• Whelan
    5
    In order to preserve the possibility of ethical disagreement, it seems to me that we must distinguish between two concepts which might go under the word “good” – the first-order and second-order concepts of good.

    The first order concept of good is the concept we use when making moral judgements in our everyday lives. Unless one is perhaps a moral philosopher or a fundamentalist theist, most people lack a clearly articulated theory about what it is that makes something good or bad. Nonetheless, it isn’t the case that such people take good to be merely the collection of things (character traits, actions, states of affairs) that they take to be good. That would seem both circular and psychologically difficult to maintain, given that we crave ‘reasons’ for our ethical judgements. Instead, we have a complex, disorderly and often inconsistent set of theories, rules, intuitions, convictions and instincts regarding what makes something good – we might call this a largely implicit normative ‘theory’.

    But if this were the only concept of 'good', it seems that moral disagreement would not be possible, since apparently conflicting propositions regarding what it ‘good’ would in fact be employing different concepts. But genuine moral disagreement does seem possible. In such situations, I'd suggest, we fall back on a second order concept of good. But what is this concept? Is it the concept which contains its first order ‘specifications’? That is, the concept of the set of first-order conceptions of goodness? This would make sort of sense of why we might care about it - we do so because we care about those first order conceptions, and wish ours to prevail. But this is fails to respect disagreement since everything both parties to the ‘dispute’ approve of becomes ‘good’ (insofar as both parties have a first order conceptions of good)!

    It is tempting to think of it as something like ‘that which should earn our highest approval’ (and conversely for ‘bad’). This definition narrowly skirts circularity, but at the risk of making unjustifiably exclusionary substantive claims (a sort of response-dependent ethics, or subjectivism) – thereby also failing to respect moral disagreement.

    Perhaps, then, it is primitive, as Moore thought. It is the bedrock concept in the domain of ethics which is unanalysable but which we cannot do without; to everyone competent with the discourse its meaning is immediately obvious, and its being understood is a precondition for participation within it.

    Primitivising the second-order concept seems like a reasonable possibility, simply because I can't think of plausible ways to analyse it, or do without it... Thoughts or suggestions of literature etc. which address this issue (I haven't seen any discussions of it, at least framed this way)?
  • zookeeper
    73
    I can't tell what half of that is saying. Need an example.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    Why wouldn't "ethical good/bad is an individual's preferences about interpersonal behavior (behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette)" be sufficient for "preserving moral disagreements"?
  • Whelan
    5
    Terrapin Station, you're quite right that a non-cognitivist can easily explain how disagreement works.

    If the problem I outline for cognitivism is genuine, and primitivism isn't satisfactory for some reason, then you have a further argument here for non-cognitivism.
  • Whelan
    5
    I can't tell what half of that is saying. Need an example.zookeeper

    Okay. Say I'm an anti-natalist environmentalist. I assert that you shouldn't have children and that it is good to remain childless. I have a vague (not explicitly articulated) theory about why this is so, including utilitarian intuitions and principles of moral equality among all animals. My first-order conception of what is good excludes having children.

    You assert that having children is good. You have a vague theory about why this is so, appealing to individual rights or a duty to populate the nation. Your first-order conception of what is good includes having children.

    When we enter into dialogue, if we are using 'good' in these contrasting ways, it seems to me that there can be no disagreement. In using that word, we are referring to different things. Instead, whether we realize it or not, I am suggesting that we are referring to something else - something at a 'higher level' of abstraction. Something like 'whatever really is good (and by the way, my conception is the right one)'*. That way, we are both talking about the same thing. One of us will be right (that having children is good or not).

    * That might be another, slightly different attempt to articulate the second-order concept of good: the moral opinion that we would converge on if we were fully rational and informed, or perhaps that we will converge on at the limit of inquiry (as Pierce might have said). But again, that might be too substantive. I could say that I didn't think that that would constitute good, and so we are again failing to connect.
  • andrewk
    2.1k
    It is correct that most ethical debates are vague. However, that is less often true in places like this than in the general community, because the discussants are more likely to be aware of concepts like premises, deduction, Hume's ought/is distinction, the Euthyphro and other relevant considerations.

    I divide ethical disagreements into two types - disagreements over values and disagreements over methods.

    Disagreements over methods occur when the discussants want the same end but disagree over how it can be achieved. Most political disagreements are of this nature. Both sides want to increase overall utility (material well-being of the population) but they disagree over how it is best achieved - lower or raise taxes? run a deficit or a surplus? open trade or restrict trade? In come cases these disagreements can be resolved, with goodwill on both sides, by careful investigation. But such goodwill is rare in politics and in disciplines like economics, the assumptions are so open to question that there is often no clear correct answer, no matter how carefully one analyses things.

    A classic disagreements over values is the egalitarian vs libertarian one. If A values individual liberty more than material well-being and B has the opposite values, they don't share the same goals, and no amount of logical analysis can reconcile their aspirations. The only available tool is rhetoric, whereby each side tries to win over voters to their values rather than those of their opponent.

    Most public debates are ultimately about one or the other of values or methods. But the confusing nature of public debate is such that it is usually hard to tell which it is. Sometimes its values for some participants and methods for others.
  • Whelan
    5


    I'm very much in agreement with your distinction between methodological vs. evaluative disagreements.

    A classic disagreements over values is the egalitarian vs libertarian one. If A values individual liberty more than material well-being and B has the opposite values, they don't share the same goals, and no amount of logical analysis can reconcile their aspirations. The only available tool is rhetoric, whereby each side tries to win over voters to their values rather than those of their opponent.andrewk

    I wonder how you understand and regard 'rhetoric' in this context. Clearly, at a certain point evaluative arguments cannot be progressed through means-ends reasoning (rationality), since it is ends that are in question. But I think perhaps there is deeper scope for at least quasi-rational discourse in reforming one's sympathies and evaluative judgements (in one direction or reciprocally). What I mean is that one party can awaken sensitivity to certain values in the other by getting them to entertain ideas, scenarios, the position of others etc. This 'awakening' may involve either the 'creation' or 'discovery' of values, though I tend to think the lines here are blurry (at what point do dispositions to feel/act a certain way become reliable enough, and manifest enough, to count as properly held values?). In this way, I think suitably engaged interlocutors can achieve a lot of convergence. I've always been on the optimistic/sentimental side when it comes to such disagreement.

    But this all leaves the main question I raised unaddressed - insofar as evaluative/ethical, cognitive disagreement remains, does a second-order concept ('good' or similar) come into play and what does it consist in?
  • sacso
    1
    I simply feel that the concept of good and bad is over stated. Man is not per-designed with the ability to differentiate between good and bad. We learn and develop a differentiation between good and bad.

    Each person has a different level or degree of good. This happens through learning, observations and experiences in life (because on the contrary there is no other way). Each persons definition of good is a product of his/her personal experiences and learning. This does not freeze and become the way of life, it evolves everyday and with every new experience comes a new learning.

    The concept of good even differs with culture.
  • Stosh
    23
    It is tempting to think of it as something like ‘that which should earn our highest approval’ (and conversely for ‘bad’). This definition narrowly skirts circularity, but at the risk of making unjustifiably exclusionary substantive claims (a sort of response-dependent ethics, or subjectivism) – thereby also failing to respect moral disagreement.Whelan

    I think this is a quick dismissal of a weakly worded position. It presumes that there is a goodness which is not circularly arrived at.
    If one doesn't believe that goodness is a real thing , but rather a attribute which we sometimes apply,, , then there should be no expectation that it would be dis-proven by showing a circularity of logic.
    If its a subjective idea, a sentiment etc , then there is no requirement for its derivation to be 'logical.'
    But anyway , our opinion of what is good , does have an origin, the human condition. It is from this vantage , that good and bad are judged. The 'human condition' of individuals is not identical , and judgements about what it is, that constitutes good , are not identical either.

    The idea that one is somehow forced to accept other persons ideas as having moral imperative equal to ones own, regarding ones own behavior , simply because the subjective basis is the same , is false.

    What I personally feel is wrong may just be my opinion, but I can and will, still judge you according to it, because I see my opinion as fitting my sense of justice. You can disagree all you like , but that isn't going to make me let you off the hook.

    Whole societies decree collectively in the same way, that which it considers to be the social norm, and act on that decree regardless of an individuals deviation- disagreement- from it.
    So this is certainly not an unfeasible perspective , it in fact, happens all the way up and down the social ladder. I am just showing this down at the level of the individual.

    What this understanding does , is inform an individual , me, that I am standing on my own feet morally , without certainty of any backup.
    I am not factually "RIGHT" in some factually provable way, but I am right as I see it , not borrowing or leaning on someone else's endorsement.
    Thinking one is factually right , is what happens when one believes that their sense of morality or goodness , is backed up by a higher power or truth , which cannot be defied.
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