• dukkha
    206
    The difference seems intuitively obvious and clear-cut, but when I really examine it, the difference starts to become no difference at all, or at least no knowable difference.

    "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience." — Wikipedia

    So what would be the difference between say your wife (or say any loved one) being a p-zombie, or not being a p-zombie? From your perspective, in terms of your first person experiences with her, there literally can be no difference, or rather no discoverable difference. You literally cannot, in-principle discover whether your wife is a p-zombie or not.

    Now you might say here, well actually what about a machine that could detect the existence of conscious experience in your wives brain. So just imagine here a helmet machine you could place on your wives head, and it could detect the presence (or not) of conscious experience going on. Surely this could prove that your wife is different from a p-zombie?

    But this is not the case, because the helmet would respond in the exact same way to the p-zombie version of your wife. The point here is that p-zombies are indistinguishable from 'normal humans', which means that when a consciousness detecting helmet is places on their heads, it would show the presence of consciousness. There can be no way to detect any difference between your 'normal' wife, and a p-zombie wife.

    My point here in this thread, is that if there really is no detectable difference between p-zombies and normal humans, then what actually is the difference? I can't help but conclude here that humans must actually BE p-zombies. All we have recourse to here is to say that transcendent to all that I can access with my consciousness, there exists a conscious experience that is in some way casually related to my loved one that I have in front of me. And it is the existence or non-existence of this conscious experience that is the difference between my loved one being a p-zombie or not.

    But even here, that " transcendent to all that I can access with my consciousness, there exists a conscious experience that is in some way casually related to my loved one that I have in front of me" is just an idea in my mind about a conscious experience that I am imagining exists out there but still somehow attached to this loved one before me.

    Basically my point is that from my own first person experience, other people are literally p-zombies. The conscious experience that they are supposedly undergoing is just this idea in my own mind that there is a conscious experience somehow within or attached to their bodies.

    And recognizing this, I can choose to either have this idea and attribute consciousness to that person, or not! It is my own mind that attributes consciousness to humans (or animals), and recognizing this I can take it away, or attribute it to other things like (for example) the sun, or the earth (not that I do this).

    The consciousness of things in the world me, exists only insofar as I attribute with my mind/thoughts, consciousness to that thing. Other people are/have consciousness only insofar as I 'see' them as conscious. Insofar as I 'decide' (unconsciously, although I am become more aware of this) that they are conscious by attributing consciousness to them. At no point here does anything close to actual, transcendentally existing to my own experience-world, conscious experience come into the picture. Every being which supposedly conscious entirely is confined within my conscious experience.

    Basically what I am saying is that other people are conscious only insofar as I choose to see them as conscious. They have no consciousness other than this. If I choose not to attribute consciousness to a person, then they aren't conscious, and even if I do attribute consciousness to them (as I do in my everyday life), they still aren't conscious in the way I (used to) think they are - which is that the person before me say is privy to a visual experience of myself when he looks at me, which would continue to exist even when I turn around. Basically that this person is undergoing a conscious experience which exists transcendent to my own. At no point in my life were people ever conscious in this way. People never were conscious like that. For my whole life I've been within my own private world, merely attributing consciousness to things which actually aren't, and attributing in such a strong way that in my everyday life I actually am duped by myself and really see and interact with others as if they were entirely separate conscious beings. This whole time I've just been attributing consciousness to objects of my own conscious experience, not realizing that it's me with my own my mind that's doing this attribution, and then interacting with and experiencing these people as if they're really conscious beings.

    Basically I've lost my mind (or really, discovered the truth but it's madness), realized solipsism has ALWAYS been the case, other humans were never conscious in the way I thought they were and experienced them to be, realized there truly is no difference at all between a p-zombie and a 'normal human', they're literally the same thing, and that basically my own creates my own experience of consciousness existing within things in the world around me (such as humans, some animals (or if I'm on LSD, rocks and chairs ;) )).

    I suppose there is still a question here of whether entirely outside of my own experience of this world and myself - entirely beyond what I can even in principle access, of whether there exists any other conscious experiences (or anything really) aside from this world/self that I exist as. But my thoughts lately have kind of been indifferent. Does it really matter whether there are? It exists beyond what I can in-principle have access to. Why even care? Beyond just the sheer curiosity of knowing, it really doesn't matter to me.
  • Michael
    14k
    My point here in this thread, is that if there really is no detectable difference between p-zombies and normal humans, then what actually is the difference?dukkha

    The difference is the one described in the definition. P-zombies don't have consciousness.

    You seem to go from "I cannot distinguish between p-zombies and conscious people" to "therefore there is no difference". That's an invalid inference. The very hypothesis is that there's an indistinguishable difference. So to attack it you'll need to argue that indistinguishable differences are nonsensical, but I don't see anything like that in your post.
  • dukkha
    206
    The difference is the one described in the definition. P-zombies don't have consciousness.Michael

    So the difference here is that you don't attribute consciousness to p-zombies, whereas you do attribute consciousness to 'normal' people.

    My point is that this really is no difference at all. The only difference here is whetheryou personally attribute consciousness to the person or not. This has nothing to do with actual, transcendentally existing conscious experiences which are somehow in relationship to this person before you. All it is is you basically going "that person over there is conscious, and therefore isn't a p-zombie", and nothing else.

    The only difference here really between a p-zombie and non p-zombie is whether you personally attribute consciousness to that person. Here you might say, "no the difference is whether that person is actually conscious or not, he's not a p-zombie because that person is actually conscious". But my point here is that's just nothing more than you again attributing consciousness to the person. It's inescapable. Non p-zombies are simply nothing more than humans that you personally attribute consciousness to.
  • Michael
    14k
    So the difference here is that you don't attribute consciousness to p-zombies, whereas you do attribute consciousness to 'normal' people.dukkha

    No, the difference is that p-zombies don't have consciousness, and conscious people do. Whether or not I attribute consciousness to a particular person is irrelevant. I could be wrong.
  • dukkha
    206
    No, the difference is that p-zombies don't have consciousness, and conscious people do.Michael

    You can't escape the fact that this is you attributing consciousness. You are here personally saying that x has consciousness.
  • Michael
    14k
    You can't escape the fact that this is you attributing consciousness. You are here personally saying that x has consciousness.dukkha

    I'm defining a p-zombie as something that doesn't have consciousness. That's not the same as claiming that so-and-so doesn't have consciousness.

    And besides, whether or not I attribute consciousness to a thing is irrelevant. You seem to be going from "we attribute consciousness to a thing" to "therefore, there's nothing more to the matter than us attributing consciousness to a thing", and again that's an invalid inference.

    You might as well say that because when I claim "triangles have three sides" I'm breathing then my breathing has something to do with (or even is all there is to) triangles having three sides.
  • tom
    1.5k
    My point is that this really is no difference at all. The only difference here is whetheryou personally attribute consciousness to the person or not. This has nothing to do with actual, transcendentally existing conscious experiences which are somehow in relationship to this person before you. All it is is you basically going "that person over there is conscious, and therefore isn't a p-zombie", and nothing else.dukkha

    I think I could spot a p-zombie. Every creature has to follow an algorithm of some sort, and if the algorithm did not include consciousness, then I suspect some behaviours and capacities would be absent.

    For a start, I don't think p-zombies can create knowledge.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    So the difference here is that you don't attribute consciousness to p-zombies, whereas you do attribute consciousness to 'normal' people.dukkha

    The difference isn't one of attribution. It's a difference of ontological fact.
  • Jamal
    9.1k
    From your perspective, in terms of your first person experiences with her ... You literally cannot, in-principle discover whether your wife is a p-zombie or not.dukkha

    This is the point of the thought experiment.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    The whole problem with the 'p-zombie' is the implausibility of creating such a device. If you asked it a question which involved how it felt about something, or what meant something to it - 'what is the most beautiful/hideous/moving thing you ever saw?' - then obviously it would have to emulate a response that was emotionally convincing. But this is like the Turing Test taken to a far higher level of difficulty. It would have to fake memories, attachments, preferences, and so on - without any basis for such abilities. They would all be simulated.

    So, put another way, how could a device simulate an inner life, in the absence of an actual inner life? What would it take to produce the appearance of a conscious being, in a being that is not actually conscious? What system would do that?

    I suppose one could imagine such a system, but I can easily imagine anti-gravity belts or faster-than-light travel. 'Hey, given anti-gravity belts, imagine how much better transport systems would be!' Yeah, right.
  • Marchesk
    4.6k
    So, put another way, how could a device simulate an inner life, in the absence of an actual inner life? What would it take to produce the appearance of a conscious being, in a being that is not actually conscious? What system would do that?Wayfarer

    A meat suit, since it's a philosophical zombie. I tend to think the argument is incoherent, because it poses problems for meaning. But in it's defense:

    If physicalism is the case, then all behavior is the result of physical processes. There's no need for an inner life.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    If physicalism is the case, then all behavior is the result of physical processes.Marchesk

    But this is precisely what is at issue. In other words, that begs the question. It is precisely the difference between a corpse and a human being: the corpse is indeed 'purely physical', but then, it's a corpse. It's not going to tell you what a nice day it's having.
  • Marchesk
    4.6k
    But this is precisely what is at issue. In other words, that begs the question. It is precisely the difference between a corpse and a human being: the corpse is indeed 'purely physical', but then, it's a corpse. It's not going to tell you what a nice day it's having.Wayfarer

    The reason it doesn't beg the question is because we have neuroscience, biology, chemistry and what not to understand the behavior living systems without referencing consciousness.

    It also makes sense because we're not sure when and if machines cross over into being conscious. If they tell us they're having a nice day, do we take them at their word? Maybe not if it's a phone app, but what if it's an android?

    What if the program is an extremely detailed digital version of us, living that simulated life?
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    The reason it doesn't beg the question is because we have neuroscience, biology, chemistry and what not to understand the behavior living systems without referencing consciousness.Marchesk

    Simply not the case, though. I recall an interview with the director of the massive Brain Research project that Obama initiated - he acknowledged in that interview that the link between mind and brain hasn't been solved, and may not be solved even by the forthcoming project (which I think subsequently stalled over major arguments about research directions).

    Science obviously knows enormous amounts of detail about the brain, but such fundamental problems as the 'subjective unity of perception' remain pretty much as they were (see heading of that name in this paper, which acknowledges the 'hard problem'.)

    we're not sure when and if machines cross over into being conscious.Marchesk

    Ray Kurzweil believes that will happen, but his many critics do not. At this time, I don't believe that any machine possesses any degree or amount of conscious experience whatever, so no amount of addition will address that deficiency, a million times zero is still zero.
  • Real Gone Cat
    346
    At this time, I don't believe that any machine possesses any degree or amount of conscious experience whatever, so no amount of addition will address that deficiency, a million times zero is still zero.Wayfarer

    But even if a machine becomes conscious one day, how would we ever know? A computer might insist all day long that it is a "real live boy", but that could simply be the result of clever programming, so who will believe it? And this is the point of the OP - we judge other minds to exist, extrapolating from our own, but we don't really know.

    I am actually in agreement with your view. This comment you made earlier nicely sums up the problem :

    The whole problem with the 'p-zombie' is the implausibility of creating such a device. If you asked it a question which involved how it felt about something, or what meant something to it - 'what is the most beautiful/hideous/moving thing you ever saw?' - then obviously it would have to emulate a response that was emotionally convincing. But this is like the Turing Test taken to a far higher level of difficulty. It would have to fake memories, attachments, preferences, and so on - without any basis for such abilities. They would all be simulated.

    So, put another way, how could a device simulate an inner life, in the absence of an actual inner life? What would it take to produce the appearance of a conscious being, in a being that is not actually conscious? What system would do that?
    Wayfarer

    The notion of the p-zombie is simply incoherent. The idea of a being who acts just like us but exhibits no consciousness simply does not hold up to scrutiny. The p-zombie is an oxymoron - perhaps with poetic value, but not philosophical.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    The whole problem with the 'p-zombie' is the implausibility of creating such a device.Wayfarer

    The p-zombie argument rests on the idea that creatures physically identical to humans, but with a difference when it comes to whether they have sentience, are conceivable.

    So there's no issue to "how we'd create one." It would be a biological creature physically identical to humans.

    Where I disagree with the p-zombie argument is that I think the idea is incoherent rather than conceivable. That doesn't mean that some folks don't say that it's conceivable, but folks say that all sorts of contradictory things are conceivable, too. Folks might not be thinking about it very clearly, in very much detail, etc.
  • m-theory
    1.1k
    The difference is semantic not analytic.
    P-zombies are not conscious by definition.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k


    I don't think it helps to say that, especially in association with conceivability, however. After all, we could thus say that anything is conceivable, contradictory or not, because we're simply defining it to be so. That pretty much wrecks the idea of conceivability.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    It would be a biological creature physically identical to humans.Terrapin Station

    Humans are 'beings'. To fulfil the definition of 'being' is to have an 'inner life'. The whole discussion is simply an abundant illustration of the intellectual bankruptcy of what passes for 'philosophy' in the American academy.
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    That is pretty much how the zombie argument works.
    P-zombies have no consciousness by definition only.
    It is certainly conceivable that we could define consciousness is such a way that strictly physical humans do not possess it.
    But what that accomplishes remains to be seen.
  • tom
    1.5k
    But even if a machine becomes conscious one day, how would we ever know? A computer might insist all day long that it is a "real live boy", but that could simply be the result of clever programming, so who will believe it? And this is the point of the OP - we judge other minds to exist, extrapolating from our own, but we don't really know.Real Gone Cat

    It is simply not possible to program consciousness prior to understanding it. It will be known that an algorithm is conscious because the principles it instantiates will be known and understood.

    The notion of the p-zombie is simply incoherent. The idea of a being who acts just like us but exhibits no consciousness simply does not hold up to scrutiny. The p-zombie is an oxymoron - perhaps with poetic value, but not philosophical.Real Gone Cat

    I agree. I think a p-zombie would be easy to spot. A p-zombie may look like a human, but its behaviour would be quite different.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    The whole discussion is simply an abundant illustration of the intellectual bankruptcy of what passes for 'philosophy' in the American academy.Wayfarer

    That it's at all taken seriously is a good illustration of that, yes. Hey, we agree on something. ;-)
  • Michael
    14k
    A p-zombie may look like a human, but its behaviour would be quite different.tom

    Then it wouldn't be a p-zombie.
  • Real Gone Cat
    346
    Where I disagree with the p-zombie argument is that I think the idea is incoherent rather than conceivable.Terrapin Station

    Is it possible for a concept to be incoherent yet conceivable? Can you give examples?
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    Is it possible for a concept to be incoherent yet conceivable?Real Gone Cat

    Not "incoherent yet conceivable." "Incoherent rather than conceivable."
  • Real Gone Cat
    346


    What is the distinction? If a concept is incoherent can it be conceived?
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k


    "x yet y" --means that something is x, but still it's y too.

    "x rather than y"-- something is x instead of y. In other words, it's not y at all. It's just x.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    If a concept is incoherent can it be conceived?Real Gone Cat

    Escher's_Relativity.jpg
  • Real Gone Cat
    346


    So can something be incoherent, but still conceivable? Concept A is known to be incoherent - can concept A be conceivable?
  • Real Gone Cat
    346


    But can we take in the entire picture, or just focus on its parts?

    Can you see the duck and the rabbit simultaneously?
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    So can something be incoherent, but still conceivable?Real Gone Cat

    Man, this can't be this difficult for you.

    "Rather than" is the same as "instead of." Do you understand that?
bold
italic
underline
strike
code
quote
ulist
image
url
mention
reveal
youtube
tweet
Add a Comment

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.