim. I think where I am getting tripped up is when I read the phrase "all possible acts", I think a set of all possible actions such as "lifting a hand", "taking a step" or "creating a physical being ex nihilo". So when you say that an infinite being can engage in all possible acts, it seems obvious to me that this is wrong because an infinite being can only execute a small subset of the set of all possible acts (some of which can only be executed by finite beings).

However, you seem to be thinking of the "set of all possible acts" in a different way. In your previous response you seem to be indexing possibility to the being in question. So instead of talking about the set of all possible acts in total, you're talking about the sum of all possible acts for a being of type X. So to say that a particular infinite being can engage in all possible acts means that it can engage in that subset of possible acts that any infinite being could execute. Whereas a particular finite being could never engage in the set of all possible acts that any finite being could execute (e.g. a man with no hand could not raise his hand, etc.).

Just trying to understand you. Is that anywhere close?

Yes, it can. An infinite being acting as only a finite being can is not a possible act. — Dfpolis

Using this line of reasoning, we could say that a finite being acting as only an infinite being or as only any other finite being can is also not a possible act. Therefore, finite beings can engage in any possible act.

Why is it problematic? Truly eating requires a number of operations that imply finiteness: changing in the course of chewing means that the eater has unrealized potencies. Using and requiring nutrients to maintain one's being implies contingency. and so on. So, you must see the acts, not in abstraction (which would be Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness), but in the context of being done by an unlimited being. — Dfpolis

That's not the issue. The issue is that your distinction between infinite and finite beings is made in terms of an ambiguous definition of "possible acts". See above.

Am I invited? — Dfpolis

Sure, if you like ham sandwiches.

No, because that would entail the contraction of Its being limited, but It could create a finite being capable of doing so. — Dfpolis

Wait, so an infinite being cannot engage in any possible act? You seem to be saying that there are certain acts that only a finite being can accomplish. This seems problematic. You said that the difference between infinite being and finite being is that the latter can only engage in some possible acts whereas the former can engage in any possible act. If that's no longer true then your distinction between finite and infinite being collapses.

A finite being can act limited ways, and an Infinite Being can do any possible act. — Dfpolis

I apologize if you addressed this already, but could you clarify what you mean by any possible act? Could an infinite being eat a ham sandwich for lunch at my dining room table today?

If there is no hard problem, we should be able to reach scientific or philosophical consensus on those types of questions. — Marchesk

I think we will, more or less. As artificial intelligence develops and machine behavior becomes more and more convincing, most people's intuitions about mind and mechanism will shift and the vast majority of the human populace will have little/no qualms with ascribing phenomenal consciousness to their robot friends, much as they have no problem ascribing it to their human friends. Sure, there will be luddite communities that cling to metaphysical arguments "demonstrating" the irreducibility of mind to matter, much as small numbers of people today still promulgate arguments and theories supporting astrology, alchemy, flat-earthism, geocentrism, creationism, vitalism, the luminiferous ether, etc. The hard problem will technically go unsolved, but practically no one will care. For most it will become categorized as a pesudo-problem that, while nominally interesting, is not worth seriously worrying about, similar to how the problem of solipsism is treated today by practically everyone who is not suffering from schizophrenia, despite the inability of anyone to solve it.

Thank you both for your replies. I have to admit that I'm a bit puzzled by your responses. With regards to noumena, you both seem satisfied with Kant's treatment of them in the Critique. This seems to hinge on his "apophatic" approach, a kind-of "via negativa" that keeps Kant safe from contradiction.

While I don't deny that apophatic treatments have their place within philosophy (and perhaps theology), I'm not sure Kant's appeal works. This is because Kant is not simply denying epistemic access to noumena, he's denying conceptual access. Since all of our claims are mediated by concepts, and since concepts cannot apply to noumena, the implication is that we should not even be capable of making claims about noumena, even just to say that they are the kinds of things about which claims cannot be made. Because in order to utter such a claim, we will have had to have conceptualized noumena, per impossible.

Kant cannot have it both ways. One the one hand he says:

For by no means do I require, nor am I warranted in requiring, cognition of this object of my idea as to what it might be in itself; for I have no concepts for that, and even the concepts of reality, substance, causality, indeed even necessity in existence, lose all meaning and are empty titles for concepts without any content when with them I venture outside the field of sense. — Critique of Pure Reason

And yet all of his talk about noumena necessarily employs concepts. When he claims that they exist, he applies the category of existence. When he claims that they are the cause of phenomena, he applies the category of causality. When he claims that they are not in space or time, he applies the category of negation. Even when he claims that the categories cannot apply to noumena he applies the category of possibility and/or necessity!

The medievals ran into similar problems when making claims about God, but whereas they worked out sophisticated theories of analogy in order to deal with it, Kant hardly bothers to acknowledge that there's a problem. Kant's claim that we must postulate noumena in order that our appearances be appearances of something should have been a clue that he had made a false assumption somewhere along the way.

Again, I think this goes back to his faulty concept of representation/appearance. For what is the meaning of saying that we can know only the appearances? How should we know that they are appearances if we have no means of comparing them against what they are appearances of? The very concepts of appearance and representation seem to demand that we have some positive conception of what it is that appears or what it is that is thereby represented.

Anyway, I apologize for the length of this post, but I really don't see how Kant's appeal to a "purely negative" conception of noumena saves him from contradiction, and I'm tempted to say that his concept of representation is downright incoherent, though I'm not as certain about that.

Now, you guys may say that I've still failed to convince, and that's fine. We can leave it at that.

Obviously, I don't agree with your interpretation of Kant, but there is no point wasting time and energy repeating myself. — Janus

Ok. I mean, I've tried to back up my interpretation with textual evidence and reasoned argument. I'd be happy to discuss it further with you, but if we've reached in impasse then I'll let it go.

I think I accidentally replied to both you and Janus in my previous post. Sorry about that. Here are my thoughts on your thoughts...

I can agree with you that Kant's skepticism is ultimately more appropriately rooted in Cartesian skepticism. I agree that Locke's epistemology was, in part, a response to Cartesian epistemology and an attempt to re-establish the primacy of sense perception in the provenance of human knowledge. Basically, Locke tries to play Aristotle to Descartes' Plato, but his efforts go awry, yielding Berkeley and Hume. Kant wanted to save the new science from the skepticism of Hume, while putting the metaphysics of Wolff in it's proper place. He was willing to sacrifice metaphysics in order to save science, but sacrificed both in the process.

I do maintain that Kant uncritically appropriated an opaque conception of representation from his predecessors. At the same time, I can agree that the genealogy of Kant's thought is more complicated than my initial, overly-simplistic analysis allowed for and am willing to acknowledge that entirety of the Kantian corpus does not stand or fall simply on that one point, though I do think it was an avoidable mistake that compromises his system at the foundations. Not compromising it in the sense of introducing an inconsistency, but in ensuring that certain avenues were never open to him, thus forcing him down his tortured path.